GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 40th District Court of Ellis County
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NUMBER 13-10-406-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ aka WILLIE RODRIGUEZ,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
On appeal from the 40th District Court
of Ellis County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
A jury convicted appellant, Guillermo Rodriguez aka Willie Rodriguez, of assault
on a public servant, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1),
(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2010). After finding that appellant had two prior felony convictions,
the jury assessed punishment at thirty years‟ imprisonment. By two issues, appellant
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning of July 9, 2009, Debra Murray, an Ellis County Sheriff‟s
Department dispatcher, received a 9-1-1 call from Kandice Lemley, who said she was at
“the domes in Italy [Texas]” and that “Willie” was “yanking on her and throwing beer
bottles at her and chasing her.” Murray dispatched several law enforcement officers to
the scene, including Officer Chris Bentley and his partner, Officer Mike Adams.
Officer Bentley, a police officer with the City of Italy Police Department, testified
that when he and Officer Adams arrived at the scene, they talked to Lemley, who told
them appellant had “gone into his dome,” which Officer Bentley described as an efficiency
apartment.
After Officer Adams pounded several times on appellant‟s front door,
appellant came out and told Officers Bentley and Adams that he had thrown beer bottles
at Lemley. Officer Adams tried to arrest appellant, but he “pushed away from” Officer
Adams and tried to go back into his dome.
Appellant, who appeared intoxicated,
struggled with the officers, and they had to pepper spray him in order to handcuff his
hands behind his back.
At that time, Officer Chin parked his police car outside
appellant‟s dome. As Officers Bentley and Adams escorted appellant to Officer Chin‟s
car, appellant told them he was not going to jail and kicked the door of Officer Chin‟s car,
putting a dent in the door. Officer Bentley testified appellant‟s act of kicking the door
“knocked us off balance and we all fell.” He stated that when they fell, “my left elbow
being in his [appellant‟s] back, it hit the concrete. We all fell on it.” When the prosecutor
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asked him, “[W]hen your elbow hit the ground, did it cause you pain?”, he replied, “Yes,
sir,” and said that “[i]t was a lot of pain . . . not only was it hurt, everyone was laying on it
and I couldn‟t get it out. It was pinned down.” After Officers Chin and Adams put
appellant into the police car, appellant “started beating his head against the window.”
While Officer Bentley was still at the scene, paramedics gave him an ice pack to
put on his elbow. At the hospital, Officer Bentley learned that there “could be” a small
cracked bone in his elbow.
Officer Bentley testified that at the time he injured his elbow, he was wearing “a
distinctive uniform of the Italy Police Department.” He stated that the uniform was a
“Class B uniform,” meaning “[i]t is a little more flexible. It has cargo pockets on the pants.
It has police across the back. It has a sewn on badge opposed to it being pinned on.”
He stated the badge is “clearly visible” and that he had “[p]atches on both arms. . . .” He
also testified he was driving “a marked police vehicle. It has police on both sides of it. It
has a light bar on it” that was “activated.” He explained that Officer Chin‟s police car was
a “marked vehicle” that had “an in-window lighting system that is not out on the outside.
It‟s marked police in red on the side.”
On cross-examination, Officer Bentley testified that “[a]s he [appellant] was falling
from kicking the door, it forced me to the ground.” He stated that “[w]hen he [appellant]
fell, my arm was inside his arm, and when he fell, it pulled me to the ground.”
On re-direct-examination, when the prosecutor asked Officer Bentley, “Why did
you-all fall?”, he said, “Because he kicked the door so hard that it knocked him off balance
and it knocked us off balance.” After this response, the prosecutor asked, “And pushed
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you?” He said, “And pushed us to the ground.” When the prosecutor asked him, “You
fell because he kicked the door, pushed in to both you and Officer Adams and down
everybody went?”, he said, “Yes, sir.” Next, the prosecutor asked him, “And as he went
down, he pulled you down as well?” To this, he said, “Yes, sir.”
Appellant testified that on the evening in question, Lemley came to his residence
and drank two beers. At that time, she asked him for money so she could pay her rent.
When he told her he did not have any money to give her, she left. He testified he “had a
few beers after she left, but I wasn‟t intoxicated.” He stated he did not throw beer bottles
at Lemley, and he said he did not tell Officer Bentley that he had thrown beer bottles at
her.
Appellant testified that when he opened his front door, “they rushed in and grabbed
me and started trying to pull me out.” He said that “they pushed me to the car and all this
time they tried to rush my head into the . . . cop car.” He said that after they put him in
handcuffs, “and . . . after they tried to run my head into the . . . cop car, I put my foot to stop
them from running my head. . . .” He explained that “[I] put my foot up so I wouldn‟t . . . hit
my head. And then . . . that‟s when they . . . threw me to the ground.
And we all three
fell, but he did not fall up under me because I fell up under my wrist, on my arm. . . .”
When defense counsel asked appellant, “What, in fact, to your knowledge, what made the
dent in the car?”, he said, “[P]robably when I put my . . . foot up there to stop them from .
. . running my head into it.” However, he also stated, “It wasn‟t . . . dented when I . . . left,
when they put me in there. I couldn‟t have done that big old dent.” When defense
counsel asked him if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to
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[Officer] Bentley?”, he said, “No, sir.” When asked if he had “push[ed] or pull[ed]” Officer
Bentley to the ground, he said, “No, sir.”
On cross-examination, appellant testified he did not know that Officer Bentley was
a police officer, and he did not know when Officer Bentley received his injury. He
testified he was not handcuffed when the officers took him to the police car and that
“[t]hey were running [him] head first into the car[.]” When he put his foot up to stop them,
“[e]verybody went to the ground[.]” Afterwards, the officers handcuffed him and then
pepper sprayed him.
II. DISCUSSION
In issue one, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction for assault on a public servant. In issue two, he argues the evidence is
factually insufficient to support his conviction for assault on a public servant. We review
his sufficiency complaints under only the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
A. Standard of Review
“When conducting a legal sufficiency review, a court must ask whether „any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt‟—not whether „it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19) (emphasis in original). “In doing so, we
assess all of the evidence „in the light most favorable to the prosecution.‟” Id. (quoting
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Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “After giving proper deference to the fact finder‟s role, we will
uphold the verdict unless a rational fact finder must have had reasonable doubt as to any
essential element.” Id. at 518. We must presume that the fact finder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 326.
1. Applicable Law
Our review of a legal sufficiency challenge should be examined under the
principles of review for a hypothetically correct jury charge. Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d
273, 280-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “„Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the
law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State‟s burden
of proof, or unnecessarily restrict the State‟s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.‟” Villarreal v. State,
286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234,
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
To prove the offense of assault on a public servant, the State must prove that: (1)
appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Officer Bentley; (2)
Officer Bentley was a public servant; (3) appellant knew Officer Bentley was a public
servant; and (4) Officer Bentley was lawfully discharging his official duties at the time of
the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1); Chadwick v. State, 277 S.W.3d
99, 105 (Tex. App.−Austin 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010); see also Hall v. State, 158 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Bodily
injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. §
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1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2010). In this case, the charge stated, in relevant part, that the
jury could convict appellant of assault on a public servant if it found “from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about July 9, 2009, . . . [appellant] did intentionally
or knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to Chris Bentley by pushing or pulling him to
the ground, and the defendant did then and there know that the said Chris Bentley was
then and there a public servant, to-wit: a peace officer, and that the said Chris Bentley
was then and there lawfully discharging an official duty, to-wit:
arresting the said
[appellant]. . . .”
2. Analysis
In this case, a rational jury could have determined the following from the evidence:
(1) Officer Bentley testified that appellant “pulled me to the ground” and “pushed us to
the ground” when appellant kicked the door of the police car; (2) when appellant pulled
Officer Bentley to the ground, he caused physical pain to Officer Bentley; (3) at the time of
the assault, Officer Bentley was on duty as a City of Italy police officer, who was engaged
in the lawful discharge of an official duty of arresting appellant; (4) that at the time of the
assault, Officer Bentley was in uniform and wearing a badge; and (5) appellant was aware
Officer Bentley was a police officer. To the extent that Officer Bentley‟s testimony
conflicted with appellant‟s testimony, it was within the jury‟s province to resolve the
conflicts. See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction for assault on a public servant
beyond a reasonable doubt. Issues one and two are overruled.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court‟s judgment.
ROSE VELA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 3rd
day of February, 2011.
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