JOHN A. GRAVES v. RICHARD L. MANSKE, ET AL.--Appeal from 130th District Court of Matagorda County

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NUMBER 13-05-742-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JOHN A. GRAVES, Appellant,
v.

RICHARD L. MANSKE, ET AL., Appellees.

 
On appeal from the 130th District Court
of Matagorda County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Ya ez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

 

Appellant, John A. Graves, a prison inmate, appeals pro se from the dismissal of his claims against Richard L. Manske. (1) By three issues, appellant generally contends that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the suit with prejudice pursuant to chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14.001-.014 (Vernon 2002). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

"A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure." Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); see Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) (providing that litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel); cf. Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (concluding that "[a] pro se inmate's petition should be viewed with liberality and patience and is not held to the stringent standards applied to formal pleadings drafted by attorneys."). Therefore, "[o]n appeal, as at trial, the pro se appellant must properly present its case." Green, 152 S.W.3d at 841.

In a civil case, this Court will accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). Appellees have filed no brief in this appeal. Therefore, they have not contradicted the facts presented by appellant. However, the rules of appellate procedure require that an appellant's brief contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Id. at rule 38.1(h). In this case, appellant presents only general arguments for his contentions made, arguments that are neither clear nor concise. Furthermore, appellant has provided no record cites to support the facts, if any, stated therein.

We have little latitude on appeal and can neither remedy deficiencies in a litigant's brief nor supply an adequate record. Green, 152 S.W.3d at 841 (citing Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678). And we have no duty to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained of occurred. See id. Because appellant failed to adequately brief his issues on appeal, he has presented nothing for our review. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

Moreover, at the dismissal hearing appellant informed the trial court that although he filed this suit as a civil suit, he did not desire to bring a civil cause against any person or entity. Rather, he desired to file a criminal complaint. Based on this representation, the trial court concluded that the civil proceeding was frivolous and dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant contends that the trial court's "choice" to dismiss his suit with prejudice prevented him from amending his suit or from refiling his civil suit following the criminal prosecution. However, these arguments were not made to the trial court, and the assertions that he wished to refile the suit following the criminal proceeding or to amend his pleadings are not supported by the record. The record does, however, support the following finding included in the trial court's order dismissing appellant's cause:

During the hearing, [appellant] stated to the [c]ourt that he did not desire to bring a civil cause against any person or entity, and that he desired to file, and has in fact filed a criminal complaint against one or more parties named as [d]efendant in the . . . [o]riginal [p]etition . . . .

 

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant's claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2002). We overrule appellant's issues on appeal.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

 

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 2nd day of November, 2006.

 

1. Appellant filed his "Motion for Original Petition" asserting claims of theft and organized criminal activity against the following defendants: Richard L. Manske; Peggy T. Manske; the law firm of Manske & Manske; Mary Joe Berry; Dennis D. Morgan; Leland M. [sic]; Chad P. Ellis; Sunset Bank & Trust Company (SBTC); James Gilbeau, Jr., president of SBTC; Don W. Oliver, ex-president of SBTC; Jack Patin, loan officer of SBTC; L. Brent Vidrine, officer of SBTC and notary public; Mary N. Janise, officer of SBTC and notary public; Carl M. Duhon, attorney for SBTC; RUSH & RUSH law firm; Warren Rush, attorney for SBTC; Judy M. Burleigh; Patricia M. Lemaire; Bay City Abstract; Stewart Title Company; Daniel E. Hayes; John C. Masher; Law Firm of Delange Hudspeth; Michael R. Tibbits; Town of Sunset, LA; Bull & Daigle Law Corporation; Thomas M. Daigle; Williams Bryan Bull; and other defendants.

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