RALPH VALDEZ GARCIA v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from County Court at Law of Aransas County

 NUMBER 13-05-480-CR

 COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

RALPH VALDEZ GARCIA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court at Law of Aransas County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Hinojosa, Ya ez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ya ez

On June 23, 2005, a jury found appellant guilty of resisting arrest.[1] The trial court assessed his punishment at a $1000 fine and $266 in court costs. By one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict based upon the State=s failure to prove the element of venue. We affirm.

Facts

On February 10, 2005, appellant was charged with resisting arrest. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred in Aransas County. During the June 22, 2005 trial, Rolando Barrientos, the State=s only witness, testified that he was commissioned by the Aransas County Sheriff=s Department and that he was dispatched on February 10, 2005, to the scene of the alleged offense. However, he never explicitly testified that the offense occurred in Aransas County. Prior to the jury=s retirement, appellant=s trial counsel moved for a directed verdict on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the venue element of the charged offense. The court denied appellant=s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury subsequently found appellant guilty of resisting arrest. On July 18, 2005, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

Issue on Appeal

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to prove the element of venue in the county of prosecution.

Analysis

Venue in a criminal case need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.[2] Venue can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.[3] Venue is sufficient if the jury may reasonably conclude from the evidence that the offense was committed in the county alleged.[4] Courts of appeals must presume that venue was proven in the trial court, unless it was disputed during the trial or the record affirmatively shows the contrary.[5]

A challenge to the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.[6] When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence of venue, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the venue proper by a preponderance of the evidence.[7] If a rational juror could have found that venue was proper by a preponderance of the evidence, we must affirm.[8]

The State is required to prove that the prosecution is being brought in the proper venue.[9] Article 13.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that A[i]f venue is not specifically stated, the proper county for the prosecution of offenses is that in which the offense was committed.@[10]

In this case, Officer Barrientos testified that he was employed by the Aransas County Sheriff=s Office and was on patrol on the date of the offense. He further testified that he received a dispatch call while Aon the north side of the county. . . approximately about a mile and a half, two miles near Cavasso Creek on 35.@ Officer Barrientos also confirmed that he encountered appellant and attempted to arrest him at or near the location where he was dispatched. Specifically, he testified that the location was 1002 West Market, which is inside Aransas County. Although direct testimony did not establish venue, sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented for the jury to reasonably infer that the offense occurred within Aransas County.[11] Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant=s motion for a directed verdict. Appellant=s issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Because we have overruled appellant=s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

LINDA REYNA YA EZ, Justice

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed

this the 27th day of July, 2006.

[1] See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 38.03 (Vernon 2003).

[2] See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.17 (Vernon 2005); Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

[3] See Black, 645 S.W.2d at 790.

[4] See Rippee v. State, 384 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); Sudds v. State, 140 S.W.3d 813, 816 19 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

[5] See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(c)(1).

[6] See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005);Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Perales v. State, 117 S.W.3d 434, 443 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

[7] See Lemoine v. State, 85 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).

[8] See id.

[9] See Sudds, 140 S.W.3d at 816.

[10] See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13.18 (Vernon 2005).

[11] See Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd).