Daniel Gilberto Juarez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 139th District Court of Hidalgo County

NUMBER 13-02-186-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

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DANIEL GILBERTO JUAREZ, Appellant,

 
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

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On appeal from the 139th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellant, Daniel Gilberto Juarez, was found guilty of reckless injury to a child. The trial court assessed his punishment at eighteen months in a state jail facility. Juarez complains the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial and he contends the State failed to meet its burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

This is a memorandum opinion not designated for publication. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b), 47.4. The parties are familiar with the facts and we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See id. Rule 47.4.

By his first issue, Juarez contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. However, his argument does not address this contention. See id. Rule 38.1(h). Rather, appellant's argument relates to the granting of a new trial under appellate rule 21.3(f). See id. Rule 21.3(f). In the interest of justice, we will address appellant's argument that the trial court erred in nor granting a new trial.

We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). "The defendant must be granted a new trial . . . when, after retiring to deliberate, the jury has received other evidence." Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(f). However, in order for a new trial to be mandated, the appellant must establish that: (1) the jury received the other evidence; and (2) the other evidence was adverse or detrimental. See Bustamante v. State, No. 74,079, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 103, at *14 (June 4, 2003); Gibson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). In determining whether evidence was received by the jury, a court may consider how extensively the evidence was examined by the jury and whether the jury was given an instruction to disregard. Bustamante, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS, *14.

In the case at bar, the other evidence at issue is the State's worksheet containing a checklist of the elements of appellant's crime. The worksheet had not been admitted into evidence, but mistakenly ended up in the packet of exhibits given to the jury to use in their deliberations. Although the worksheet was in the possession of the jury for approximately three and one-half hours, it is apparent the jury extensively examined the worksheet. The jury put pencil marks on the worksheet, checking off each individual element and circling one particular element of the crime. See Gibson, 29 S.W.3d at 224 ("There must be something in the record to indicate the jury viewed the contents of the document and received the information it contained."). Because the jury extensively examined the State's worksheet, we find other evidence was received by the jury. See Bustamante, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS, *14; see also Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(f).

In determining whether the other evidence was adverse or detrimental to appellant, the controlling factor is the character of the evidence in light of the issue before the jury, not its actual effect on the jury. See Garza v. State, 630 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Reed v. State, 841 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd).

In order to have a fair trial, the jury must decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial. See Robinson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 216, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In this instance, the worksheet in question was an exact copy of a chart that was shown to the jury during voir dire and throughout the trial. The difference between the chart used during the trial and the worksheet was that State's counsel added a listing of the State's exhibits at the bottom of the worksheet. In most cases, other evidence admitted contains new information that is adverse or detrimental to the defendant because it was not admitted during the trial. See In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. 1998) (jury found marijuana cigarette in pocket of defendant's jacket); Gibson, 29 S.W.3d at 224 (full police report accidentally included with evidence when sent to jury); Carroll v. State, 990 S.W.2d 761, 761-62 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (mug shot pictures, not admitted into evidence during trial, but indicative of previous conviction, sent to jury among exhibits). We do not believe that the State's worksheet, containing a checklist of the elements of appellant's crime, which was viewed throughout the trial but not admitted into evidence, was of such character to be adverse or detrimental to appellant during jury deliberations. See Garza, 630 S.W.2d at 274; Reed, 841 S.W.2d at 59. Thus, because the other evidence received by the jury was not detrimental or adverse to appellant, see Bustamante, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 103, at *14; Gibson, 29 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for new trial. See Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7. Appellant's first issue is overruled.

By his second issue, appellant contends the State failed to meet its burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

When a defendant claims self-defense, the State has a burden of persuasion to disprove the evidence of self-defense. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Hull v. State, 871 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). However, that is not a burden of production; the State is not required to affirmatively produce evidence that refutes the self-defense claim. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913; Hull, 871 S.W.2d at 789. This burden of persuasion is simply a burden on the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913; Hull, 871 S.W.2d at 789. There is no burden on the State to disprove the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913; Hull, 871 S.W.2d at 789. Therefore, appellant's second issue is overruled.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

 

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

Opinion delivered and filed

this 18th day of July, 2003.