Eagle Pass Independent School District v. Margaret Woolworth; Central Education Agency; and Mike Moses, in his Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas--Appeal from 53rd District Court of Travis County

Eagle Pass v. Woolworth TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-95-00656-CV
Eagle Pass Independent School District, Appellant
v.
Margaret Woolworth; Central Education Agency; and Mike Moses, in his Official
Capacity as the Commissioner of Education for the State of Texas, Appellees
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 94-11195, HONORABLE PAUL R. DAVIS, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

This is an appeal from a district court judgment in a continuing contract teacher termination case. (1) Appellant Eagle Pass Independent School District's Board of Trustees (the "Board") voted to terminate its teacher, appellee Margaret Woolworth. She appealed to the Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner") who reversed the Board's decision. Eagle Pass then sued in district court for judicial review of the Commissioner's order. (2) The district court upheld the Commissioner's decision. On appeal to this Court, Eagle Pass complains that the district court erred in affirming the Commissioner because he applied the incorrect standard of review. We will reverse the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Margaret Woolworth was employed as an elementary school teacher under a continuing contract with Eagle Pass Independent School District during the 1990-91 school year. See Former Educ. Code 13.107, .109. Parents of four of Woolworth's students complained that she had classroom discipline problems, made inappropriate remarks to their children, used abusive language, and engaged in improper classroom conduct. The charges included that she scratched and pushed students; threw erasers and a pencil at students; exposed herself to them when sitting; told students that she had a right to kill them; called students demeaning names; and refused to allow students to use the restroom when necessary. No one at the District talked directly to the four students to evaluate the truthfulness of their accusations but officials did confer with their families; Woolworth was not included in these discussions. The Eagle Pass superintendent proposed to the Board that Woolworth's employment be terminated. The Board notified Woolworth in writing that it proposed to terminate her employment (1) due to her physical and mental incapacity that prevented her performing her contract and (2) for good cause based on her failure to meet generally accepted standards of conduct for teachers by violating seven enumerated principles in the Code of Ethics and Standard Practices for Texas Educators. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code 177.1 (West 1997) (Teachers' Professional Practices Comm'n, Standards, Ethics, and Practices). Woolworth requested a hearing at which she appeared with a teacher representative and challenged the accusations. The four students who had complained did not testify; the information was presented by their parents or other relatives and school officials. (3) At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Board voted to discharge Woolworth.

Woolworth appealed the Board's decision to the Commissioner claiming the Board violated numerous provisions of the Texas Education Code and that she was not guilty of the alleged actions. See Former Tex. Educ. Code 13.115(a). The Commissioner held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of her discharge, deciding the appeal by de novo review. (4) The written record of the Board's hearing was introduced before the Commissioner. In addition, the Commissioner received extensive evidence not considered by the Board such as: (1) videotaped depositions of teachers, a teacher's aide, and the four students taken after the Board's hearing; (2) live testimony from Woolworth, a child psychologist, and an Eagle Pass principal; and (3) documentation regarding Woolworth's employment, class notes, lesson plans, and newspaper articles. The Commissioner made findings of fact based upon a preponderance of the evidence he received, finding for example that the students' accusations were unproven, distorted, or false; that the Board had failed to advise Woolworth of sufficient factual detail of the grounds for seeking her termination; that no mental or physical incapacity prevented Woolworth from performing her contract; and that she did not fail to meet accepted standards of professional conduct. Based upon these findings of fact, the Commissioner concluded the notice given Woolworth and the hearing afforded her violated Woolworth's procedural due process rights, and that the Board lacked good cause to terminate her contract. The Commissioner did not order a new hearing but instead ordered Eagle Pass to reinstate Woolworth.

Both Eagle Pass and Woolworth sought judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision in district court. (5) The district court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. Eagle Pass appealed to this Court and challenged the Commissioner's decision on the ground that the Commissioner applied the wrong standard of review in reviewing Eagle Pass's termination of Woolworth.

 
DISCUSSION

Eagle Pass asserts in a single point of error that the trial court erred in affirming the Commissioner's decision because in conducting his hearing, the Commissioner applied the incorrect standard of review. The Commissioner does not dispute that in overturning her discharge he exercised his own discretion and judgment, assessed the weight and credibility of the evidence, and made factual determinations based upon a preponderance of the evidence he received.

Woolworth's appeal to the Commissioner was governed by former section 13.115(a) of the Texas Education Code because she was under a continuing contract and was terminated during the school year. See Former Educ. Code. Ann. 13.107, 109, .115(a). Although former section 13.115(a) fails to specify the manner and scope of review by the Commissioner, this Court recently held that the Commissioner's review is governed by the substantial evidence rule. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 933 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, writ denied).

In a substantial evidence review, the reviewing tribunal may not re-weigh the evidence, find facts, or substitute its judgment for that of the original tribunal. Id. at 751 n.5 (citing Central Educ. Agency v. Upshur County Commr's Court, 731 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. 1987)). In this case, the Commissioner received new evidence, evaluated the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, determined the weight to be given to the witnesses' testimony and the documentary evidence, and substituted his judgment for that of the Board. The Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority by failing to conduct a substantial evidence review. We, therefore, sustain Eagle Pass's point of error. (6)

CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court's judgment and remand the cause to the Commissioner for review of the Board's decision under the substantial evidence rule.

 

Marilyn Aboussie, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Jones

Reversed and Remanded

Filed: July 24, 1997

Do Not Publish

1. Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 745, 7(g), 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2012, 2016, amended by Act of May 20, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 405, 2, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 1449 (codified at Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 13.001 et seq., since repealed and recodified as Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 21.001 et seq. (West 1996)). Because the relevant provisions were amended by the 74th legislature, all cites will be to the former code ("Former Educ. Code").

2. See Former Educ. Code 13.115(c).

3. The only procedural complaint Woolworth raised before the Board was that the district had not provided her every annual evaluation but only her evaluations for the past three years and had not provided her with all grievances she had filed but only the ones filed since the 1989-90 school year. During the hearing she objected to a psychologist's report but the record does not reflect her reason, it was not admitted in evidence, and the psychologist did not testify. She also argued that her due process rights had been violated by not attempting to resolve matters at the lowest level by including her in conferences concerning the complaints.

4. For the first time, Woolworth complained in her pleadings to the Commissioner that the written notice she received was insufficient and denied her procedural due process of law because it did not provide her factual detail of the names of witnesses and the nature of their testimony against her. The record of the Board's hearing contains pre-hearing correspondence including a long list furnished to her of witnesses and a summary of their proposed testimony.

5. Eagle Pass claimed that the Commissioner (1) exceeded his authority and acted arbitrarily by substituting his judgment for that of the local board and (2) based his decision on unlawful procedure, because he erroneously conducted a de novo review of the Board's decision. Woolworth claimed that the Commissioner erred in not awarding backpay.

6. The Commissioner argues in the alternative that, even if he applied the wrong standard of review, the judgment must be upheld because his legal conclusion is unchallenged on appeal that the notice given Woolworth and the hearing afforded her violated her procedural due process rights. We disagree. Woolworth never complained to the Board that the written notice she received was deficient; the Commissioner made no finding that the written notice and subsequent notices given her did not satisfy the statute or were inadequate. The Commissioner emphasized that before the Board's hearing no one at the District talked to the four accusing students, Woolworth was not given the opportunity to confront the four students, and the Board made its decision without benefit of their testimony, while he gave great weight to the students' video depositions from which he was able to judge their credibility. He found from a preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing that the District failed to advise Woolworth of the grounds for seeking her termination in sufficient factual detail to fairly enable her to show any error that might exist. He thereby concluded that the notice and hearing violated her procedural due process rights. The Commissioner's decision makes clear that his conclusion turns upon the scope of review he employed: the findings that support his conclusion he determined from a preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing, based upon his judgment as to credibility of witnesses and the weight he ascribed to the evidence.

stimony and the documentary evidence, and substituted his judgment for that of the Board. The Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority by failing to conduct a substantial evidence review. We, therefore, sustain Eagle Pass's point of error. (6)CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court's judgment and remand the cause to the Commissioner for review of the Board's decision under the substantial evidence rule.

 

Marilyn Aboussie, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Jones

Reversed and Remanded

Filed: July 24, 1997

Do Not Publish

1. Act of May 27