John Thibodeaux v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company--Appeal from 345th District Court of Travis County

Thibodeaux v. Lumbermens TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-93-00580-CV
John Thibodeaux, Appellant
v.
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 488,167, HONORABLE MARY PEARL WILLIAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

 

This appeal arises from a workers' compensation suit. Appellee Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company sued appellant John Thibodeaux to set aside an award of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission. (1) Thibodeaux cross-petitioned to mature the award, alleging that his award had become final and that he had received no payment. The trial court denied Thibodeaux' petition to mature the award and, after a jury found that Thibodeaux was not injured in the course of employment, rendered judgment for Lumbermens. Thibodeaux challenges the denial of his petition to mature the award by a single point of error. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Thibodeaux argues in his sole point of error that the trial court never obtained jurisdiction of Lumbermens' suit because Lumbermens' request that Thibodeaux' counsel answer its suit did not justify Lumbermens' delay in causing citation to issue. The statute governing Lumbermens' suit to set aside the Commission's award required it to notify the Commission of its suit within twenty days of the Commission's decision and to "bring suit" in a court of competent jurisdiction within twenty days of giving notice. Act of May 23, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 412, 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1113 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307, 5, since repealed and codified at Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 410.251-.254 (West Supp. 1995)) ("art. 8307, 5"). The statute also required Lumbermens to "institute and prosecute" its suit within the twenty days following notice. Id.

Courts adjudicating suits to set aside Commission awards have held that the words "institute and prosecute" in article 8307, section 5, mean the same as the words "bring suit." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jones, 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. 1937); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgm't adopted); Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Cook, 834 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Filing a petition within twenty days of notice with the bona fide intent that citation will issue and be served at once or that a waiver of citation will be obtained and filed at once is all that the statute requires. Jones, 104 S.W.2d at 849; May, 15 S.W.2d at 597; Cook, 834 S.W.2d at 121.

The twenty-day period to bring suit is jurisdictional. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. 1979). Because the statute concerns jurisdiction and not limitations, the due-diligence requirements of a statute of limitations do not apply. Jones, 104 S.W.2d at 849; Cook, 834 S.W.2d at 121.

The Commission made its award to Thibodeaux on July 25, 1990. Lumbermens notified the Commission of its intent to sue on August 14 and filed suit on July 26, 1990. Counsel for Lumbermens, Dana McClaren, instructed the clerk in her letter accompanying the petition that issuance and service of citation were not then required. On the day she filed suit, McClaren called counsel for Thibodeaux, Jack Eisenberg, to ask whether he would accept service of process on Thibodeaux' behalf. Eisenberg replied that he would ask Thibodeaux and let McClaren know. McClaren followed the phone call with a letter to Eisenberg dated August 2, in which she enclosed a copy of the petition and inquired whether Eisenberg would agree to accept service of the petition and file an answer on behalf of Thibodeaux. McClaren concluded the letter by stating that she hoped for an early response from Eisenberg. Not having heard from Eisenberg by August 29, McClaren called his office on that date to determine whether Eisenberg would agree to accept service of process on behalf of Thibodeaux. An office worker told McClaren that the office was continuing to ask Thibodeaux whether he would authorize Eisenberg to accept service and that someone would call her on finding out.

On September 19, McClaren's legal assistant spoke with Eisenberg by phone and asked whether he had contacted Thibodeaux. Eisenberg responded that he had written Thibodeaux but had not yet received an answer. Although Eisenberg stated that he would write Thibodeaux again and contact McClaren's office, the legal assistant never heard from him on the matter. McClaren's legal assistant testified that Eisenberg never refused to waive service of process and never told her to obtain formal service on Thibodeaux.

On October 16, McClaren again telephoned Eisenberg's office to determine whether he would agree to accept service of process. She left word with an office worker, who told her that the office was still checking with Thibodeaux and that someone would let her know his response. To follow up on the phone conversation, McClaren wrote Eisenberg a letter on October 19 requesting him to inform her immediately whether he would file an answer on behalf of Thibodeaux or whether McClaren should have citation served. Eisenberg did not respond to this letter.

McClaren's legal secretary testified that she left messages for Eisenberg three or four times, but that he never responded. When she finally spoke with him on December 17, she asked whether he would accept service of process on Thibodeaux' behalf. Eisenberg said that he had not yet communicated with his client. When the legal secretary stated that McClaren was anxious to move forward with the case, Eisenberg replied that she should have Thibodeaux served.

On December 17, McClaren requested the district clerk to issue citation. She received the issued citation on January 9, 1991, and forwarded it to the Williamson County sheriff for service on January 28. Because Thibodeaux changed his address after he filed his first report of injury, he was not located and served until April 23, 1991.

Thibodeaux bore the burden in the trial court to prove that Lumbermens did not bring suit timely. Following its denial of Thibodeaux' petition to mature the award, the trial court found as a fact that Lumbermens timely filed its petition contesting the award with a bona fide intent that waiver of service or issuance of citation be obtained at once. Thibodeaux attacks this finding on appeal.

Based on Thibodeaux' burden of proof at trial and the language of his argument, we construe Thibodeaux' point of error to assert that he established as a matter of law that Lumbermens did not file its petition timely with the bona fide intent that issuance or waiver of citation be obtained at once. See O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976). To determine Thibodeaux' matter-of-law challenge, we first examine the evidence in support of the trial court's adverse finding, ignoring any contrary evidence. If no evidence supports the adverse finding, we then examine the entire record to see if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

Lumbermens filed its petition within twenty days of giving notice. That on filing suit Lumbermens instructed the clerk not to issue citation does not prove that Lumbermens failed to bring suit timely. E.g., Jones, 104 S.W.2d at 848-49; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 88 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1935, writ ref'd). Rather, the question the evidence raises is whether Lumbermens filed its petition with a bona fide intent to obtain a waiver of service without delay. Lumbermens asked Thibodeaux' attorney to accept service on the same day it filed suit. Despite Eisenberg's repeated promises to obtain a reply from Thibodeaux and to inform McClaren, McClaren continued to initiate communication with Eisenberg over the next five months. The evidence shows that McClaren deferred causing citation to issue only in the expectation that Eisenberg would accept service and file an answer. Once Eisenberg made clear his refusal to accept service of citation, McClaren moved forward to obtain it. The evidence supports Lumbermens' bona fide intent to procure a waiver of citation without delay. See, e.g., Spillers, 88 S.W.2d at 739-40 (plaintiff timely brought suit even though citation was not issued for three and one-half months after plaintiff filed suit, partly because counsel failed to pay fee). Having determined that Thibodeaux did not establish as a matter of law that Lumbermens' failed to bring suit timely, we overrule point one.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd

Affirmed

Filed: April 12, 1995

Do Not Publish

1. On the date Thibodeaux was allegedly injured, June 16, 1989, the Commission was still named the Industrial Accident Board. See Act of December 12, 1989, 71st Leg., 2d C.S., ch.1, 17.01, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 115. Because Thibodeaux' award was made by the Commission, we will use that name.