In the Matter of E. J. S.--Appeal from 98th District Court of Travis County

E.J.S. TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-95-00047-CV
In the Matter of E. J. S.
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. J-12,487, HONORABLE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

 

E.J.S. appeals from the order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction over the offenses charged against him and transferring him to the criminal district court of Travis County for trial as an adult. Appellant contends by two points of error that the juvenile court erred in waiving jurisdiction over him. We will affirm the waiver and transfer of jurisdiction.

The First Amended Original Petition For Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer to Criminal District Court details the charges pending against E. J. S. The State accuses him of killing a man and shooting a second in the course of separate robberies on the same evening. The State charges E. J. S. with capital murder, two counts of murder, attempted capital murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

After hearing the evidence, the court waived its jurisdiction and transferred the case to the criminal trial court.

E. J. S. raises two points of error against technical aspects of the waiver. He contends that the juvenile court did not find probable cause to believe he had committed each offense. He also complains that the court erred by not specifying its reasons for waiving jurisdiction in its order. In neither point does he contend that the court's findings were erroneous.

The Family Code requires the juvenile court to make several findings before it can waive and transfer jurisdiction. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995). The court can waive and transfer the case if the child allegedly committed a felony, the child was fifteen years or older when committing the alleged offense, a full investigation shows that probable cause exists to believe that the child committed the alleged offenses, and the seriousness of the offenses or the background of the child requires criminal proceedings to benefit the welfare of the community. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02(a) (West Supp. 1995).

The juvenile court must expressly deal with each offense alleged when considering a motion for waiver and transfer. In re R.A.G., 866 S.W.2d 199, 199 (Tex. 1993). The court must find probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a charged offense; if multiple offenses are charged, the court must expressly dispose of each. Id. The court can transfer only those charges which it finds probable cause to believe were committed, and must dismiss the others. Id. If the juvenile court fails to state on the record its disposition of a particular charge, we cannot presume it determined not to exercise jurisdiction over that charge; we must vacate the transfer order and remand the case to the juvenile court. Id.

In R.A.G., the juvenile was charged with three offenses. Id. at 200. The supreme court vacated the transfer order and remanded the cause because the juvenile court failed to find probable cause as to each. The juvenile court found "probable cause to believe that R.A.G. had `committed the offense [singular] of capital murder, attempted capital murder, or [disjunctive] solicitation of capital murder.'" (Emphasis and bracketed information added by supreme court.) Id. at 199. The supreme court vacated the order because the disjunctive terminology might have masked a finding of probable cause to believe the commission of only one of the charges, possibly the least serious offense. Id. at 200. The court refused to allow the transfer of all of the offenses without a clear finding of probable cause as to each offense. Id.

We need not vacate the order in this case because the court below found probable cause to believe that the appellant "committed the offenses alleged in the First Amended Original Petition For Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer to Criminal District Court." The court's use of the plural distinguishes its order from the vacated R.A.G. order. Nothing in this quoted statement or elsewhere in the order detracts from the conclusion that the court found probable cause to believe that E. J. S. committed each of the offenses charged. We overrule point one.

The appellant complains that the court failed to specifically state the reasons for its waiver of jurisdiction as required by Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02(h) (West Supp. 1995). The court made findings regarding the six factors that the court must consider when determining the appropriateness of waiver. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02(f) (West 1986). The court's findings tracked the statutory language; for example, on the issue of whether the offenses were offenses against persons or property, the court simply wrote, "The court finds that the alleged offenses were crimes against persons." The appellant complains that these findings were too general, relying on the Supreme Court's rejection of a waiver order in which the court stated only that "after full investigation, I do hereby waive jurisdiction of the petitioner." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966).

We hold that the court's findings were sufficiently specific. The order must be specific enough to allow us to understand and review the reasons for the juvenile court's waiver determination. Casiano v. State, 687 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). Though more specific findings could be made, we do not need more specifics to understand and review the above-quoted finding regarding the nature of the crime. The findings here are more specific than the general statement rejected in Kent and are sufficiently specific to notify us of the basis for the court's decision. We overrule point two.

We affirm the waiver and transfer of jurisdiction.

 

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Jones and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: November 8, 1995

Do Not Publish

e child allegedly committed a felony, the child was fifteen years or older when committing the alleged offense, a full investigation shows that probable cause exists to believe that the child committed the alleged offenses, and the seriousness of the offenses or the background of the child requires criminal proceedings to benefit the welfare of the community. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02(a) (West Supp. 1995).

The juvenile court must expressly deal with each offense alleged when considering a motion for waiver and transfer. In re R.A.G., 866 S.W.2d 199, 199 (Tex. 1993). The court must find probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a charged offense; if multiple offenses are charged, the court must expressly dispose of each. Id. The court can transfer only those charges which it finds probable cause to believe were committed, and must dismiss the others. Id. If the juvenile court fails to state on the record its disposition of a particular charge, we cannot presume it determined not to exercise jurisdiction over that charge; we must vacate the transfer order and remand the case to the juvenile court. Id.

In R.A.G., the juvenile was charged with three offenses. Id. at 200. The supreme court vacated the transfer order and remanded the cause because the juvenile court failed to find probable cause as to each. The juvenile court found "probable cause to believe that R.A.G. had `co