Antonio Cano Laguna, a/k/a Pablo Garcia Perez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 368th District Court of Williamson County

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-92-512-CR
ANTONIO CANO LAGUNA, a/k/a PABLO GARCIA PEREZ,

APPELLANT

 
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
NO. 92-350-K368, HONORABLE BURT CARNES, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

Appellant pleaded guilty before a jury to the offense of burglary of a habitation. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 30.02 (West 1989). Appellant also pleaded true to a previous burglary conviction alleged for enhancement, and the jury assessed punishment at imprisonment for seventy years.

In point of error one, appellant contends the district court erred by admitting evidence of appellant's previous conviction for criminal trespass. Appellant first argues that the conviction was not admissible because trespass is not a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Appellant's argument confuses impeachment under Rule 609(a) with proof of the defendant's criminal record under article 37.07, 3(a). Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 609(a); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, 3(a) (West Supp. 1993). A misdemeanor conviction for criminal trespass is admissible at the punishment stage as part of the defendant's prior criminal record. Chancy v. State, 614 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Appellant also argues under this point of error that the prosecutor was erroneously permitted to adduce details of this previous offense. This contention was not preserved for review, as it was not made to the trial court. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Moreover, the only arguably inadmissible detail that was admitted was that appellant and some friends had slept in a warehouse by the railroad tracks. Under the circumstances, the admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2). The first point of error is overruled.

In his second point of error, appellant complains that the court refused to admit mitigating testimony from defense witness Belinda Rodriguez. At the time of trial, appellant had been living with Rodriguez and her children for three years. During his own testimony, appellant stated that he loved Rodriguez and her children and hoped to marry her, that he helped support Rodriguez and never took money from her, and that he committed the instant offense after he lost his job and could not pay the rent. Rodriguez testified that she loved appellant, that appellant supported her financially, and that she, appellant, and the children interacted as a family. On objection by the State, however, Rodriguez was not permitted to testify to specific instances of such interaction, such as going to movies and on picnics. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 405.

Appellant's argument under this point of error is premised on the contention that the court refused to permit Rodriguez to testify that appellant provided financial assistance to her and helped her care for her children. As can be seen from the summary of the testimony in the previous paragraph, this contention is not accurate. Both appellant and Rodriguez testified to appellant's financial and familial support. Although the court sustained the State's objection to testimony concerning other specific acts of good conduct, the court ruled that appellant could ask "any questions you want to ask about paying the bills" because that subject had already been discussed without objection. Point of error two is overruled.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd

Affirmed

Filed: September 15, 1993

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