Carol Volkmann v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 6 of Travis County

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-92-461-CR
AND
NO. 3-92-462-CR
CAROL VOLKMANN,

APPELLANT

 
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 6 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NOS. 350-469 & 350-492, HONORABLE DAVID PURYEAR, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

At a single trial, the county court at law found appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated and possession of alprazolam, a controlled substance. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701l-1 (West Supp. 1993); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 481.117 (West 1992). The court assessed punishment at incarceration for seventy-five days and a $1000 fine in the former cause, and at incarceration for seventy-five days and a $500 fine in the latter. In both causes, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation.

On the night of January 26, 1991, Department of Public Safety troopers Chris Love and Leo Pena stopped a car driven by appellant after the officers saw it exceed the speed limit and weave from side to side within its lane of traffic. When appellant was asked to step from her car, she staggered and had difficulty maintaining her balance. Appellant's pupils were dilated, her speech was slurred, and she had a blank stare on her face. One officer described appellant as "spaced out." Appellant was unable to perform several field sobriety tests. The officers concluded that appellant was intoxicated.

Inside appellant's car the officers found a cloth bag containing approximately two hundred pills, a white powder residue, and drug paraphernalia including scales and a "cocaine grinder." Subsequent tests showed that some of the pills contained alprazolam, known by the trade name Xanax, while others contained diazepam, also known as Valium. The white powder was cocaine.

Following her arrest, appellant was videotaped at the jail. The tape was admitted in evidence and viewed by the court.

In her only point of error, appellant urges that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that she was intoxicated at the time and place in question. Her argument under this point is merely an attack on the credibility of the two officers and an assertion that the court should have believed her own exculpatory testimony. The credibility of the witnesses, however, was for the trial court to determine. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that appellant drove a motor vehicle in a public place while not having the normal use of her mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of a controlled substance into her body. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The point of error is overruled.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

 

[Before Justices Powers, Kidd and B. A. Smith]

Affirmed on Both Causes

Filed: March 31, 1993

[Do Not Publish]

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