Joe Sheldon Kotrla v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Williamson County

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
AT AUSTIN
NO. 3-92-142-CR
JOE SHELDON KOTRLA,

APPELLANT

 
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 32736-2, HONORABLE ROBERT F. B. MORSE, JUDGE PRESIDING

After finding appellant guilty of operating a motorcycle upon a public street without wearing approved headgear, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701c-3 (West Supp. 1993), the court assessed a fine of fifty dollars. Appellant, pro se, challenges the constitutionality of art. 6701c-3.

Appellant urges that the Act is discriminatory in that no exemption is granted people with medical conditions other than severe head or facial injuries that would be worsened if headgear is worn and that article 6701c-3 is unrealistic in providing fewer exemptions than the safety belt law. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701d, 107C (West Supp. 1993). Article 6701c-3 provides in part:

 

Sec. 2 (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, a person may not operate a motorcycle on a public street or highway of this state unless he wears protective headgear that meets standards adopted by the Department of Public Safety, nor may any person carry a passenger on a motorcycle on a public street or highway of this state unless the passenger wears protective headgear that meets standards adopted by the Department of Public Safety, nor may any person ride as a passenger on a motorcycle on a public street or highway of this state unless he wears protective headgear that meets standards adopted by the Department of Public Safety.

 

(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) of this section that, at the time the offense was committed, the person required by Subsection (a) of this section to wear protective headgear:

 

(2) presented to the arresting peace officer a medical exemption that conforms to the requirements of Subsections (c) and (d) of this section.

 

(c) A medical exemption may only be issued by a practicing physician licensed to practice medicine by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners to a person who has sustained an acute head or facial injury that would be worsened if the person wore protective headgear.

 

Appellant has not shown that the challenged statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to him. The burden one bears who challenges a statute under these circumstances is set forth in Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992):

 

A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute will be valid. Since a statute may be valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid as applied to another, "it is incumbent upon the [appellant] to show that in its operation the statute is unconstitutional as to him in his situation; that it may be unconstitutional as to others is not sufficient."

 

This rule conforms with the criterion for standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States:

 

"A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations. A limited exception has been recognized for statutes that broadly prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment."

 

(Citations omitted).

Since art. 6701c-3 places no limitation on First Amendment rights and appellant has failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, we hold that appellant has no standing to challenge its constitutionality.

The judgment is affirmed.

 

Tom G. Davis, Justice

[Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Davis*]

Affirmed

Filed: May 5, 1993

[Do Not Publish]

 

* Before Tom G. Davis, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 74.003(b) (West 1988).