In re Gordon R. Simmonds--Appeal from 12th District Court of Walker County
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-08-00167-CV
IN RE GORDON R. SIMMONDS
Original Proceeding
OPINION
Under chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, is an inmate required
to pay the court costs in an action that has been dismissed as frivolous before he can file
a new lawsuit if the dismissal order is not final? No.
Introduction
Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs suits brought by an
inmate in which the inmate files an indigence affidavit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 14.002(a) (Vernon 2002). Relator Gordon Simmonds, a prison inmate, sued the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice and five of its officials (the TDCJ). Because
Simmonds also filed an indigence affidavit, chapter 14 applied to his suit. Id. The
district court dismissed Simmonds‖s suit as frivolous under chapter 14, and Simmonds
is appealing that ruling. Simmonds then tried to file a new and different lawsuit, but
the Respondent District Judge, the Honorable William L. McAdams, and the
Respondent District Clerk, the Honorable Robyn Flowers, have refused to file it because
Simmonds has not paid the court costs in the dismissed suit that is on appeal.
In this original proceeding, Simmonds seeks either a writ of prohibition or a writ
of mandamus compelling Respondents to file his new lawsuit. We requested, but did
not receive, a response from the Respondents.
Applicable Statutes
This proceeding involves the application of sections 14.006(a), 14.007, and
14.011(a) of chapter 14. Section 14.007 provides:
(a) An order of a court under Section 14.006(a) shall include the costs
described by Subsection (b) if the court finds that:
(1) the inmate has previously filed an action in a district, county,
justice of the peace, or small claims court; and
(2) a final order has been issued that affirms that the action was
dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001 or Section
14.003 or otherwise.
(b) Costs under Subsection (a) shall include, as costs of court, expenses
incurred by the court or by the department, jail, or private facility
operator, in connection with the claim and not otherwise charged to the
inmate under Section 14.006, including:
(1) expenses of service of process;
(2) postage; and
(3) transportation, housing, or medical care incurred in connection
with the appearance of the inmate in the court for any proceeding.
Id. § 14.007 (emphasis added).
Subsection 14.006(a) states:
A court may order an inmate who has filed a claim to pay court fees, court
costs, and other costs in accordance with this section and Section 14.007.
In re Simmonds
Page 2
The clerk of the court shall mail a copy of the court‖s order and a certified
bill of costs to the department or jail, as appropriate.
Id. § 14.006(a). Subsection 14.011(a) provides in pertinent part:
[O]n receipt of an order assessing fees and costs under Section 14.006 that
indicates that the court made the finding described by Section 14.007(a), a
clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the inmate until
the fees and costs assessed under Section 14.006 are paid.
Id. § 14.011(a).
Factual and Procedural Background
Simmonds filed suit (Cause No. 23516) in the 12th District Court of Walker
County against the TDCJ in July 2006. On September 24, 2007, the court signed an order
dismissing with prejudice Simmonds‖s suit, finding it frivolous under chapter 14. See
id. § 14.003(a), (b). Simmonds filed a notice of appeal of that dismissal order, and we
have docketed that appeal as Cause No. 10-07-00361-CV. It is still pending.
A deputy district clerk wrote Simmonds the following letter dated October 16,
2007:
Enclosed please find a copy of the signed Order of Dismissal by Judge
McAdams in cause # 23516 on September 24th, 2007. Please be aware that
the monies charged for filing fees when you filed a new civil law suit,
$639.00, became frivolous cost when your case was dismissed as frivolous.
You will not be able to file in the courts of Walker County until all costs
are paid. Your remaining balance is $639.00.
On November 29, 2007, Simmonds submitted directly to Judge McAdams a new
civil petition (and the required chapter 14 affidavits) in which he seeks to sue Mickey
Todd, a fellow inmate, for theft of property and assault.1 Simmonds states that he sent
The dissenting note‖s notion that Todd, a potential defendant who has not been served with process in a
suit that has not even been filed, is a party to this proceeding is unsupported by law. Moreover, Todd is
1
In re Simmonds
Page 3
the petition directly to Judge McAdams, as allowed by Rule of Civil Procedure 74,
because of the clerk‖s letter‖s stated intention to bar him from filing future lawsuits in
Walker County until he paid the prior costs in Cause No. 23516. In his transmittal letter
to Judge McAdams, Simmonds explained his position that, because he was appealing
the frivolousness dismissal order in Cause No. 23516 and the dismissal order was thus
not final, the clerk‖s letter erred in concluding that the clerk could not accept a new
lawsuit from Simmonds until he paid the prior costs.
It appears from the record that Judge McAdams took no action on Simmonds‖s
direct submission.
Therefore, on April 6, 2008, Simmonds tendered for filing his
petition (and the required chapter 14 affidavits) against Todd to the Walker County
District Clerk and, in his transmittal letter, again communicated his view that
subsection 14.011(a) did not apply because he was appealing the frivolousness dismissal
order in Cause No. 23516. The deputy district clerk returned Simmonds‖s proposed
filing, stating in an April 9, 2008 letter:
The District Clerk has received your recent request. It is being returned to
you for the following reasons:
Attached is a copy of an order that was signed on September 24th, 2007.
As stated in that order for cause # 23516[,] that was dismissed as frivolous.
The clerk may NOT accept for filing any other lawsuit filed by the plaintiff
until the bill of cost assessed against plaintiff has been paid in full. There
is a balance of $639.00 for cause # 23516, once these fees have been paid
you may file this complaint with our office.
not a real-party-in-interest in this proceeding because his interest, if any, is only indirectly affected by the
relief Simmonds seeks. It is only the district clerk‖s interest—in the form of receiving court costs owed by
Simmonds—that is directly affected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.
In re Simmonds
Page 4
Writ of Prohibition
We will issue a writ of prohibition only to protect our jurisdiction. In re Salas, 994
S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding). Its use is limited to cases in
which we have actual jurisdiction of a pending proceeding. Id. Simmonds argues that
the Respondents‖ refusal to file his lawsuit because of the frivolousness dismissal order
that is presently before us on appeal acts as an ancillary sanction that interferes with our
jurisdiction over his pending appeal.
We disagree.
Respondents‖ use of the
frivolousness dismissal order to bar the filing of his new lawsuit does not interfere with
our jurisdiction over Simmonds‖s appeal. That use interferes only with Simmonds‖s
attempt to file his new lawsuit, which we address below. We deny Simmonds‖s petition
for writ of prohibition.
Writ of Mandamus
We will grant mandamus relief if there has been an abuse of discretion and the
relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 13538 (Tex. 2004).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and
unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or when it misapplies
the law to the established facts of the case. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d
223, 226 (Tex. 1991). “A trial court has no discretion to determine what the law is or in
applying the law to the facts and, consequently, the trial court‖s failure to analyze or
apply the law correctly is an abuse of discretion.” In re American Homestar of Lancaster,
Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001).
In re Simmonds
Page 5
The district clerk has a ministerial duty to accept and file all
pleadings presented for filing. In re Bernard, 993 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (O‖Connor, J.,
concurring); see also DeLeon v. District Clerk, 187 S.W.3d 473, 474 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (orig. proceeding). But, a court of appeals has no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a district clerk except to
protect our jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV‖T CODE ANN. § 22.221(b) (Vernon
2004); In re Bernard, 993 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, orig. proceeding). The district court also has the power to issue
writs to enforce its jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV‖T CODE ANN. § 24.011
(Vernon 2004); In re Bernard, 993 S.W.2d at 454 (O‖Connor, J., concurring)
(“When a district clerk refuses to accept a pleading presented for filing,
the party presenting the document may seek relief by filing an application
for writ of mandamus in the district court.”).
In re Long, 2007 WL 765284, at *3, n.9 (Tex. App.—Waco March 14, 2007, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.).
In this proceeding, we are faced with the Respondent district judge‖s implicit
refusal to file Simmonds‖s lawsuit or to order the district clerk to file it and the
Respondent district clerk‖s explicit refusal to file Simmonds‖s lawsuit.
Before we
address the merit of their refusals to file Simmonds‖s lawsuit, we will examine whether
mandamus relief would be proper.
When a district clerk refuses to accept a pleading for filing, the party
should attempt to file the pleading directly with the district judge,
explaining in a verified motion that the clerk refused to accept the
pleading for filing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 74. Should the district judge refuse to
accept the pleading for filing, this Court would have jurisdiction under
our mandamus power to direct the district judge to file the pleading.2
Bernard, 993 S.W.2d at 455 (O‖Connor, J., concurring) (quoted in Long, 2007 WL 765284,
at *3). We have agreed with that view, noting that it is within our mandamus power to
The district court, having been served with Simmonds‖s verified petition for writs of prohibition and
mandamus, still has not accepted Simmonds‖s suit for filing or ordered the district clerk to accept it for
filing.
2
In re Simmonds
Page 6
direct a district judge to rescind his order to the district clerk not to accept a lawsuit for
filing. Long, 2007 WL 765284, at *3.
In this case, Simmonds correctly anticipated that the district clerk would not file
his lawsuit, so he first went to the district judge, who refused to file it. Simmonds then
went to the district clerk, who also refused.
Under these circumstances, we have
jurisdiction under our mandamus power to consider whether to order the district court
to accept Simmonds‖s lawsuit for filing. See Long, 2007 WL 765284, at *3; Bernard, 993
S.W.2d at 455 (O‖Connor, J., concurring).
Analysis
We now turn to the applicable statutory law.
As noted above, subsection
14.011(a) provides that when a clerk receives an order assessing fees and costs under
section 14.006 that indicates that the court made the finding described by subsection
14.007(a), the clerk may not accept for filing another claim by the inmate until the fees
and costs assessed under section 14.006 are paid. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
14.011(a). Thus, if subsection 14.007(a) applies to Simmonds, the clerk could refuse to
file his new lawsuit.
The clerk‖s record in Cause No. 23516 (Appeal No. 10-07-00361-CV), which we
take judicial notice of, contains the following:
A bill of cost for the $207.00 filing fee, dated July 13, 2006.
The trial court‖s July 13, 2006 order directing the TDCJ to withdraw payments
from Simmonds‖s inmate trust account, as provided for in subsection 14.006(a),
to pay the $207.00 filing fee.3
3
The balance of section 14.006 provides:
In re Simmonds
Page 7
A supplemental bill of cost in the amount of $108.00 for subpoena and service
fees, dated July 24, 2007.
The trial court‖s July 24, 2007 order directing the TDCJ to withdraw payments
from Simmonds‖s inmate trust account, as provided for in section 14.006, to pay
the $108.00 supplemental bill of costs.
Another supplemental bill of cost in the amount of $324.00 for subpoena and
service fees, dated July 27, 2007.
The trial court‖s July 27, 2007 order directing the TDCJ to withdraw payments
from Simmonds‖s inmate trust account, as provided for in subsection 14.006(a),
to pay the $324.00 supplemental bill of costs.4
(b) On the court‖s order, the inmate shall pay an amount equal to the lesser of:
(1) 20 percent of the preceding six months‖ deposits to the inmate‖s trust account;
or
(2) the total amount of court fees and costs.
(c) In each month following the month in which payment is made under Subsection (b),
the inmate shall pay an amount equal to the lesser of:
(1) 10 percent of that month‖s deposits to the trust account; or
(2) the total amount of court fees and costs that remain unpaid.
(d) Payments under Subsection (c) shall continue until the total amount of court fees and
costs are paid or until the inmate is released from confinement.
(e) On receipt of a copy of an order issued under Subsection (a), the department or jail
shall withdraw money from the trust account in accordance with Subsections (b), (c), and
(d). The department or jail shall hold the money in a separate account and shall forward
the money to the court clerk on the earlier of the following dates:
(1) the date the total amount to be forwarded equals the total amount of court
fees and costs that remains unpaid; or
(2) the date the inmate is released.
(f) The inmate shall file a certified copy of the inmate‖s trust account statement with the
court. The statement must reflect the balance of the account at the time the claim is filed
and activity in the account during the six months preceding the date on which the claim
is filed. The court may request the department or jail to furnish the information required
under this subsection.
(g) An inmate may authorize payment in addition to that required by this section.
(h) The court may dismiss a claim if the inmate fails to pay fees and costs assessed under
this section.
(i) An inmate may not avoid the fees and costs assessed under this section by nonsuiting
a party or by voluntarily dismissing the action.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.006(b) – (i).
Subsection 14.007(b) provides that costs of court under subsection 14.007(a) shall include service fees,
but that inclusion occurs only if there has been a finding that an inmate‖s action has been dismissed as
frivolous by a final order. See id. § 14.007(a), (b). Because such a finding had not been made when the
July 24 and July 27 service fees totaling $432.00 were billed as costs against Simmonds, we question their
premature assessment, but that issue is not before us in this proceeding.
4
In re Simmonds
Page 8
The trial court‖s September 24, 2007 order dismissing with prejudice Simmonds‖s
action as frivolous (but with no additional order providing for the assessment of
costs under subsection 14.006(a), as required by subsection 14.007(a), nor with
the findings required by subsections 14.007(a)(1) and (2)).
The trial court‖s several subsection 14.006(a) orders in Cause No. 23516 do not
include the findings specified in subsection 14.007(a) that are necessary for the bar in
subsection 14.011(a) to be triggered with respect to Respondents‖ refusal to accept for
filing Simmonds‖s suit against Todd.5 That defect alone warrants mandamus relief in
this proceeding because of the failure to apply the law correctly. For a court order
under subsection 14.006(a) to be in compliance with subsection 14.007(a) so as to allow a
clerk to properly refuse to file a new suit under subsection 14.011(a), that order must
include a finding that (1) the inmate has previously filed a civil action in a state court
and (2) a final order has been issued that affirms that the action was dismissed as
frivolous.6 Id. § 14.007(a)(1)-(2). Only then is subsection 14.011(a) triggered: “[O]n
receipt of an order assessing fees and costs under Section 14.006 that indicates that the
court made the finding described by Section 14.007(a), a clerk of a court may not accept
Plainly, a clerk‖s letter like those sent to Simmonds cannot satisfy the statute‖s requirement for a court
order.
5
Upon these findings, in addition to the chargeable costs (court fees and court costs) in subsection
14.006(a), the order shall also include as costs the expenses incurred by inmate‖s custodian in connection
with the inmate‖s claim, including service fees, postage, and transportation, housing, or medical care
expenses incurred in connection with the inmate‖s court appearances. See id. § 14.007(b).
We see no practical reason why a trial court‖s order dismissing a suit as frivolous (or malicious)
cannot, for purposes of subsection 14.011(a), include the required subsection 14.007(a) findings and the
subsection 14.006(a) costs assessment as long as that order also provides, as we hold below, that
subsection 14.011(a) applies only if the inmate has exhausted or waived his appeal of the frivolousness
dismissal order. Including all of these items in the dismissal order is judicially economical and will also
assist the inmate, the appellate court, and the trial-court clerk in properly addressing further and any new
proceedings. Alternatively, if an inmate does not appeal the frivolousness dismissal order, a
postjudgment order entered after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal and including the required
subsection 14.007(a) findings would suffice.
6
In re Simmonds
Page 9
for filing another claim by the inmate until the fees and costs assessed under Section
14.006 are paid.” Id. § 14.011(a).
We will proceed to reach the larger issue of whether a frivolousness dismissal
order being appealed is a “final” order under subsection 14.007(a)(2) for purposes of
triggering subsection 14.011(a). This issue is a matter of first impression. We begin our
analysis by reading subsections 14.007(a)(2) and 14.011(a) in concert: If a final order has
been issued that affirms that an inmate‖s action was dismissed as frivolous, the clerk
may not accept for filing another claim by the inmate until the assessed fees and costs in
the dismissed action are paid. See id. §§ 14.007(a)(2), 14.011(a).
Undoubtedly, the trial court‖s order of dismissal in Cause No. 23516 is a “final
order” for the purpose of appeal—it actually disposes of all claims and parties. See
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex. 2001). And, Simmonds‖s appeal
of that dismissal order is pending before us. But we cannot conclude that it is a “final
order” for the purpose of the application of subsection 14.011(a) for several reasons.7
First, a judgment is not final, in the sense that the litigation is concluded, so long
as an appeal is pending. See Apparel Contractors, Inc. v. Vantage Prop., Inc., 620 S.W.2d
We have noted:
As the Supreme Court has recently observed, “the term ―final,‖ as applied to judgments,
has more than one meaning.” Sultan v. Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. 2005) (quoting
Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding)).
The term ―final judgment‖ applies differently in different contexts. A judgment is
―final‖ for purposes of appellate jurisdiction if it disposes of all issues and parties in
a case. The term ―final judgment‖ is also used with reference to the time when trial
or appellate court power to alter the judgment ends, or when the judgment
becomes operative for the purposes of res judicata.
Id. (quoting Street, 756 S.W.2d at 301) (quoting McWilliams v. McWilliams, 531 S.W.2d 392,
393-94 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (citations omitted)).
Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. H & S Supply Co., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet.
denied.
7
In re Simmonds
Page 10
666, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref‖d n.r.e.). But at least one exception to
that rule exists: A judgment is final for purposes of issue and claim preclusion (res
judicata) despite the taking of an appeal unless the appeal actually consists of a trial de
novo. Scurlock Oil v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986). In Scurlock Oil, the supreme
court adopted the Restatement‖s rule because under the then-extant rule, “until all
avenues of appeal have been exhausted, the victor in the first suit has little incentive to
go to trial in a subsequent suit, and the first suit loser has every reason to procrastinate
on appeal. Moreover, the waste of judicial time in relitigating already decided issues is
apparent.” Scurlock Oil, 724 S.W.2d at 6.
Neither res judicata nor the rationale in Scurlock Oil applies to Simmonds‖s
situation.
In his new lawsuit, Simmonds is not attempting to relitigate any issue
decided in Cause No. 23516, and Simmonds has no incentive to procrastinate in the
appeal of the trial court‖s dismissal of Cause No. 23516.
Second, under the analogous federal statute,8 federal courts hold that
frivolousness dismissals do “not count against a prisoner until he has exhausted or
waived his appeals.” Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996); see
Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (counting dismissals as strikes
only when appeals have been exhausted or waived); Campbell v. Davenport Police Dep't,
That federal statute provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or
proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
8
In re Simmonds
Page 11
471 F.3d 952, 953 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility,
175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
Any other reading of the statute [section 1915(g)] poses a risk of
inadvertently punishing nonculpable conduct. For example, an indigent
prisoner‖s fourth claim could expire while his first three dismissals were
being reversed on appeal. . . . It is uncontroversial from the plain
language of the statute that Congress intended section 1915(g) only to
penalize litigation that is truly frivolous, not to freeze out meritorious
claims or ossify district court errors.
Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 387-88.
Chapter 14 was designed to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed in
Texas courts by prison inmates, consuming valuable judicial resources with little
offsetting benefit. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no
writ). But the federal case law‖s rationale for not counting a frivolousness dismissal
until the inmate has exhausted or waived his appeal equally applies to Texas inmates
and subsections 14.007(a)(2) and 14.011(a), while maintaining chapter 14‖s purpose of
discouraging and penalizing truly frivolous lawsuits.
If an inmate is appealing a
frivolousness dismissal, barring him from filing a new suit until he has paid the costs in
the dismissed action could inadvertently punish the inmate‖s nonculpable conduct if
the frivolousness dismissal is reversed and the new claim expires. See, e.g., Brewer v.
Simental, --- S.W.3d ---, 2008 WL 4172719 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 10, 2008, no pet. h.)
(reversing trial court‖s dismissal of inmate‖s suit as frivolous). If the frivolousness
dismissal order is affirmed, the inmate is then properly penalized and discouraged from
filing another frivolous suit, and any suit filed while the appeal was pending could be
In re Simmonds
Page 12
abated or dismissed without prejudice until the inmate paid the costs in the now-final
dismissed action.
We therefore hold that subsection 14.011(a) does not allow a clerk or trial court to
refuse to accept for filing another claim by an inmate until the inmate has exhausted or
waived his appeal of the dismissal order at issue in the subsection 14.007(a)(2) finding.
By refusing to file Simmonds‖s lawsuit under an incorrect application of
subsections 14.007(a) and 14.011(a), the Respondent district judge abused his discretion.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 74. We also find that Simmonds lacks an adequate remedy by appeal
because there is no underlying action and thus no appealable order. See Long, 2007 WL
765284, at *3 (“We further find that Long lacks an adequate remedy by appeal; there are
no underlying actions and thus no appealable orders in those actions.”).
Conclusion
We conditionally grant in part Simmonds‖s petition for writ of mandamus.
Within fourteen days after the date of this opinion, Simmonds shall resubmit his
petition against Todd and his chapter 14 affidavits to the Respondent Judge McAdams.9
The writ will issue only if the Respondent fails to advise this Court in writing within 28
days after the date of this opinion that Simmonds‖s petition and chapter 14 affidavits
Because we have no information on the location or the district judge‖s disposition of Simmonds‖s
original submission of his suit to the district judge, we reject Simmonds‖s request that we order the
district judge to file that original submission. Moreover, Simmonds‖s chapter 14 affidavits are likely stale.
9
In re Simmonds
Page 13
have been filed with him and that those items have been transmitted to the district
clerk, whom we have no doubt will accept it for filing based on this opinion.
BILL VANCE
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Petition for writ of prohibition denied
Petition for writ of mandamus granted in part and writ conditionally issued
Opinion delivered and filed November 26, 2008
[OT06]
In re Simmonds
Page 14
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.