Ollie Brown v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 77th District Court of Limestone County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-07-00068-CR

Ollie Brown,

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,

Appellee

From the 77th District Court

Limestone County, Texas

Trial Court No. 11094-A

MEMORANDUM Opinion

Ollie James Brown was convicted of assault on a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.01(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2007). He pled true to two enhancement paragraphs and was sentenced to 33 years in prison. We affirm.

Brown was charged with assaulting Joann Brackens, a detention center officer, while Brown was jailed in the Limestone County Detention Center. Limestone County contracted with Civigenics Texas Incorporated to operate the Limestone County Detention Center. In two issues, Brown contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because he did not have actual knowledge of the contract between Limestone County and Civigenics.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court looks at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). A legal sufficiency of the evidence review does not involve any weighing of favorable and non-favorable evidence. Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Courts reviewing all the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict must assume jurors made all inferences in favor of their verdict if reasonable minds could, and disregard all other inferences in their legal sufficiency review. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 165 n.27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When faced with conflicting evidence, the reviewing court presumes the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution. Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999.

In a factual sufficiency review, the evidence is reviewed in a neutral light . . . ." Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); accord Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). "There is only one question to be answered in a factual sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?" Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), overruled on other grounds, Watson at 405). "Evidence is factually insufficient when . . . the evidence is 'so weak' that the verdict 'seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust,' or the verdict is 'against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.'" Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Watson at 414-15, 417).

Civigenics contracts with Limestone County to operate the detention center, and Brackens is an employee of Civigenics. The contract between Limestone County and Civigenics was introduced into evidence. The guards at the detention center wear a distinctive uniform to distinguish themselves from inmates. Further, the guards were authorized to guard the inmates in all parts of the detention center, including the area where Brown was housed when he injured Brackens. The guards had the same license that a jailer at the county jail would have.

Brackens testified she was wearing a uniform, similar[1] to the one she wore in court, on the day that Brown assaulted her. She also testified that this was not the first time she had met or dealt with Brown in her capacity as a guard. Brackens considered herself working for both the Limestone County Detention Center and Civigenics. The warden testified that after the assault he received a letter from Brown complaining that the guards were not well trained and that the incident was a result of Brown trying to train Brackens.

Brown contends that the State did not prove he had actual knowledge of the existence of the contract between Limestone County and Civigenics. However, the statute provides that the offense is a third degree felony if the offense is committed against a person who contracts with a government facility and the person is engaged in performing a service if the actor knows the person is authorized by government to provide the service . Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.01(b)(3)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). This language does not necessarily mean that the actor must have actual knowledge of the existence of the contract. Juries are permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial and circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). From the circumstantial evidence, the jury could infer that Brown knew Brackens was authorized by the government, that being Limestone County, to provide the services in which she was engaged at the time of the assault.

Accordingly, viewing the record under the appropriate standards, we find the evidence both legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. Brown s first and second issues are overruled.

The trial court s judgment is affirmed.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed January 30, 2008

Do not publish

[CRPM]

[1] Brackens testified that she has two different pairs of uniform pants and could not recall which pair she had on during the assault.