Johnathon Henry Greene v. Frances Anne Greene--Appeal from County Court at Law No 2 of Brazos County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-00-276-CV

JOHNATHON HENRY GREENE,

Appellant

v.

FRANCES ANNE GREENE,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court # 36,422A-CCL2

O P I N I O N

This is a divorce suit. The parties informed the trial court in a January 2000 hearing that they had settled the matter and asked the court to render judgment accordingly. In July 2000, Frances Greene filed a motion requesting the court to sign a proposed decree. After a hearing, the trial court signed the final decree of divorce. Jonathon Greene argues 1) that the trial court erred in entering an agreed judgment when the parties had not fully agreed to the terms; and 2) the parties settlement agreement was ambiguous.Background

On January 18, 2000, both parties testified in open court that they had agreed to a proposed settlement dividing the marital estate and debts. An inventory reflecting the proposed property division was introduced as an exhibit without objection. The court orally approved the settlement agreement and granted a divorce. Over the next few months, the parties disagreed about the division of the American Airlines Retirement AB Accounts. Frances asserted that she was entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of the fair market value of the account. Jonathon argued that her portion of that account should be set at three-fourths (3/4) of $200,000 under the parties agreement. Frances moved in July 2000 to sign the decree of divorce awarding her 3/4 of the fair market value of the account. At the July hearing, Jonathon asserted that the parties now disagreed on the division of property, and thus, the trial court could not sign an agreed judgment.

Oral Rendition of Judgment

Applicable Law

A judgment routinely goes through three stages: 1) rendition; 2) reduction to writing; and 3) entry. See In re Ruiz, 16 S.W.3d 921, 924 n.3 (Tex. App. Waco 2000, no pet.) (citing Oak Creek Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 758 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App. Waco 1988, no writ)). Rendition of judgment and entry of judgment are distinct actions. Id.; see also Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978).

A judgment is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, either in writing or orally in open court, of its decision upon the matter submitted for adjudication. See S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. 1995). Rendition is a present act, either by spoken word or by signed memorandum, which resolves the issues upon which the ruling is made. Id. (citing Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976)). Rendition is distinguishable from the entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act by which judgment is recorded and preserved. See Keim v. Anderson, 943 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex. App. El Paso 1997, no pet.) (citations omitted).

If one of the parties revokes consent before the court renders an agreed judgment, the agreement cannot be enforced as a consent judgment. See S & A Restaurant Corp, 892 S.W.2d at 857. If one of the parties revokes consent after the court renders judgment, the agreement can be enforced as a consent judgment. Id.; see also Kelley v. Pirtle, 826 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (party s attempt to withdraw consent after court orally announced judgment was ineffective).

Analysis

In point one, Jonathon asserts that the trial court erred in signing the decree because the parties did not agree to all the terms of the agreement. The court, however, rendered judgment orally at the January hearing by stating the following:

The court, having heard the evidence and testimony, finds the marriage has become insupportable due to irreconcilable differences and grants the divorce. The court approves the agreed division of the community estate to include community property and community debt.

(emphasis added).

Here, the rendition was a present act granting the divorce and approving the settlement agreement. See S & A Restaurant Corp, 892 S.W.2d at 857. Once the court orally rendered judgment in open court on the parties settlement agreement, Jonathon could not revoke his consent to the agreement. Id.; Kelley, 826 S.W.2d at 654-55; see also Hollaway v. Hollaway, 792 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App. Houston [1st. Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (trial court intended to render final judgment, even though he stated the settlement would be approved next month, and thus, the wife was not entitled to repudiate the settlement agreement). Jonathon did not revoke or repudiate his consent to the settlement agreement before the court rendered judgment. Thus, whether he revoked consent before the court signed the decree in July is irrelevant because the pronouncement of judgment in January was the critical moment when the judgment became effective. Accordingly, point one is overruled.

Ambiguity

Jonathon urges in his second point that the parties settlement agreement was ambiguous. Because the court rendered judgment, he cannot now challenge the ambiguity of the agreement. // Id. Point two is overruled.

The judgment is affirmed.

REX D. DAVIS

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Davis,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Gray

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed May 1, 2002

Do not publish

[CV06]