Rodney Eggan Willis v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 220th District Court of Bosque County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-195-CR

RODNEY EGGAN WILLIS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 220th District Court

Bosque County, Texas

Trial Court No. 92-10-11618-BCCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rodney Willis pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault on February 17, 1993, and the court placed him on deferred adjudication probation for eight years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B) (Vernon 1994); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995). On January 31, 1994, the State moved to adjudicate his guilt on the basis that Willis knowingly harbored a runaway child, a female younger than 18 years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 25.06. After a hearing, the court granted the motion to adjudicate and sentenced Willis to ten years' imprisonment. By one point of error, Willis claims that the court "erred in granting the motion to proceed to adjudication when uncontroverted evidence established . . . a defense to the State's allegation." Because we do not have the authority to entertain this sole point, we will dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.

The right to appeal from a criminal proceeding is a statutory right. See Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, the legislature may limit the issues that the defendant is allowed to bring to the appellate court. See id. The Legislature has expressly prohibited an appeal from the decision to adjudicate, declaring that "[n]o appeal may be taken from this determination." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, 5(b); Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). "[W]hen a legislative enactment says an accused may not appeal a determination to adjudicate, there is no right to do so." Phynes, 828 S.W.2d at 2. Thus, the proper procedure is to dismiss any points which raise a complaint concerning the decision to adjudicate. See id.; Olowosuko, 826 S.W.2d at 942. Where, as here, all points relate to this decision, the proper course is to dismiss the entire cause. See Phynes, 828 S.W.2d at 2. Thus, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Willis' sole point of error. See id.

The cause is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Opinion delivered and filed February 15, 1995

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