Ernest Presha v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 54th District Court of McLennan County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-92-199-CR

ERNEST PRESHA,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court # 91-443-C

O P I N I O N

A jury found Ernest Presha guilty of burglary of a motor vehicle and assessed punishment at twenty years in prison and a $5,000 fine. In a single point Presha argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm.

On May 19, 1991, La Vanda Wagoner's car was broken into. C.W. Bruner, a security patrol supervisor, testified that he stopped by the Twenth-fifth Street Theatre to check on security guards on duty at the club. After checking on the guard in the front of the building, Bruner rounded the corner and noticed two men who yelled, "Hey", or "Look out." He noticed Presha with his arms in Wagoner's car up to his elbows. Bruner testified that the passenger-side glass of the car was broken out, that a cinder block was in the seat, and that particles of glass were on the inside and outside of the car, as if someone had pulled and pushed on the window. Waco Police Officer Donny Morgan testified that Presha had glass specks in his clothing.

Presha argues that the jury's verdict was based on insufficient evidence. In reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 202, 116 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1991).

The Texas Penal Code provides that:

(a) A person commits an offense, if without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft.

(b) for purposes of this section, enter means to intrude:

(1) any part of the body . . . ."

Tex. Penal Code Ann. 30.04 (Vernon 1989).

Mere presence of an accused at the scene of an offense is not alone sufficient to support a conviction; however, it is a circumstance tending to prove guilt that, combined with other facts, may suffice to show that the accused was a participant. Harris v. State, 738 S.W.2d 207, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 207, 98 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1987). Specific intent to commit theft may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Simmons v. State, 590 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

Presha was the only person in the vicinity of the crime, others tried to warn him of the approaching security guard, he was caught reaching into the car, he had glass particles on his clothing, and he gave a false name to the police. The jury could infer from these circumstances that Presha had the specific intent to commit a felony or theft. We conclude that the jury, as a rational trier of fact, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Turner, 805 S.W.2d at 427. We overrule the point and affirm the judgment.

BOB L. THOMAS

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed April 14, 1993

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