Grady Christie v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 361st District Court of Brazos County

NO. 10-91-012-CR

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

TENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT WACO

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GRADY CHRISTIE,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

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From 361st Judicial District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court # 16,713-361

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O P I N I O N

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Appellant claims that the judgment revoking his probation should be reversed because the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause. We will affirm the judgment.

Appellant was convicted in 1989 for the offense of sexual assault of a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon 1989). He was sentenced to five years in prison, probated for five years. In 1990, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant's probation. The trial court found that the allegations were true, revoked Appellant's probation, and sentenced him to five years in prison.

The information charging Appellant in this cause provided in part:

BILL R. TURNER, District Attorney of the 85th/272nd District of the State of Texas, in behalf of the State of Texas and presents in and to the 85th/272nd District Court of Brazos County . . . .

(Emphasis added). Appellant's probation was revoked by the judge of the 361st District Court. He maintains that this judge did not have the power to revoke his probation because the felony information limited jurisdiction to the 272nd and 85th District Courts.

Section 24.506 of the Government Code provides that the 361st District is composed of Brazos County--the county in which this offense occurred--and that it "shall have and exercise jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases as well as the jurisdiction prescribed by general law for district courts." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 24.506 (Vernon 1988); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing that district courts shall have original jurisdiction in felony criminal cases). Therefore, the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this cause. Further, although Appellant could have complained that the State did not present the case to one of the courts named in the information or that the State did not move for a transfer of the cause to the 361st District Court, the transcript shows that the judge of the 361st District Court has always presided over this cause. The bench-plea checklist, waiver of indictment, plea bargaining agreement, release of bail bond funds, and the order deferring further proceedings and placing defendant on probation all show that the cause was heard by the judge of the 361st District Court. The record does not show that Appellant ever challenged the authority of the 361st District Court. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds for the ruling he desired were not apparent from the context. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a); see also, Daniels v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 596, 352 S.W.2d 267, 268 (1961) (holding that where two or more criminal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction and statutory authority to transfer cases from one to the other, omission of an order of transfer from the record cannot be complained of in absence of timely plea on such ground). We hold that Appellant's complaint, after the 361st District Court has been hearing motions and issuing orders in this case since 1986, is not timely.

We affirm the judgment.

BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas

Justice Cummings and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 25, 1991

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