Joy Bybee Brown v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 31st District Court of Gray County
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NO. 07-02-0007-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
SEPTEMBER 5, 2002
______________________________
JOY BYBEE BROWN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 31ST DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY;
NO. 5885; HONORABLE STEVEN R. EMMERT, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ, and BOYD, SJ.1
On July 23, 2001, appellant Joy Bybee Brown was found guilty of arson and
assessed a five-year probated sentence in the Institutional Division of the Department of
Criminal Justice and a $500 fine. On September 19, 2001, an application to revoke
1
John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment.
probation was filed and it was amended on October 3, 2001. After a hearing on December
14, 2001, the probation was revoked and appellant was ordered to serve the five-year
sentence.
Appellant’s appointed attorney has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). In that brief, he certifies that
after careful examination of the record, he has concluded that appellant’s appeal is without
merit. In that brief, he certified that he sent a copy to appellant for her examination. He
has also filed a motion to withdraw in which he certified that a copy of the motion was
being sent to appellant and that she had a right to file her own brief. The clerk of this court
also notified appellant of her right to file a brief and, after obtaining an extension of time
within which to do so, appellant has now filed her pro se brief.
In considering briefs and requests of this type, we must satisfy ourselves that the
attorney has provided the client with a diligent and thorough search of the record for any
arguable claim that might support his client’s appeal. Then, after considering counsel’s
brief and appellant’s pro se brief, we must determine if counsel has correctly concluded
the appeal is frivolous. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 108
S.Ct. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim.
App.1978).
When we review an order revoking probation, the only question before us is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d
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303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated a condition of the probation.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Although one sufficient ground
for revocation supports a revocation order, Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.
Crim.App. 1979), a plea of true standing alone is sufficient to support the trial court’s
revocation order. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
At the hearing on the motion to revoke, appellant entered a plea of true to nine of
the alleged probation violations. That in itself is sufficient to support the revocation order.
Appellant was also sworn and testified. We have carefully examined the record of her
testimony and her pro se brief. We can only conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking appellant’s probation.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and appellate counsel’s
motion to withdraw is granted.
John T. Boyd
Senior Justice
Do not publish.
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