Ann Marie Lustgraaf v. State of Texas--Appeal from 251st District Court of Potter County
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NO. 07-01-228-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
________________________________
ANN MARIE LUSTGRAAF,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 41,557-C; HON. PATRICK PIRTLE, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Dismissal
_______________________________
Before REAVIS, QUINN and JOHNSON, JJ.
Ann Marie Lustgraaf (appellant) attempts to appeal from a judgment under which
she was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The judgment was entered
pursuant to her guilty plea and plea bargain with the State. Furthermore, the trial court’s
decision and sentence comported with the terms of the plea bargain. Appellant filed a
general pro se notice of appeal along with an affidavit of indigency. We dismiss for want
of jurisdiction.
Because appellant pled guilty and the sentence assessed by the court did not
exceed the parameters of the plea bargain, appellant was required to comply with Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3). That is, she was required to recite in her notice
that she was appealing based upon jurisdictional defects, that the substance of her appeal
was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial, or that the trial court granted her
permission to appeal.
None of these statements appear in her notice, however.1
Consequently, we have no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. Cooper v. State, 45
S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This is true even though she contends, via her notice
of appeal, that she failed to understand the applicable range of punishment, id. (holding
that issues of voluntariness cannot be raised through a general notice of appeal), and that
her punishment was excessive.2
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish.
1
W e do not decide at this time whether a trial court’s stating in its judgment (as the court did here)
that one who pled guilty had the right to appeal and that counsel would be appointed to represent him on
appeal if he could not afford one is tantamount to granting permission to appeal. Yet, we note the potential
for such comm entary inducing a prospective appellant into believing that he could appeal. Nevertheless, the
notice of ap pea l still would have to com port with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3) before we
acquired jurisdiction.
2
Appellant also s tates in her n otice o f app eal tha t she doe s “no t intend to contes t [her] conviction.”
2
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