Contreras, Dana Marie v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 320th District Court of Potter County
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NO. 07-97-0487-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
OCTOBER 25, 2001
______________________________
DANA MARIE CONTRERAS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 37,880-D; HONORABLE DON EMERSON, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
ON REMAND FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Following a remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, we now affirm the judgment
of the trial court in this cause. The procedural history underlying this opinion began when
this court reversed the judgment of the trial court on rehearing. Contreras v. State, 998
S.W.2d 656 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1999). Subsequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the State’s petition for review and, thereafter, reversed and remanded the case
back to this court. Contreras v. State, No. 1682-99 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).
A detailed factual summary was set out in both the cases cited above, so our
discussion will be limited to facts only as they become relevant to our decision. The issue
centers around the fact that appellant was not taken to the police department from the
crime scene until 45 to 50 minutes after the police arrived. The ultimate holding of the
Court of Criminal Appeals is that the 45-minute delay in taking appellant to the police
station cannot be construed as unnecessary.1 Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals
deemed the 45-minute delay as “de minimis” and “necessary.” In reaching its decision, that
court reasoned that law enforcement was engaged in “trying to save the victim’s life,”
investigating the stabbing, and securing the scene. The Court of Criminal Appeals
believed that six officers, paramedics, Amarillo Medical Services, and the Fire Department
were “necessary” in order to properly carry out the listed tasks.
Thus, under these circumstances, “unnecessary delay” is not present, and the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
John T. Boyd
Chief Justice
Publish.
1
Determinations of what constitutes “unnecessary delay” fall within the realm of
section 52.02(a)(2) of the Texas Family Code and are determined on a case-by-case basis.
2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
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