In the Interest of F.M., a Child Appeal from 324th District Court of Tarrant County (memorandum opinion)

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-22-00270-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF F.M., A CHILD On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 324-698664-21 Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION F.M. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his son F.M. (Finn)1 and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of Finn to the Department of Family and Protective Services. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (Q), (b)(2). We will affirm. Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Father’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights-termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Father’s counsel has also moved to withdraw as Father’s counsel. The brief meets Anders’s requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Father’s counsel provided Father with copies of the Anders brief and the withdrawal motion and has informed Father of his rights to request and to review the We use aliases to identify the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 1 The trial court also terminated Finn’s mother’s parental rights, but Finn’s mother has not appealed. 2 2 appellate record3 and to file a pro se response in this court. We also informed Father that his appointed appellate counsel had filed an Anders brief and gave him an opportunity to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se response to the Anders brief. Father filed a motion for pro se access to the record. We, in turn, sent him copies of the appellate record and the Anders brief and gave him an opportunity to file a response. Father filed a pro se response. The Department notified us that it agrees with Father’s counsel that no meritorious grounds for appeal exist and thus has declined to file a responsive brief. In assessing the correctness of a compliant Anders brief’s conclusion that an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is frivolous, we must independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.— To that end, Father’s counsel explained to Father the process of obtaining the appellate record; furnished him with a motion for pro se access to the record, which lacked only Father’s signature and date; and provided him with our mailing address and the motion’s filing deadline. 3 3 Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief, the appellate record, and Father’s pro se response. Finding nothing in the record that could arguably support an appeal, we agree with counsel that Father’s appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). We will thus affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to Finn. But we deny Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel did not show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly, Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved from her duties for good cause in accordance with Texas Family Code Section 107.016(2)(C). See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C). /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: November 17, 2022 4

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.