Samantha P. Blair v. Victoria Hutchison Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County (memorandum opinion)

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In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-21-00132-CV ___________________________ SAMANTHA P. BLAIR, Appellant V. VICTORIA HUTCHISON, Appellee On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019-006884-1 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION Samantha P. Blair attempts to appeal from the trial court’s “Order Granting Motion for Reinstatement.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3). We have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and from certain interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When, as here, an order does not dispose of all pending parties and claims, the order is interlocutory, and unless a statutory exception applies, the order is unappealable until the trial court signs a final judgment. See Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195; Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “No statute permits an appeal of an interlocutory order granting a motion to reinstate under Rule 165a(3).” Marvin v. Schneider, No. 14-20-00338-CV, 2020 WL 5552809, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 17, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see Hale v. Mothershed, 715 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1986, no writ). We notified Blair of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because the order did not appear to be a final judgment or appealable order. We informed her that unless she or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response within ten days showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we would dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. We have received no response. 2 Because the trial court’s “Order Granting Motion for Reinstatement” is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss the appeal.1 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: June 24, 2021 Blair might be able to challenge the reinstatement order through other avenues. See, e.g., Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding); Mem’l Hosp. of Galveston Cty. v. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d 364, 365–66 (Tex. 1987); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 296 S.W.3d 813, 829–30 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, orig. proceeding); S. Main Bank v. Wittig, 909 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding); cf. Ingram v. Ingram, No. 02-14-00063-CV, 2014 WL 1510049, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). 1 3

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