Anthony Shaw Young v. The State of Texas Appeal from 371st District Court of Tarrant County (memorandum opinion )
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-16-00145-CR ANTHONY SHAW YOUNG APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE ---------FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 1438234D ---------- MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ---------Appellant Anthony Shaw Young entered an open guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, namely heroin, in an amount less than one gram. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b) (West 2010). Young pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph, which enhanced the punishment for the charged offense to a second-degree felony. 1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.425(b) (West Supp. 2016). The trial court accepted Young’s open plea, found the enhancement paragraph to be true, and sentenced him to three years’ confinement. See id. § 12.33(a) (West 2011) (setting out punishment range for second-degree felonies). This appeal followed. Young’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified Young of her motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him of his right to file a pro se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal is frivolous, and took concrete measures to facilitate Young’s review of the appellate record. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded Young the opportunity to file a response on his own behalf, but he did not do so. As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). 2 We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Sue Walker SUE WALKER JUSTICE PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: February 23, 2017 3
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