Yundlander Jones v. Claude Jones Appeal from 325th District Court of Tarrant County (memorandum opinion per curiam)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-13-00133-CV YUNDLANDER JONES APPELLANT V. CLAUDE JONES APPELLEE ---------FROM THE 325TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 325-507689-11 ---------- MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ---------In six points, pro se appellant Yundlander Jones (Wife) appeals the trial court s divorce decree and division of the marital estate. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. In her fourth point, Wife argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the division of property contained in the divorce decree. 1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. Among her arguments, she complains about the residence located at 1728 Ransom Terrace, Fort Worth, Texas (the Ransom Property). Wife and Claude Jones (Husband) were married in 2004. Husband filed his original petition for divorce on December 7, 2011. On March 22, 2013, the trial court signed the final decree of divorce, awarding Wife, among other things, the sole right, title, and interest in the [Husband] and [Wife s] community residence, the Ransom Property. The record reflects that on April 16, 2008, the Ransom Property was conveyed by warranty deed to Yundlander Jones in consideration for ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration. The record also reflects that on October 4, 2011, Wife sold the Ransom Property and recorded the transaction with the Tarrant County Clerk. A trial court is charged with dividing the community estate in a just and right manner, considering the rights of both parties. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2014); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 99 (Tex. 1981). Although the trial court has wide discretion in dividing the marital estate, only community property is subject to division. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.002; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985). Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court s judgment only if the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the error materially affected the just and right division of the community estate. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 732 33; Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). 2 Here, the trial court s inclusion of the Ransom Property as a community asset after the evidence conclusively established that it had been sold before the parties divorce distorted the value of the community estate. This error benefited Husband and materially affected the just and right division of the community estate in that Wife s portion of the community included a worthless interest in an asset belonging to a third party. See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it included a noncommunity asset in its division of the estate. See Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 733. Therefore, we sustain this portion of Wife s fourth point. Because this portion of Wife s fourth point is dispositive, we do not reach the remainder of Wife s points. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We affirm that portion of the decree granting the parties divorce; we reverse the remainder of the trial court s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on the division of the community estate. PER CURIAM PANEL: MCCOY, DAUPHINOT, and MEIER, JJ. DELIVERED: August 21, 2014 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
