In the Interest of N.E. Appeal from 279th District Court of Jefferson County (memorandum opinion)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-22-00245-CV __________________ IN THE INTEREST OF N.E. __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F-234,867 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four-yearold son, N.E.1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of the child.2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (F), (K), (N), (O), (P), (2). To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The trial court had previously terminated the parental rights of the unknown father of N.E. 1 1 Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doing so. Mother did not file a response with the Court. We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of 2 Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s court-appointed appellate attorney because the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother has not been discharged. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28. AFFIRMED. _________________________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice Submitted on December 28, 2022 Opinion Delivered January 12, 2023 Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
