In the Interest of J.C., A Child--Appeal from 150th Judicial District Court of Bexar County (concurring)
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CONCURRING OPINION No. 04-12-00116-CV IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., a Child From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011-PA-01561 Honorable Solomon Casseb, III, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice Concurring Opinion by: Steven C. Hilbig, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Steven C. Hilbig, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 31, 2012 I agree with the reasoning expressed by Justice Angelini in her opinion and concur in the judgment. I also agree with the concerns expressed by Justice Speedlin in her concurring opinion. I write separately to express my concern about the result reached in this case. Justice Angelini correctly sets forth the standard by which we are to interpret statutes. Based on a plain reading of the relevant statutes, the paternal grandparents were required to establish standing by demonstrating they had substantial past contact with J.C. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ยง 102.005(5) (West Supp. 2012). The record contains evidence that the grandparents sought to have contact with J.C. while J.C. was in the hospital and before the parental rights were terminated, but the Department failed to provide any information about J.C. or her location to the paternal grandparents. The grandfather testified that the Department didn t want to give us visits. We had to go back to court until they decided to give us visits. He also testified that he and the grandmother would have visited J.C. more often, but the Department did not allow it. The grandmother testified that she wanted to visit J.C., but the Department kept her away despite her repeated requests. Concurring Opinion 04-12-00116-CV I am troubled because it appears a government agency prevented the paternal grandparents from having the opportunity to establish standing by denying them the opportunity to have substantial past contact. As Justice Speedlin asserts in her concurrence, under certain circumstances, a fundamental liberty interest in the parent-child relationship extends to grandparents. Concurring Opinion, at *3. While the exact parameters of this interest have not been established, it seems fundamentally unfair to deny standing to a grandparent when government action prevented the actions or activity necessary to establish the right to be considered for adoption. Steven C. Hilbig, Justice -2-
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