Jamilah K. Craig and as Next Friend of Priscilla Craig, a Minor v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company--Appeal from 407th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-07-00319-CV

Jamilah K. Craig and as Next Friend of Priscilla Craig, a Minor,

Appellant

v.

Texas Mutual Insurance Company,

Appellee

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CI-04199

Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 23, 2008

AFFIRMED

This is an appeal from a summary judgment affirming a decision of the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers Compensation (DWC) appeals panel regarding workers compensation death benefits. We affirm the judgment.

Background

Roseanna M. Craig, an employee of Gas Go Markets, Inc., was killed in a work related accident on November 12, 2000. Gas Go Markets, Inc. carried workers compensation insurance

with Appellee Texas Mutual Insurance Company. Roseanna was survived by a sixteen year old daughter, Jamilah Craig, and a two year old granddaughter, Priscilla Craig, both of whom were dependents. Jamilah received death benefits until she became ineligible because she turned eighteen and ceased to be enrolled as a full time student for two consecutive semesters.

After becoming ineligible, Jamilah sought a redistribution of the death benefits to her daughter Priscilla. Texas Mutual denied the claim, as did the DWC hearing officer. A DWC appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer s decision. On March 14, 2006, Jamilah, as next friend of Priscilla, appealed to the district court. Texas Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment based on Priscilla s ineligibility status at the time of Rosanna death and the trial court granted the summary judgment. This appeal ensued.

Analysis

Appellant argues that once she became ineligible to receive death benefits, Rule 132.5 of the Texas Administrative Code and Section 408.182 of the Texas Labor Code require a redistribution of the death benefits to Priscilla as the remaining legal beneficiary. We disagree.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether Priscilla, as the grandchild of Roseanna and the child of Jamilah, while ineligible to receive death benefits at the time of Roseanna s death, is now eligible as a result of Jamilah s ineligibility. Section 408.182 of the Texas Labor Code provides the eligibility requirements for benefits after an employee s death. Both parties base their arguments on Section 408.182 and Rule 132.5(a) of the Texas Administrative Code. Because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the trial court s decision de novo. Tex. Dep t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002).

Section 408.182 of the Texas Labor Code provides, in relevant part:

(c) If there is an eligible child or grandchild and no eligible spouse, the death benefits shall be paid to the eligible children or grandchildren.

. . . .

(f) In this section:

(1) Eligible child means a child of a deceased employee if the child is:

(A) a minor;

(B) enrolled as a full-time student in an accredited educational

institution and is less than 25 years of age; or

(C) a dependent of the deceased employee at the time of the

employee s death.

(2) Eligible grandchild means a grandchild of a deceased employee who

is a dependent of the deceased employee and whose parent is not an eligible child.

Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 408.182 (Vernon 2006). Rule 132.5(a) of the Texas Administrative Code states: [a] grandchild who was dependent on the deceased employee on the day of death shall be entitled to receive death benefits, unless the grandchild s own parent is eligible for benefits. 28 Tex. Admin. Code 132.5 (1991) (Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers Compensation).

The objective in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature s intent. Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 318. To that end, we presume that the legislature intended the plain meaning of its words. Nat l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000).

Appellant states that Rule 132.5(a) determines the eligibility of Priscilla. Specifically, appellant divides Rule 132.5(a) into two sections separated by the comma. Appellant contends the first part declares that Priscilla is entitled to receive benefits because she was a dependent at the time of Roseanna s death. As to the second part, appellant asserts that it is written in the present tense and since Jamilah is currently not eligible for death benefits, Priscilla should be entitled to redistribution. We disagree with this construction. We are unable to enforce administrative rules when the result would be contrary to a statute s plain language. See FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 883 (Tex. 2000) (stating that [a]lthough we defer to administrative interpretations of legislation, we do so only when they are reasonable interpretations ). We determine Priscilla s eligibility as established by statute.

Essentially, appellant s argument is premised on determining the eligibility of Priscilla at some point after the death of Roseanna. However, [d]eath benefits are vested[,] in the sense that the status of a beneficiary . . . is determined[,] as of the date of the worker s death. Freeman v. Tex. Comp. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. 1980); Texas Employers Ins. Ass n v. Tobias, 669 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.). Further, Section 408.184(a) states that [i]f a legal beneficiary dies or otherwise becomes ineligible for death benefits, benefits shall be redistributed to the remaining legal beneficiaries as provided by Sections 408.182 and 408.183. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 408.184 (Vernon 2006). Thus, redistribution occurs only among those with a vested right as of the date of the worker s death.

It is undisputed that at the time of Roseanna s death, Jamilah was an eligible child. As a result, Jamilah s eligibility excluded Priscilla as an eligible grandchild. We interpret the plain language of Section 408.182 as defining an eligible grandchild at the time of the worker s death. Tex. Gov t Code Ann. 311.023(4) (Vernon 2005). Accordingly, under the statutes plain meaning, Priscilla was not eligible to receive the benefits at the time of Roseanna s death and was not eligible for redistribution of benefits at the time Jamilah became ineligible.

Conclusion

Because Section 408.182 determines the eligibility of a grandchild as of the date of the worker s death, we conclude that Priscilla is not entitled to a redistribution of the death benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rebecca Simmons, Justice