Hayward T. Holman v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 144th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-05-00839-CR

Hayward T. HOLMAN,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2004-CR-5912

Honorable Mark R. Luitjen , Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion , Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin , Justice

Rebecca Simmons , Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 11, 2006

AFFIRMED

Appellant Hayward Holman was convicted by a jury of sexual assault of a child. The jury assessed punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty years and a fine of $10,000.00. In his sole point of error, Holman claims the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge, thus denying his right to due process and equal protection under the law. Because the prosecution provided a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike, and Holman failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination, the trial court's denial of the Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual Background

Holman was charged with the offense of sexual assault of a child and requested a jury trial. During the voir dire proceedings, the State utilized one of its peremptory challenges to remove an African-American venire member from the potential jury. Holman challenged the State's action as discriminatory. The trial court acknowledged Holman's Batson challenge, and asked the State to provide its basis for the strike. The State provided a racially neutral reason for the peremptory strike, and Holman did not seek to cross-examine the prosecutor thereafter. In rebuttal, Holman's counsel argued that other prospective jurors also provided short answers but were empaneled. The trial court held that Holman failed to demonstrate purposeful discrimination and denied the challenge. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Holman guilty of the offense and sentenced him to twenty years confinement.

Standard of Review

Holman contends that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge. A trial court's decision on a Batson challenge is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365-66 (1991) (plurality opinion); Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). To determine whether the fact finder's decision is clearly erroneous, appellate courts must review the record to determine if they are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Great deference is given to the trial court's decision because only the trial court is so situated to observe the attorneys and the prospective jurors. See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534. If, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the defendant did not overcome the State's race-neutral explanation, the reviewing court will uphold the trial court's judgment. See Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Analysis

Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny dictate that peremptory strikes during jury selection may not be made based on a juror's race, gender, or ethnicity. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986);Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 245-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A Batson challenge consists of three steps: 1) the defendant must first make a prima facie case that a venire member was peremptorily excluded on the basis of race; 2) the burden then shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering a race-neutral justification that the challenge was based on something other than the potential juror's race; and 3) if a racially neutral explanation is tendered, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut such explanation, and the trial court must then decide whether the defense has proved purposeful racial discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)(per curiam).

The first two steps of a Batson challenge require an evidentiary hearing by the court. Peetz v. State, 180 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The opponent of the strike must first present sufficient evidence that gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, thereby establishing a prima facie case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The burden then shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a facially neutral explanation. Id. at 97. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent, the explanation is deemed race-neutral to satisfy the second prong. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. The State's explanation must be clear, reasonably specific, legitimate, and related to the particular case at hand. See Mandujano v. State, 966 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet ref'd). A neutral explanation is one that is based on something other than membership in a group, such as race. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. A legitimate reason is simply one that does not deny equal protection. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-769.

It is not until the third step--the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination--that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Whether the State's race-neutral justification for striking a venire member was pretextual is a question of fact for the trial court. Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534. Moreover, it is the defendant's burden to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. The trial court bases its decision not only on the prosecutor's credibility regarding the State's proffer of a racial neutral challenge, but also its observation of voir dire. Therefore, we give the trial court great deference based on its position during voir dire to readily perceive any discrepancies during the jury selection process. Holt v. State, 912 S.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd).

In this case, Holman challenged the State's use of peremptory strike against venire person number one. He contends the prosecution excluded this particular venire member because of race. During voir dire, Holman made a prima facie case of race discrimination by claiming that the State struck the only two African-Americans on the jury panel, one of whom was venire person number one. The State explained that, based on the venire person number one's short and curt answers, it was unable to determine whether this venire member would be a fair juror. By its comments, the trial court obviously recognized that Holman had the burden of persuasion to show that the reason was pretextual and to further show purposeful discrimination. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 581-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). However, Holman failed to carry this burden and the Batsonchallenge was denied.

The State argues that venire member number one was struck because he might not be a fair juror, was racially neutral and satisfied the prosecution's burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. In response, Holman's entire rebuttal argument was that other venire members also gave short answers but were still empaneled. The defense neither requested nor conducted any cross-examination of the prosecutor in an attempt to invalidate the reason enunciated. Pondexter, 942 S.W.2d at 581-82; see also Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that a party's failure to offer any real rebuttal to a race-neutral justification can be fatal to his claim).

The trial court, in the instant case, supervised the entire jury empaneling process and had first-hand knowledge through direct observation of the proceedings. After holding the Batsonhearing, the trial court determined that Holman's rebuttal did not overcome the State's justification for the peremptory strike. If the trial court's account of the evidence is plausible when viewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even if it would have weighed the evidence differently. See Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Upon review of the entire record, including the voir dire and the colloquy surrounding Holman's Batson challenge, we conclude that the trial court's finding of no racial motivation was fairly supported by the record. Thus, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in denying Holman's challenge. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rebecca Simmons , Justice

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