Daniel Camacho Arteaga v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court At Law No 2 of Guadalupe County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-05-00011-CR

Daniel C. ARTEAGA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. CCL-04-1049

Honorable Frank Follis, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 28, 2005

REVERSED AND ACQUITTAL ORDERED

Daniel Arteaga appeals his conviction for driving while license invalid. After a jury found him guilty, Arteaga s punishment was assessed at 180 days confinement and a $500 fine, probated for two years. On appeal, Arteaga contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury s verdict; section 521.457 of the Texas Transportation Code is unconstitutionally vague; and the jury charge is fundamentally defective. Because we hold the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for driving while license invalid, we reverse the trial court s judgment and order acquittal.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Arteaga contends the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction for driving while license invalid. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we do not weigh the evidence tending to establish innocence, nor do we assess the credibility of witnesses. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). If we determine that the evidence is legally insufficient, we must render a judgment of acquittal. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Arteaga was charged with an offense under section 521.457 of the Texas Transportation Code, which provides, in pertinent part:

a) A person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle on a highway:

1) after the person s driver s license has been canceled under this chapter if the person does not have a license that was subsequently issued under this chapter;

2) during a period that the person s driver s license or privilege is suspended or revoked under any law of this state;

3) while the person s driver s license is expired if the license expired during a period of suspension; or

4) after renewal of the person s driver s license has been denied under any law of this state, if the person does not have a driver s license subsequently issued under this chapter.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 521.457 (Vernon 2003). Arteaga contends that the State s evidence is legally insufficient because it failed to prove the elements set forth in the statute. The evidence presented by the State showed that Arteaga was issued a Texas driver s license on May 8, 1973, which expired on November 2, 1992. Despite the earlier expiration of this Texas driver s license, the license was purportedly suspended on August 15, 2001 and November 18, 2002 for Arteaga s failure to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 601.231 (Vernon 1999) (a person s driver s license may be suspended for failure to maintain evidence of financial responsibility). At trial, Arteaga did not contest that he was operating a motor vehicle on a highway on May 6, 2004 in Guadalupe County, Texas, and admitted his driver s license expired on November 2, 1992. The State contends it presented sufficient evidence to prove Arteaga committed a violation of subsection (a)(2) of the statute: Arteaga operated a motor vehicle during a period when his driver s license or privilege was suspended. We disagree.

License is defined in the Transportation Code as an authorization to operate a motor vehicle that is issued under or granted by the laws of this state and includes driver s licenses as well as non-resident operating privileges. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 521.001(a)(6) (Vernon 1999). According to the revisor s notes, section 521.001 s predecessor, Revised Civil Statutes article 6687b, section 2(a), referred to a valid license. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 521.001 revisor s note (Vernon 1999). The revisor s notes explain that the term valid was omitted as unnecessary because the word does not add to the clear meaning of the law. For example, a document purporting to be a license is no longer a license if it is expired and is not a license if it is a forgery. Id. (Emphasis added). When the Legislature recodified article 6687b into Chapter 521 of the Transportation Code, it intended to maintain the substance of the laws. See id. Here, the State presented evidence that Arteaga was issued a driver s license in 1973, but the license expired by its own terms in 1992. This evidence did not establish that Arteaga was operating a motor vehicle on May 6, 2004 with a license as that term is defined in Chapter 521. // While Arteaga may have committed a different offense, // viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support Arteaga s conviction for driving while license suspended. Arteaga s first issue is sustained.Conclusion

Because we sustain Arteaga s first issue, we need not address his remaining issues. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. The judgment of conviction is reversed and Arteaga is ordered acquitted. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133.

Catherine Stone, Justice

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