In the Matter of Y.L.A.--Appeal from 289th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00198-CV
In the Matter of Y.L.A.
From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-JUV-02946
Honorable Carmen Kelsey, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sitting: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 14, 2004

AFFIRMED

After finding that Y.L.A. engaged in delinquent conduct by possessing cocaine, the trial court rejected a plea agreement calling for probation and committed Y.L.A. to the Texas Youth Commission until the earlier of his release or his twenty-first birthday. On appeal, Y.L.A. contends the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TYC "because the record does not justify the commitment in light of the purposes of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code" to "provid[e] for the protection of the public and the public safety, and, consistent with such protection, provid[e] treatment and rehabilitation for errant children" "in a family environment whenever possible." Y.L.A. argues "[t]he trial court might have served these same purposes by placing [Y.L.A.] on probation, as was agreed to by the parties." We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Standard of Review

"[T]he criminal abuse of discretion standard-divorced from evidentiary standards of legal and factual sufficiency-applies to a trial court's juvenile disposition order under section 54.04(d)(2)." In re K.T., 107 S.W.3d 65, 74-75 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Under this standard, "we 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling,' affording almost total deference to findings of historical fact that are supported by the record," but review the "resolution of the factual issue[s that do] not turn upon an evaluation of credibility or demeanor," as well as "the trial court's determination of the applicable law" and "its application of the appropriate law to the facts it has found, de novo." Id. (quoting and citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "By employing this standard, we simultaneously afford the greatest measure of deference available to the trial court's factual determinations, while enabling the appellate courts to develop the legal principles involved and encourage their consistent application to similar facts." Id. at 74.

Discussion

In its disposition order, the trial court expressly states that it is committing Y.L.A. to TYC because he suffers from a serious addiction to heroin. That Y.L.A. is addicted to heroin is supported by the testimony of probation officer Guerra, who so testified. Guerra also testified that, at the time sixteen-year-old Y.L.A. was arrested, he was in possession of cocaine and heroin; while in detention, he admitted to Guerra that he had once used heroin; and, when he was released from a twenty-day detention, he cut his ankle monitor, returning to detention on a warrant with additional misdemeanor and felony charges of evading arrest and possession of cocaine and heroin. Moreover, the State's recommendation included "long-term residential secure placement at a drug facility"; but, in response to questioning by the trial court, Guerra, who recommended commitment to TYC, testified that there is no long-term secure residential drug facility that could accommodate Y.L.A.; there is only Shoreline, which is not a secure facility, and Southton, which is "not geared for drug rehab." Given these circumstances, the trial court followed the probation department's recommendation and committed Y.L.A. to TYC, because it has "the resources and the ability to get you into a chemical dependency program ...."

A twenty-day detention failed to "cure" Y.L.A. of his chemical dependency; when he was brought in on a warrant, he was again in possession of cocaine and heroin. And, because Y.L.A. cut the monitor, monitoring proved completely ineffective. The record thus establishes that it is not possible to protect the public and public safety and provide Y.L.A. with treatment and rehabilitation by placing him on probation and allowing him to remain in a family environment. And the long-term secure residential drug facility envisioned by the plea agreement is simply not available. Under these circumstances, the trial court's disposition order committing Y.L.A. to the Texas Youth Commission until he is released or his twenty-first birthday, whichever first occurs, is fully consistent with the purposes of the Texas Juvenile Justice Code. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice