Kenneth Earl Stanley v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 209th District Court of Harris County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-02-00740-CR

Kenneth E. STANLEY,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 209th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 888964

Honorable Michael T. McSpadden, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 8, 2003

AFFIRMED

The jury found defendant, Kenneth E. Stanley, guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at 99 years' confinement and a $5,000 fine. In three issues on appeal, defendant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction and the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his psychiatric records. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's psychiatric records; therefore, we affirm.

EXCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE

In his third issue, defendant asserts the trial court erred when it excluded his psychiatric records from evidence. He contends the records, which allegedly show a history of mental illness, are relevant to whether he gave his confession voluntarily.

We review the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The State may use the statement of an accused against him if it appears that he freely and voluntarily made the statement without compulsion or persuasion. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2003). The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is based on an examination of the totality of circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). A court will keep out otherwise relevant evidence if the evidence will likely confuse or mislead the jury. See Tex. R. Evid. 403.

At trial, defendant did not call an expert to the stand to explain the psychiatric records. Instead, he relied on a self-proving affidavit that satisfied the business records requirement. Defendant contends that satisfying the business record's predicate satisfies the admissibility requirement without further need for an expert to explain the records. While not alone determinative, a court may use mental impairment as a factor in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Lay jurors, however, are not expected to evaluate technical medical evidence and make an informed decision regarding proof of any link between the evidence and the fact issue without the assistance of an expert in the technical or specialized field. Reed v. State, 59 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). Here, the psychiatric records include medical terms and prescribed medication that are not commonly known to jurors or within the experience of laymen. Without proper explanation by an expert, these terms and medications create an impermissible danger of misleading the jury and confusing the issues. See id. at 282-83. Also, the documents on their face do not establish a connection between defendant's medical condition and the voluntariness of his confession. See id. at 282. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant's psychiatric records.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first and second issues, defendant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient because there are discrepancies in the evidence about both he and his brother's physical description about who held the gun, and because his mental illness caused him to imagine his presence at the offense. Defendant also claims his medical records prove his mental instability at the time he confessed to the offense. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the appropriate standards of review. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) (legal sufficiency); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (same); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 6-7, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (factual sufficiency); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (same). The standard of review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The province of the jury includes reconciling conflicts and contradictions in the evidence. Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The jury may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others, and it may accept portions of the testimony of a witness and reject other portions. Id. This court will not interfere with the jury's exclusive province where the record reflects that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

On the evening of August 18, 2001, defendant and his brother approached Jose Sarabia and two co-workers and entered into a conversation about working for Sarabia in the future. The conversation lasted between five and ten minutes before defendant asked for Sarabia's business card. When Sarabia turned his back to retrieve the business card, defendant pulled out a gun, threatened the three men, and ordered them out of their vehicle. Defendant and his brother proceeded to rob the three of their wallets, cash, and other items. After defendant and his brother drove away, Sarabia called the police who subsequently dispatched Officer C.E. Miller. Sarabia gave Officer Miller a description of the defendant and his brother describing them as black males between the ages of twenty to twenty-eight, approximately 6'3" in height, with one weighing 180 to 190 pounds and the other suspect with the same height weighing 215 to 225 pounds. Houston police developed defendant as a suspect and included him in a photospread that was later shown to Sarabia. Based on a positive identification Sarabia made using that photospread, Houston police obtained an arrest warrant and arrested defendant. After his arrest, defendant voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to give a statement to the police detailing his involvement in the crime. During defendant's trial, Sarabia and officers involved in the case, repeatedly identified defendant as the suspect with the gun who robbed Sarabia.

After reviewing the record, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support defendant's conviction.

CONCLUSION

We overrule defendant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH