Rafael DeLeon v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 175th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-03-00004-CR

Rafael DELEON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2002-CR-3826

Honorable Pat Priest, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 3, 2003

AFFIRMED

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant, Rafael DeLeon, pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance. The trial court assessed punishment at eight years' confinement and a $1,000 fine. On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. All issues of law are settled; therefore, our opinion only advises the parties of the court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the suppression hearing, San Antonio Police Officer Anthony Ward Hill testified he received a dispatch regarding an assault at 1014 Gulf. Hill said that when he arrived at the scene, several people were walking around. He approached the complainant, Robin Martinez, who was bleeding from her forehead and crying hysterically. When Hill asked Martinez who hurt her, she pointed to defendant. Hill immediately handcuffed defendant and arrested him. A search incident to the arrest revealed marijuana and cocaine in defendant's pockets.

Also at the suppression hearing, an investigator hired by the defendant, Mike Earl, testified he spoke with Martinez several months after the incident. Earl said Martinez told him she was inside her house when defendant was arrested. She said she identified defendant as her assailant only after Hill asked her to step outside and look into his patrol car where defendant was seated.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant asserts his warrantless arrest was in violation of those articles of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that authorize such an arrest.

DISCUSSION

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo the trial court's application of law to those facts in the determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89. When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supporting its ruling, if those findings are supported by the record. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of any witness's testimony. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 14 authorizes an officer to make a warrantless arrest under certain specified circumstances. Article 14.03, applicable here, provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant:

(1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws;

(2) persons who the peace officer has probable cause to believe have committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to another person and the peace officer has probable cause to believe that there is danger of further bodily injury to that person . . . .

Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 14.03(a)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).

For a warrantless arrest to be proper under article 14.03(a)(1), the State must establish (1) the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and (2) the defendant was in a suspicious place. State v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Courts engage in a two-part test in determining whether an article 14.03(a)(1) arrest is proper. First, courts examine the facts and circumstances known to the officer that would reasonably show the defendant has committed an offense listed in article 14.03(a)(1). See Dyar v. State, No. 1794-01, 2003 WL 1917729, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2003). Second, courts examine the facts and circumstances in relation to a particular place to determine whether the defendant was found in a suspicious place. See id. In Dyer, the officer arrived at the scene of an accident and was told the driver had been taken to the hospital. The Court noted that "[t]his information would tend to make a hospital a suspicious place in which to seek the driver who was suspected of causing the accident." Id. at *8. At the hospital, the officer observed the appellant had slurred speech, red glassy eyes, a strong smell of alcohol, and that many of his answers were unintelligible. The appellant admitted to drinking and driving. The Court held that these "facts in relation to the hospital make the hospital a 'suspicious place.' Those same facts also provided probable cause to believe that the appellant had been drinking and driving." Id.

Here, Hill was dispatched to the location of a reported assault. When he arrived, several people, including Martinez and defendant, were standing outside. Hill observed that Martinez was bleeding, hysterical, and crying. Martinez pointed to the defendant as the person who injured her. These facts and circumstances in relation to the area in which defendant was standing support the trial court's implicit findings that Hill had probable cause to believe defendant had committed some offense against the law or a breach of the peace and that defendant was in a suspicious place. See id. at *8; see also Parson, 988 S.W.2d at 268 (what constitutes a "suspicious place" is highly fact specific); Ste-Marie v. State, 32 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (breach of the peace is an act that disturbs or threatens to disturb the tranquility enjoyed by the citizens). These same facts and circumstances also support the trial court's implicit findings that defendant committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to Martinez and there was a danger of further bodily injury to her. See McClatchy v. State, 758 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Tex. App.--Houston [14 Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (finding probable cause existed under article 14.03(a)(2)).

For these reasons, we hold that defendant's warrantless arrest pursuant to article 14.03 was proper and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH