McLaughlin, Inc. v. Northstar Drilling Technologies, Inc.--Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 1 of Harris County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00511-CV
MCLAUGHLIN, INC.,
Appellant
v.
NORTHSTAR DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 1, Harris County, Texas
Trial Court No. 750,403
Honorable R. Jack Cagle, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 23, 2003

ABATED AND REMANDED

McLaughlin, Inc. ("McLaughlin") asserts that the trial court reversibly erred by, among other issues, failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree that the trial court's failure to make findings was harmful error; therefore, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the entry of the findings of fact and conclusions of law may affect the issues McLaughlin intends to raise upon reinstatement of the appeal, we do not address the other issues raised in McLaughlin's brief in this opinion.

"Following a proper request and reminder, the trial court's duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law is mandatory." Brown v. McGonagill, 940 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no writ). "The failure to respond where all requests have been made is presumed harmful, unless the record affirmatively shows no injury." Id. at 179-80. "The appropriate question to consider in determining harm in such a case is whether the appellant will be forced to guess the reason or reasons that the trial court ruled against it." Id. at 180.

"If there is only a single ground of recovery or a single defense, an appellant does not usually have to guess at the reasons for the trial court's judgment." Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. The Weber Co.,Inc., No. 05-01-01889-CV, 2003 WL 21419043, at *2 (Tex. App.--Dallas June 20, 2003, no pet. h.). "When there are two or more possible grounds of recovery or defense, [however], an appellant is forced to guess what the trial court found unless the trial court's findings are provided to him." Id. "Forcing the appellant to guess at the trial court's reasons for rendering judgment defeats the inherent purpose of both rule 296 and rule 297, [which is to] 'narrow the bases of the judgment to only a portion of [the multiple] claims and defenses, thereby reducing the number of contentions that the appellant must raise on appeal.'" Id. (quoting 6 McDonald & Carlson, Texas Civil Practice 2d 18:3 (1998)).

In this case, Northstar Drilling Technologies, Inc. ("Northstar") sued McLaughlin, asserting claims for suit on a sworn account, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, declaratory judgment, and quantum meruit. McLaughlin filed a general denial and asserted the affirmative defenses of payment, statute of frauds, failure of consideration, and estoppel. McLaughlin also asserted counterclaims against Northstar for breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, and breach of warranties. Northstar filed a general denial to the counterclaims and asserted the affirmative defenses of failure of conditions precedent, waiver, contributory negligence, disclaimer of warranty, contractual preclusion of consequential damages, and assumption of the risk.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Northstar on April 26, 2002. On May 14, 2002, McLaughlin filed a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296 (requiring request to be filed within twenty days from the date of the judgment). The findings of fact and conclusions of law were due to be filed on June 3, 2002. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law to be filed within twenty days after a timely request). When the trial court failed to meet this deadline, McLaughlin filed a timely notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 10, 2002. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (requiring notice to be filed within thirty days after the original request).

Northstar responds that the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless because the trial court verbally stated on the record that the counterclaims were denied. The trial court's verbal statement that the counterclaims were denied, however, does not assist McLaughlin in determining the reason for the denial. McLaughlin is still required to guess whether the denial was based on a failure of proof or on one of the numerous affirmative defenses asserted by Northstar. The evidence regarding the quality of the guidance services provided by Northstar was conflicting and approximately 69 joint trial exhibits were admitted. Accordingly, the record does not overcome the presumption of harm. See Brown, 940 S.W.2d at 179-80.

Northstar further responds that McLaughlin has not been harmed because it did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in its brief. Northstar's contention ignores the inherent purpose of the rules. The reason for requiring the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law is to preclude an appellant from being "forced to broaden his appeal to attack all possible findings the trial court conceivably could have made." Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. The Weber Co., Inc., No. 05-01-01889-CV, 2003 WL 21419043, at *2 (Tex. App.--Dallas June 20, 2003, no pet. h.). Requiring an appellant to undertake such a broad attack in its initial brief in addition to challenging the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law would require the appellant to potentially waste money on briefing that might be rendered meaningless after the findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed. For this reason, McLaughlin is entitled to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law before it is required to raise and brief any issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.

Northstar additionally counters that McLaughlin has not been harmed because a complete reporter's record has been filed, a trial court's findings of fact are not conclusive in appellate review, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. These contentions also ignore the plain language and intended purpose of Rules 296 and 297 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules 296 and 297 make the trial court's filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law mandatory. Brown, 940 S.W.2d at 179. The rules do not contain an exception for cases in which a reporter's record is filed, and the standard by which we review the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law does not detract from their required entry.

Because the record does not affirmatively show the trial court's reason for denying McLaughlin's counterclaims, this appeal is abated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Catherine Stone, Justice