Gilbert Reyes v. State of Texas--Appeal from 187th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-00-00673-CR

Gilbert REYES,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2000CR0843
Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding (1)

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 18, 2001

AFFIRMED

Gilbert Reyes ("Reyes") pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault-serious bodily injury and was sentenced to two years imprisonment in accordance with the terms of his plea bargain agreement. On appeal, Reyes presents two issues, contending that his plea was involuntary. We overrule Reyes's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Voluntariness of Plea

Reyes contends that his plea was involuntary because he was "incapable of understanding the full implications" of his plea. Reyes further contends that the trial court failed to make any inquiry as to his mental competence. Finally, Reyes contends that his plea was not voluntary at the time it was accepted.

When the record reflects that a trial court appropriately admonished a defendant, a prima facie showing that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary is established. Guzman v. State, 993 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000); Crawford v. State, 890 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1994, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that he did not otherwise understand the consequences of his plea. Crawford, 890 S.W.2d at 944. The entire record must be examined in determining the voluntariness of a plea. Harling v. State, 899 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd). A plea does not become involuntary simply because a defendant receives a greater punishment than he expected. Crawford, 890 S.W.2d at 945.

In this case, the trial court fully admonished Reyes in writing. The trial court further inquired into Reyes's competence at the plea proceeding. Reyes's trial counsel informed the court that he was satisfied that Reyes had a rational and factual understanding of the charge and the proceeding. Trial counsel further informed the court that he had some difficulty communicating with Reyes the prior weekend due to Reyes's unwillingness to talk about his case, not his inability to do so; however, trial counsel indicated that prior to that weekend, Reyes had discussed his case with counsel and understood the allegations and range of punishment. Reyes agreed that trial counsel has explained the plea bargain offer received from the State that morning. Trial counsel stated that Reyes understood the charges against him and had been able to assist him in assessing the propriety of the plea bargain offer.

The written plea agreement stated, "There is no application for community supervision/deferred adjudication." In reviewing the plea agreement, the trial court expressly inquired about that provision, stating, "It is noted that you did not apply for community supervision ...." After summarizing the terms of the plea bargain, including the absence of an application for community supervision, the trial court asked, "Have I stated your agreement as you understand it?" Reyes answered affirmatively.

At the hearing on Reyes's motion for new trial, Reyes's primary complaint was trial counsel's failure to discuss probation with him. Reyes's trial counsel was not called to testify; however, the trial court noted that the State never offered Reyes probation, so trial counsel would have no reason to discuss probation with Reyes.

The record shows that Reyes was fully admonished. In addition to the written admonishments regarding Reyes's competence, the trial court verbally inquired into his competence. Both the written plea agreement and the trial court's question advised Reyes of the fact that no application for community supervision had been filed. Nothing in our record demonstrates that Reyes did not understand the consequences of his plea. Although Reyes may wish to have received an offer for probation or may wish to have been placed on probation, his plea does not become involuntary simply because he received a greater punishment than he desired. Crawford, 890 S.W.2d at 945.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

PHIL HARDBERGER,

CHIEF JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. The Honorable Pat Priest presided over the plea proceeding. The Honorable Raymond Angelini presided over the sentencing proceeding and the motion for new trial hearing.