Charles Travis Moorhead v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 218th Judicial District Court of Wilson County

No. 04-00-00230-CR
Charles Travis MOORHEAD,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 98-09-0108-CRW
Honorable Stella H. Saxon, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 4, 2001

AFFIRMED

Charles Travis Moorhead appeals his conviction for the offense of aggravated sexual assault on an elderly individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2001). Moorhead, a juvenile certified to stand trial as an adult, was tried before a jury on the issues of guilt and punishment. The jury returned a guilty verdict and sentenced him to serve fifteen years in prison. On appeal, Moorhead presents five issues. We affirm.

Factual Background

Moorhead was a nurse's assistant at Country Care Manor nursing home in La Vernia, Texas where the offense occurred. Another employee at the home discovered Moorhead sexually assaulting an eighty-two year old resident who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. Moorhead unsuccessfully tried to keep the employee from reporting him. Upon notification of the occurrence, the director of nursing contacted the police. Deputy Ayala investigated the call. When he arrived at the nursing home, he was informed Moorhead was sixteen years old. Therefore, Officer Ayala did not speak with Moorhead but called a juvenile probation officer, Art Seguin, to meet him at the justice center. Officer Ayala transported Moorhead to the designated juvenile holding facility located at the Floresville justice center. Officer Ayala allowed the juvenile probation officer to take over upon his arrival. As required by the Family Code, Officer Ayala contacted Justice of the Peace Flores, a magistrate qualified to warn the juvenile of his rights and take his statements. Flores, alone with Moorhead, read him the juvenile warnings mandated by the Family Code. After assuring the magistrate he understood his rights, Moorhead told Flores he did not want to make a statement at that time. The magistrate informed the officers and left the justice center.

Later, Art Seguin spoke with Moorhead to complete the detention paperwork. Seguin read and explained his Miranda rights. Moorhead responded he understood them and had no questions. After the paperwork was completed, Moorhead indicated to Seguin he wanted to talk about the offense. Seguin then spoke to Moorhead's parents, who requested a drug test for their son. While Seguin left to attend to the request, Deputy Roemer remained with Moorhead.

When Seguin returned, he allowed Moorhead's father to speak with him. With Seguin in the room, Moorhead's father urged him to tell the truth. Moorhead hung his head and admitted he assaulted the victim. His father hugged him and told him to live up to his responsibilities. Seguin asked Moorhead at that point, if he wanted to give his statement to the judge.

Justice of the Peace Flores returned to the center and went into the room alone with Moorhead. He asked Moorhead what changed his mind and Moorhead responded what he did was wrong and he wanted to confess. Flores also asked Moorhead if the officers offered him coffee, allowed him to go to the bathroom or mistreated him. Moorhead responded that everything was okay. At first, Moorhead simply wrote a statement which said, "I confess." The magistrate gave the statement to Officer Ayala who explained the two words did not really classify as a statement as there was no real detail. Officer Ayala explained to Moorhead that the statement should be more like a school essay, and then left the room. Thereafter, the magistrate came out of the room with Moorhead's detailed, written and signed statement which was admitted into evidence before the jury.

Right to Remain Silent

In his first issue, Moorhead complains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession. He argues the statement was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Anthony v. State, 954 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We must afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of facts supported by the record and its rulings on application of law to fact, or "mixed" questions of law, when those fact findings involve an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

The United States Constitution protects citizens from self incrimination as emphasized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda provided safeguards "designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). These safeguards include notification of rights by the State and exclusion of statements taken after a citizen invokes the rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Moorhead alleges the state impermissibly approached him to obtain a confession after he invoked the right to remain silent. While Miranda requires the State to respect a citizen's invocation of the right to remain silent, the decision does not prohibit the admission of any and all statements taken after an initial invocation of the right. See id. at 478. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the extreme application of Miranda results in an absurd conclusion of excluding subsequent statements even if the accused changed his mind and wanted to speak to the state. Id. at 61.

Initially, we assume Moorhead invoked his right to remain silent by declining to make a statement to the magistrate. The invocation was scrupulously honored as the magistrate left and the probation officer only asked Moorhead questions related to juvenile processing. When allowed to converse with his father, Moorhead admitted his guilt to his father before the probation officer. On appeal he contends the officer's question, "Do you want to make a statement?"constituted interrogation. Miranda indicates that interrogation involves words or actions of the police "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 384 U.S. at 292. Thus, asking if a defendant wants to make a statement does not require a testimonial response on his behalf. A testimonial response resulting in the indication of guilt by Moorhead would require some communication of an express or implied assertion of fact or belief. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-98 (1990). A "yes" or "no" to the question does not implicate the guilt of Moorhead. "Do you want to make a statement?" simply fails to qualify as interrogation. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated that exclusion of evidence is improper under Miranda and its progeny where the accused "was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning" by the police. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 521 (1987). Moorhead's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was not violated. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion and overrule the first issue on appeal.

Juvenile Confession

Moorhead asserts his confession should have been suppressed since it was taken in violation of Texas Family Code, section 51.095. He asserts the Code requires a statement be signed in the presence of the magistrate with no law enforcement officer present. Because Officer Ayala explained that a statement required elements similar to a school essay, Moorhead contends this violated the cited Family Code section. We review this argument under the abuse of discretion standard explained earlier. Oles, 993 S.W.2d at 106.

We have found an abuse of discretion where there was failure to comply with the Family Code, but the facts in this case are distinguishable. See Anthony, 954 S.W.2d at 136. In Anthony, no juvenile officer had been contacted and the juvenile was not processed in a properly designated area. Id. The present case contrasts with Anthony on both those issues. A juvenile officer processed Moorhead in the designated juvenile area. In another case addressing suppression of a juvenile's statement, a confession was held to be inadmissible because the juvenile's parents had not been promptly notified of his arrest as required by the Family Code. Gonzales v. State, 9 S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. granted). In this case, Moorhead's parents were promptly notified.

Moorhead wrote and signed his confession in the presence of the magistrate. No officer was present at the time. After Moorhead wrote the statement "I confess," Officer Ayala merely informed him the statement was inadequate and should be written more like a school essay. The officer left the room before Moorhead wrote anything. Moorhead fails to show a violation of the relevant Family Code provision or that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Moorhead's statement. We overrule his second issue.

Fair and Impartial Magistrate

Moorhead complains on appeal his confession should have been suppressed because the magistrate was not fair and impartial as required by the Texas Family Code, section 51.095. He asserts the magistrate acted as a law enforcement officer or prosecutor by interviewing him and taking his confession. We review this issue under the same abuse of discretion standard as previously discussed. We find Moorhead's argument is without merit.

Under the Texas Family Code, the magistrate's responsibility is to assure a juvenile makes a statement voluntarily, knowingly and uncoerced. Texas Family Code, section 51.095 requires a magistrate to be "fully convinced" that the juvenile "understands the nature and contents of the statement." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 2001). The statement must be signed in the presence of the magistrate without the presence of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney. Id. 51.095(a)(1)(B)(i). Furthermore, the magistrate is required to determine the statement was given voluntarily. Id. 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii). The record reveals the magistrate complied with the Family Code mandates. The magistrate properly verified that Moorhead voluntarily made his statement and signed it outside the presence of any police officer. Moorhead fails to cite to any testimony or evidence indicating the magistrate acted as a law enforcement officer or prosecutor. Based on the record and lack of controverting evidence or arguments, we overrule Moorhead's third issue.

Corpus Delicti

In his next issue, Moorhead asserts the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense. Specifically, he argues the State must present proof to corroborate his confession that penetration of the victim's sexual organ by his sexual organ actually occurred.

"The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidentiary sufficiency that can be summarized as follows: an extrajudicial confession of wrongdoing, standing alone, is not enough to support a conviction; there must exist other evidence showing that a crime has in fact been committed." Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). This other evidence is commonly referred to as the "corpus delicti." Id. Standing alone, the evidence need not be sufficient to prove the offense, rather: "all that is required is that there be some evidence which renders the commission of the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. (quoting Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 15-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100 (1994)).

The corpus delicti of the crime was proven. First, a coworker saw Moorhead "humping" between the spread, naked legs of the victim. Second, the nurses testified the victim's vagina was abnormally red, consistent with friction. Third, the victim exhibited extreme behavior changes after the assault, which disappeared after she left the nursing home. Fourth, after moving back in with her daughter, the victim refused breakfast and suddenly said, "Please don't let him hurt me like that anymore." She then cried and cried. Fifth, after the assault, she resisted her legs being moved apart to change her diaper. Additionally, other evidence in the court record substantiates Moorhead's confession. However, we consider a complete rendition of the entire court record unnecessary in light of the previously discussed evidence. These facts corroborate Moorhead's confession and satisfy the corpus delicti rule. We overrule the fourth issue.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Moorhead argues the trial evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support his conviction. We review the issues separately.

In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We conduct the legal sufficiency review by examining the relevant evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Considering the evidence previously discussed in a light most favorable to the verdict, we determine the evidence is legally sufficient. Moorhead confessed to the assault, there was an eyewitness who saw Moorhead "humping" the victim, and the victim exhibited physical signs consistent with a sexual assault.

In a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider the evidence on both sides but set aside the verdict only if "such a step is necessary to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7, 9; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Reviewing evidence under a factual sufficiency challenge, we examine the evidence weighed by the jury tending to prove an elemental fact in dispute and compare this with the evidence tending to disprove the same fact. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 6-7 (citing Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 832 (1997)).

The evidence presented at trial constitutes sufficient evidence to find guilt on the part of Moorhead. We then consider the controverting evidence presented by Moorhead. His only argument is the evidence failed to prove he penetrated the victim's sexual organ. The State, however, offered into evidence Moorhead's own statement which stated he had sexual intercourse with the victim. Additionally, Moorhead fails to cite to other evidence disputing this fact except an assertion that no witness saw the penetration.

We must give due deference to a jury's assessment of witness credibility and the weight assigned to such testimony. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. Considering the evidence and arguments presented, we find the judgment is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Johnson, S.W.3d at 9; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. Therefore, we find the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Having found the verdict is supported by both legally and factually sufficient evidence, we overrule this issue.

Conclusion

Despite Moorhead's contentions, we find his confession was given voluntarily and in conformance with the cited Texas Family Code provisions. Furthermore, we find the evidence

established the corpus delicti of the crime. Finally, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Karen Angelini, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH