Robert Hackney, Jr. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 218th Judicial District Court of Karnes County

Nos. 04-99-00737-CR & 04-99-00738-CR

Appellant

v.

STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 98-10-00132-CRK & 98-12-00146-CRK

Honorable Pat Priest, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 7, 2001

AFFIRMED

Robert Hackney, Jr. was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on a public servant and deadly conduct. The jury then sentenced Hackney to ten years in prison on each charge, but recommended confinement be suspended on the deadly conduct charge, for which conviction he was placed on community supervision. Hackney appeals both convictions on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. We affirm.

Facts

Karnes County Deputy Sheriff William Ainsworth was driving a marked patrol car on a rural highway late at night when he saw a vehicle pass through a four-way stop sign at a high rate of speed. Deputy Ainsworth activated the patrol car's emergency lights and pursued the vehicle which, after a short chase, entered the driveway of a private residence and stopped. The driver exited the vehicle and began to run toward a fence. As the deputy drove into the driveway behind the pursued vehicle, he saw the driver disappear behind the fence.

Leaving the headlights and emergency lights on, Deputy Ainsworth exited the patrol car and began searching for the driver with a flashlight. As the deputy came around the fence, he saw a woman step off the back porch of the residence and walk toward the back gate. The deputy approached the woman and talked to her. She said her husband, Robert Hackney, Jr., was the driver of the car. As they talked, Deputy Ainsworth heard someone on the back porch yelling and cursing. He then heard two gunshots.

The back porch was directly opposite from where Deputy Ainsworth was standing. The deputy saw "two round circles of fire," indicating to him that the shooter "was shooting directly at me." He immediately retreated to a safer position, about 250 yards from the Hackney residence.

Backup officers began to arrive on the scene and several more shots were fired from the vicinity of the residence. State Trooper Lambert Jendry heard a shot go past him and Officer Casillas of the Kenedy police department. Officers were able to see Hackney walking back and forth carrying a rifle. After the last burst of gunfire, Hackney got back into his car and drove it across a field toward the officers. The officers fired on the car until it stopped about forty yards away from them. Hackney got out of the car and ran to the cover of some brush along a fence line. He then ran back toward his car and was fired upon by the officers, who thought he was still armed. Hackney retreated into the brush. He tried again to get back to his car, but the officers fired at him again. Hackney then fell to the ground and announced he had been hit by gunfire. He surrendered to the officers.

In a pre-trial statement admitted into evidence, Hackney said he knew he was being chased by law enforcement officers. He also admitted that when he arrived home he took his SKS rifle out to the driveway and fired several shots.

Hackney claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the convictions. We apply the usual standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The evidence detailed above establishes facts and inferences sufficient to show Hackney intentionally or knowingly threatened Deputy Ainsworth with imminent bodily harm by use of a deadly weapon, specifically the SKS semi-automatic rifle. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 22.002(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). Moreover, the evidence supports the charge that Hackney knowingly fired his weapon in the direction of one or more individuals, or at a vehicle and was reckless as to whether the vehicle was occupied. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 22.05(b)(1)-(2) (Vernon 1994).

We additionally conclude that, when viewing all the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," the verdict is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7.

The sufficiency of the evidence complaints are overruled and the convictions are affirmed.

PAUL W. GREEN

JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH