Charles Gaines v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No 1 of Bexar County

No. 04-00-00050-CR
Charles GAINES,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 1, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 711409
Honorable Al Alonso, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Alma L. L pez, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 7, 2001

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Charles Gaines ("Gaines") pled guilty to unlawfully carrying a weapon. Gaines presents three issues in his brief challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We hold that the trial court erred in denying Gaines's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

On August 26, 1998, around 11:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Christopher Saxon was on patrol when he noticed a large sticker on the back window of Gaines's vehicle. The sticker drew Saxon's attention because he recognized it as a gang sign. At the time, Saxon was assigned to the gang unit of the organized crime division.

As the two vehicles approached a traffic light, Saxon noticed that Gaines's rear light was broken and light was coming through. Saxon stated that a broken taillight is a traffic violation. Saxon pulled Gaines over, approached Gaines, and asked for his driver's license. Saxon noticed that Gaines was "real jittery" and seemed nervous. Saxon conducted a driver's license check which revealed that Gaines had an active D.P.S. warrant for his arrest. Saxon contacted the magistrate's office to determine if a D.P.S. trooper was available to book Gaines into jail, because only a D.P.S. trooper can book a person into jail on a D.P.S. warrant. No trooper was available.

Saxon stated that it took him approximately two or three minutes from the time he stopped Gaines to run the license check and return to Gaines's vehicle. When Saxon returned to Gaines's vehicle, Gaines seemed nervous, so Saxon asked Gaines to step out of the vehicle to determine if Gaines knew anything about the warrant. Saxon believed Gaines told him that he knew about the warrant and was going to make arrangements to pay it. Saxon conducted a pat down search of Gaines because Gaines seemed nervous and Saxon thought Gaines might be a gang member. Saxon stated that due to the violent behavior of gang members, he felt unsafe. After conducting the pat down search, Saxon continued to talk with Gaines and asked him if anything was in his vehicle that he was not supposed to have. Gaines responded that he had a pistol in the car. Saxon handcuffed Gaines for safety reasons and asked him to point out the location of the weapon. As Saxon looked into the car, the gun was on the front seat. Saxon arrested Gaines for unlawfully carrying a weapon.

Mary Victoria Johnson, Gaines's sister-in-law, testified that on the night Gaines was arrested, she had followed him from her brother's house. Johnson testified that Gaines's taillights were working, and she could not recall any white light shining through the taillight.

Zina Janine Gaines, Gaines's wife, testified that her brother and sister-in-law returned Gaines's vehicle around 11:30 or 12:00 on the night Gaines was arrested. The next morning, around 11:00 a.m., Zina took pictures of the car. Zina stated that both taillights were working, and they were all red. No white light was showing through the taillight. Zina admitted that at the time the pictures were taken it was much lighter outside than when Gaines was arrested. Saxon testified as follows:

Q. I have three pictures here and they all depict a right taillight on some kind of a car. It doesn't actually say. Does that look to you about the way it looked that night?

A. No, no.

Q. It doesn't look like that?

A. From these pictures I can't tell. It's possible that that might be.

Q. Do you think it is possible - this is the way it looked that night?

A. It might be.

After hearing the argument of counsel, the trial court requested a copy of the statute addressing the traffic violation, stating:

THE COURT: I want to read that statute. From looking at these pictures to me it seems like there's a little white light out of this because there's no holes around the taillight and maybe it's shining through the part where there's no holes, but my question is: Does that constitute a defective taillight?

After reading the statute, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Gaines pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to four months in jail probated for one year.

Discussion

Gaines presents three issues challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. (1) In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, but we decide de novo whether the trial court erred in misapplying the law to those facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reaching our decision, we must first determine the applicable law.

"[A]n officer may lawfully stop and detain a person for a traffic violation." McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A person commits a traffic violation if the person operates a vehicle that does not "emit a red light plainly visible at a distance of 1,000 feet from the rear of the vehicle." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 547.004, 547.322(d) (Vernon 1999). No traffic violation occurs if a fracture in a taillamp allows white light to emit, so long as the taillamp continues to emit the requisite red light. See Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (on rehearing).

In this case, the trial judge evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and accepted Saxon's testimony that the taillight was broken. However, Saxon never testified that Gaines's taillight ceased to emit the red light. Saxon stated, "a chunk [was] missing out of the right taillight therefore when [Gaines] pressed the brake pedal, a white light could come through." Saxon explained, "When the taillight illuminated it was supposed to illuminate all red and there was a white light coming through." Saxon stated that the pictures were possibly an accurate depiction of the condition of the taillight on the night he arrested Gaines, and the pictures reveal the majority of the taillight covering was in place. Based on his review of the pictures, the trial judge believed there was "a little white light" shining through, but was uncertain whether that constituted a defective taillight. Applying the law as pronounced in Vicknair, Saxon was not justified in stopping Gaines because there was no evidence that Gaines's vehicle ceased to emit the requisite red light. Vicknair, 751 S.W.2d at 189-90.

The State asserts that even if we determine that the initial stop was illegal, we can uphold the trial court's ruling based on the attenuation doctrine. The State contends that the discovery of the outstanding warrant attenuated the connection between the seizure of the illegal weapon and Gaines's illegal detention.

Although Gaines informed Saxon that the pistol was in his car, we must determine whether the illegal detention tainted that information and the subsequent seizure of the pistol. See Jefferson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd). The following factors are considered in determining whether the taint was sufficiently attenuated: (1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Jefferson, 783 S.W.2d at 820.

Gaines was not given the Miranda warnings, and only a short period of time elapsed between the illegal detention and the information volunteered by Gaines in response to Saxon's questioning. Neither of the first two factors support attenuation. See Jefferson, 783 S.W.2d at 820 (noting that as long as a two hour differential has been held insufficient to purge the taint and finding a one hour differential did not support attenuation).

With regard to the third factor, the State asserts that the discovery of the outstanding warrant is an intervening circumstance that breaks the connection between the primary taint and the subsequently discovered evidence. In those cases which hold that the discovery of a warrant factors in favor of attenuation, however, the defendant is arrested pursuant to the warrant, and the arrest creates a temporal break between the illegal detention and the legal arrest. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 915 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1995, no pet.); Welcome v. State, 865 S.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Brooks v. State, 830 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940, 947 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, no pet.). In this case, Saxon was unable to arrest Gaines pursuant to the warrant. Despite that knowledge, Saxon decided to question Gaines about the warrant. After determining that Gaines was aware that the warrant existed and that Gaines intended to make arrangements to make the necessary payment, Saxon continued to question Gaines. Gaines only volunteered the information about the pistol during Saxon's prolonged questioning. Although the warrant in this case would generally serve as an intervening circumstance, this factor does not weigh very heavily in favor of attenuation given that Saxon could not arrest Gaines pursuant to the warrant, Saxon knew he was unable to arrest Gaines when he started questioning him, and Saxon continued questioning Gaines even after clarifying the situation regarding the warrant.

With regard to the fourth factor (the flagrancy of the police misconduct), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a fractured taillight is not a traffic violation in 1986, which was twelve years prior to the date Gaines was stopped. Vicknair, 751 S.W.2d at 189-90. Twelve years after Vicknair, "no well-trained Texas police officer could reasonably believe that white light appearing with red light through a cracked red taillight lens constituted a violation of traffic law." United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999). Ignoring precedent which has been established for twelve years to stop a motorist is not reasonable.

Although the third factor weighs slightly in favor of attenuation, the remaining factors do not. Since there was no justification for stopping Gaines, and the taint from the illegal stop was not sufficiently attenuated, the trial court erred in denying Gaines's motion to suppress.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PHIL HARDBERGER,

CHIEF JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Because Gaines's judgment of guilt is not independent of the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, we have jurisdiction to consider Gaines's appeal. See Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).