Weston Ray Clayton v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 187th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

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Nos. 04-99-00163-CR & 04-99-00164-CR
Weston Ray CLAYTON,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 98-CR-5528B & 98-CR-5764
Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Alma L. L pez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 10, 1999

AFFIRMED

In Appeal No. 04-99-00163-CR, Weston Ray Clayton appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery in Cause No. 98-CR-5528B. In Appeal No. 04-99-00164-CR, Clayton appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery in Cause No. 98-CR-5764. Clayton raises the same issue in both appeals. Each of Clayton's issues address the voluntariness of his pleas. Clayton specifically complains that the district judge did not adequately admonish him about the possible consequences of his no-contest pleas and the possible effects of his plea agreements. Clayton argues that these failures caused him to enter an involuntary plea.

To be constitutionally valid, a defendant's plea must be knowing and voluntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). For this reason, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial judge to admonish a defendant prior to accepting a guilty or no contest plea. See Meyers v. State, 623 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The required admonishments are specified in article 26.13 of the Code. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (a) (Vernon 1989). Substantial compliance with the required admonishments is sufficient to uphold a "no contest" plea "unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court." Id. art. 26.13(c).

In the instant case, Clayton complains that the trial judge did not comply with article 26.13 by failing to verbally admonish him about (1) the range of punishment for aggravated assault, (2) his constitutional rights, (3) the judge's options when considering a plea agreement; and for failing to establish his mental competency prior to accepting his plea. Although he recognizes that article 26.13 permits the trial judge to admonish the defendant in writing in lieu of verbal admonishments, Clayton argues that the court's written admonishments lack the indicia of reliability needed to establish a voluntary plea. Specifically, Clayton relies upon: (1) errors on his plea agreements that indicate he pleaded guilty rather than no contest, (2) an error wherein he signed the "Certificate of Defense Counsel" rather than his attorney, and (3) the absence of a signature by the deputy district clerk on the "Court's Admonishments and Defendant's Waivers and Affidavit of Admonition." Despite these complaints, the record does not reflect that Clayton's plea was in any way involuntary or unknowing. Instead, the record reflects that despite his youth--nineteen years old, Clayton knew what was at stake when he entered his no-contest pleas.

The record contains a document entitled "Waiver, Consent to Stipulation of Testimony and Stipulations" wherein Clayton acknowledges that he understood his privilege against self-incrimination, and his right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses. Although Clayton, rather than his attorney, signed the section of this document that was intended to serve as the attorney's attestation that he advised the defendant of his rights, Clayton attested in the previous section that he had been advised about his federal and state constitutional and procedural rights. As a result, this mistake does not indicate that Clayton did not understand his rights or that his plea was not knowing.

The record contains another document entitled "Court's Admonishment and Defendant's Waiver and Affidavit of Admonishments" that bears Clayton's signature. This document contains the range of punishment for aggravated robbery, and an admonishment explaining the judge's options in considering a plea agreement. The admonishment correctly explains the law on that issue. Clayton's plea agreement is attached to the document. The agreement reflects the State's agreement to a seventeen-year cap on imprisonment. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Clayton in accordance with this cap. As a result, the trial judge's failure to orally admonish Clayton about the range of punishment and the court's options in considering a plea agreement could not have rendered Clayton's plea involuntary. Although the deputy district clerk did not notarize Clayton's signature, Clayton does not contest that he signed the document.

As for ascertaining his mental competency, Clayton does not contend that he was not competent when he entered his plea. Instead, his colloquy with the trial judge indicates that he was competent to enter his plea despite his youth. Before accepting Clayton's plea, the trial judge referred to the documents discussed above and verbally admonished Clayton about his right to a jury trial. After Clayton pleaded "no contest," the trial judge ascertained that Clayton understood that the effect of a no-contest plea was the same as the effect of a guilty plea. Under these circumstances, Clayton's plea was not involuntary.

Undoubtably, Clayton entered his no-contest pleas, hoping that the trial judge would consider his youth and grant his applications for deferred adjudication. The testimony of his numerous sentencing witnesses indicates that Clayton fully considered his legal rights and the consequences of possible pleas, and determined that his best chance for probation was before the trial judge. The decision to plead to a first degree felony is a serious and complicated decision, each plea accompanied by its own risks; however, the denial of a defendant's application for deferred adjudication does not render the defendant's plea involuntary. Because we find that Clayton's plea was knowing and voluntary, we overrule his three issues on appeal and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 

Alma L. L pez, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

 

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