Francisco Lucio v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 49th Judicial District Court of Webb County

No. 04-99-00149-CR
Francisco LUCIO,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 98-CRN-00291-D1
Honorable Manuel R. Flores, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Alma L. L pez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 6, 1999

AFFIRMED

Francisco Lucio appeals his conviction for murder. In two points of error, he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

I.

Francisco Lucio and Orlando Hernandez seized Fidel Aguilar as he was leaving church on a Sunday morning, handcuffed him, and drove him to a deserted ranch. Hernandez then beat Aguilar to death. Hernandez and Lucio loaded Aguilar's body into the trunk of the car and dumped it in an abandoned shed. At the insistence of Aguilar's wife, who was having an affair with Hernandez, Hernandez and Lucio returned to the scene to drag Aguilar's body closer to the street so that it might be found. Aguilar's body was recovered, and Hernandez and Lucio were charged with murder in connection with Aguilar's death. The trial court granted a severance. Lucio was tried alone before a jury on the murder charge. The jury found Lucio guilty of murder, and sentenced him to fifteen years incarceration.

Lucio appeals.

II.

Lucio argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for murder. We review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App.1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 100 (1997). The jury is the exclusive trier of the credibility of witnesses and of the relative weight to be given their testimony. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 247. It is exclusively within the province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. id. The standard for review in circumstantial evidence and direct evidence cases is the same: Whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Golden v. State, 851 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); accord Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). While mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to prove that a person is a party to the crime, it is a circumstance tending to prove guilt that, when combined with other facts, may suffice to show the accused is a participant. See Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App.1987); Alvarez v. State, 813 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction under the law of parties where the actor is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages the commission of the offense either by words or other agreement. See Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App.1985); Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. Crim. App.1978). In determining whether a defendant participated in an offense as a party, the court may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. See Beier v. State, 687 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim. App.1985); Medellin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. Crim. App.1981).

While there is no physical evidence linking Lucio to the primary crime scene, Lucio gave a voluntary statement to the police whereby he places himself at the ranch and admits assisting Hernandez in transporting and disposing of Aguilar's body. Lucio's statement says:

Orlando picked me up at the house. We went to pick up a dude. We went to a ranch. They got out fighting. Then he grabbed a pipe and hit him. I told him not to. He kept on hitting him, and then he took out a knife, and hit him on the neck. I was already telling him not to, and after he killed him, we loaded him in the car, and went to dump him. But I didn't know anything that they had a quarrel. But I didn't hit him or did anything to him. The car that picked me up was a four door, like an LTD. Then I helped him throw him in the trunk and we went to dump him. Then he left me at my home but I didn't know anything, and I didn't know anything about the quarrel he had with him. He had a knife under the car seat, and he tossed it out right there in the ranch.

 

There is also testimony by a police officer that Hernandez handcuffed Aguilar as he left the church, and that Aguilar remained handcuffed while in the car until the parties reached the deserted ranch.

There is no dispute that Aguilar was brutally murdered. There is no dispute for our purposes that Hernandez did the killing. The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to show that Lucio solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Hernandez to commit the offense of murder. We find that it is. Lucio's presence with Hernandez aided or attempted to aid Hernandez in the commission of the offense at a minimum by providing a lookout and an accomplice to physically restrain Aguilar if necessary. The jury was also free to infer Lucio's complicity in the murder and his intent to be present at the commission of that crime, even if Lucio did not know of Hernandez's criminal intent prior to picking up Aguilar, because he remained with Hernandez while Hernandez handcuffed Aguilar, put him in the car and traveled to a deserted locale, and fatally beat an essentially defenseless man whose hands were bound behind his back.

Under Lucio's version of the facts, he had the misfortune of being present while a friend kidnapped and handcuffed a stranger (to Lucio), took that man to a deserted location and brutally beat and stabbed the man to death, all over Lucio's half-hearted protestations and without physical involvement on his part. We reject Lucio's argument. A rational jury could find that the facts in evidence conduced to establish the elements of murder under the law of parties. The jury was free to disbelieve Lucio's alternate and conflicting alibi testimony and his protestations in his statement that he was ignorant of Hernandez's intentions. We find that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Lucio's conviction for murder. Lucio's first point of error is overruled.

When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence "without the prism of the light most favorable to the prosecution and set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jury heard Lucio's lengthy testimony attempting to establish an alibi and disclaiming any involvement in Aguilar's death. As well, the jury was presented with physical evidence linking Hernandez and Aguilar, but no physical evidence linking Lucio to Aguilar. While this evidence does not support the jury verdict, it is insufficient to classify the jury's verdict "clearly wrong and unjust." The jury had the benefit of this evidence, and, as evidenced by their guilty verdict, chose to disbelieve Lucio and afford greater weight to his statement and the testimony of the police officers. This is their prerogative. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 247. Viewing the evidence as instructed, we find that there is factually sufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder. Lucio's second point of error is overruled. III.

Having found the evidence legally and factually sufficient, we affirm Lucio's conviction for murder.

Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

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