Clarence Felder v. The State Bar of Texas--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

99-00134 Felder v State Bar of Texas.wpd No. 04-99-00134-CV
Clarence FELDER,
Appellant
v.
The STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 98-CI-00485
Honorable Mark Davidson, Judge Presiding(1)

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 6, 1999

AFFIRMED

This appeal arises from a disbarment proceeding. Appellant Clarence Felder, (hereinafter "Felder") complains that the trial court violated his state and federal due process rights by failing to provide notice that the disciplinary hearing could result in disbarment. In light of Felder's stipulations to the extensive disciplinary violations detailed in a Rule 11 agreement, we find that all constitutional due process requirements were satisfied and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1997, three clients brought claims of professional misconduct by Felder to the State Bar Commission for Lawyer Discipline. These claims were subsequently consolidated and tried by the court. The allegations described distinct instances of Felder's repeated failure to respond to discovery requests and to file answers, forgery of client's signatures to bankruptcy petitions and various other court documents, and disregard for client inquiries. For one client, Felder's misconduct resulted in a $1.6 million default judgment, which Felder further mishandled by filing the improper bankruptcy action and forging his client's signature to remedy the error. On January 8, 1999, Felder signed a Rule 11 agreement stipulating to the above allegations of professional misconduct. After both the State Bar Commission and Felder waived a jury trial on the consolidated claims, the trial court entered an order of disbarment on January 12, 1999.

Standard of Review

We review Felder's challenge to the trial court's judgment of disbarment under an abuse of discretion standard. See Rangel v. State Bar of Texas, 898 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex App. -San Antonio 1995, no writ). The judgment of a trial court in a disciplinary proceeding may be so light or so heavy as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether an attorney guilty of professional misconduct should be reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred. Id.

Compliance with Due Process Requirements

On appeal, Felder challenges his disbarment on the grounds that the trial court failed notify him that disbarment was a potential sanction. An attorney in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge. Weiss v. Comm. for Lawyer Discipline, 981 S.W.2d 8, 14 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). Felder does not dispute that he was given proper notice of the hearing or charges raised against him. Rather, he complains of lack of notice regarding the full range of punishment imposed. Although the requirements of due process guarantee that a disciplinary hearing afford an attorney with the opportunity to explain the charges raised against him, no requirement exists for informing the attorney of the full range of punishment. Weiss, 981 S.W.2d at 14.

Felder further asserts that his disbarment resulted from "innocuous and unknown conduct." This argument lacks merit because Felder knowingly entered into a Rule11 agreement which stipulated to fact-specific instances of misconduct. Specifically, Felder acknowledged violations of sections 1.01(a), 1.01(b)(1)(2), 1.03(a)(b), and 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct which address the following forms of misconduct: neglect and conscious disregard for client responsibility; failure to apprise clients of relevant information; and acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. Additionally, Felder completed a previous one year suspension for prior acts of attorney misconduct.

The record reveals that the trial court relied directly upon Felder's own fact stipulations to violations of disciplinary rules as grounds for disbarment. We therefore hold that no due process violation exists and that the trial court acted within its discretion in entering an order of disbarment.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

Catherine Stone, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. The Honorable Mark Stwenson presided over the disbarment hearing. The Honorable Mark Davidson entered the order of disbarment.