Ex Parte Sylvan Anthony Inman--Appeal from County Court At Law No 1 of Guadalupe County

No. 04-98-00202-CR
Ex parte Sylvan Anthony INMAN,
From the County Court at Law, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. CCL-97-1118
Honorable Linda Z. Jones, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 30, 1998

AFFIRMED

Sylvan Anthony Inman appeals the trial court's denial of the relief requested in his pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Because the issue in this case involves well-settled law, we affirm the trial court's order in this memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 47.1, Tex. R. App. P.

On August 3, 1997 Inman was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a complaint and information charging him with misdemeanor DWI were later filed in the Guadalupe County Court at Law. At the time of his arrest, Inman supplied a specimen of his breath showing an alcohol concentration of above 0.10. Consequently, the Texas Department of Public Safety notified him of its intent to suspend his driver's license pursuant to Chapter 524 of the Texas Transportation Code. After an administrative hearing requested by Inman, the administrative law judge held the Department failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence there was probable cause to arrest Inman for DWI and denied the Department's petition to suspend Inman's license. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 524.035(a)(2).

Inman then filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the criminal case pending in Guadalupe County, alleging the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause to arrest. After a hearing, the trial court denied the relief requested. In two points of error, Inman appeals the trial court's order, contending the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the issue of probable cause and section 524.012 (e) of the Texas Transportation Code violates the separation of powers clause of article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution(1).

For the reasons set forth in this court's opinion in Ex parte Keeler, No. 04-97-00812-CR, 1998 WL 429631 (San Antonio July 31, 1998, pet. filed) (publication ordered Sept. 23, 1998), we hold the doctrine of collateral estoppel embodied in the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy does not apply in cases involving a criminal prosecution following an administrative license suspension proceeding. Therefore, collateral estoppel cannot properly be raised in a pretrial application for habeas relief. See also State v . Brabson, No. 1309-95, slip op. at 3 n.2, 1998 WL 75670, at *1 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 1998) (reh. pend.); Ex parte Yates, 966 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. filed). We therefore overrule Inman's first point of error. Because the relief requested in Inman's writ of habeas corpus was properly denied without regard to section 524.012 (e) of the Texas Transportation Code, we need not decide the constitutional issue presented in his second point of error. The order of the trial court is affirmed.

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Section 524.012(e) provides:

A determination under this section:

(1) is a civil matter;

(2) is independent of and is not an estoppel to any matter in issue in an adjudication of a criminal charge arising from the occurrence that is the basis for the suspension; and

(3) does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 524.012(e) (Vernon Pamphlet 1998).

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