Jerry Mac Cameron v. The State of Texas Appeal from 263rd District Court of Harris County (opinion)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 19, 2016. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-15-00447-CR JERRY MAC CAMERON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 263rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1373848 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Jerry Mac Cameron was convicted of indecency with a child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, alleging he lacked the requisite intent.1 We hold the evidence is legally sufficient for a rational juror to 1 Appellant states, without separate analysis, that his conviction violates his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Texas Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. To satisfy find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense of indecency with a child. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgement. BACKGROUND The complainant, C.C., was six years old at the time of the offense. The offense occurred when C.C., her then-fifteen-year-old sister Sarah, and her sister’s then-boyfriend Ben spent the weekend at appellant’s house. Appellant is Ben’s grandfather. Appellant is known by children and others as “Pappa Mac.” C.C.’s mother, Marie, had met appellant once before, had no negative feelings towards him, and believed “he seemed fine” to watch her children. Marie dropped C.C., Sarah, and Ben at appellant’s house on a Friday night. The children spent the rest of Friday night relaxing and then went to sleep. Appellant’s home consists of one large room with a small bathroom on one side. The doorknob is missing from the bathroom door, leaving a hole in the door. The three children slept together in appellant’s bed—the only bed—while appellant slept on the couch a few feet away. On Saturday, Marie came by the house at some point to check on the girls and to bring Sarah her allergy medicine. At that point, C.C. seemed to be having a good time and “was happy” and “smiling.” Marie left and the sisters eventually went to bed for the night. When Sarah woke-up on Sunday morning, C.C. was playing outside with due process, the record must contain sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, appellant’s due process concerns can be addressed through a sufficiency of the evidence review. See Hughes v. State, 625 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no pet.); see also Strickland v. State, No. 12–06–00145–CR, 2007 WL 1492100, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 2 appellant. At some point, Sarah and Ben decided to take a bath together. They closed the door and put a cloth in the doorknob hole. They were in the bathroom longer than fifteen minutes and C.C. was alone with appellant during this time. C.C. and Sarah were dropped off at home Sunday night. The following weekend, Marie was giving C.C. a bath and going over “no-touch spots.” Marie periodically uses bath time to go over the parts of C.C.’s body that are private and not for others to touch. C.C. made her outcry statement to Marie during this bath. C.C. told her that “Pappa Mac” had touched her “private area.” The next day, Marie filed a report with the Baytown Police Department. The officer informed her that C.C. should be evaluated by someone from the Children’s Assessment Center. Marie brought C.C. to the Children’s Assessment Center, where she was evaluated by Elizabeth Castro, a forensic interviewer whose job is to interview children after allegations of sexual abuse. C.C. was also examined by Dr. Reena Isaac, a doctor specializing in medical evaluations of children who are suspected victims of sexual abuse. At trial, Sarah testified to the weekend’s events. She testified that on Saturday they went to buy movies, went to the park, and got pizza. She stated that it seemed like C.C. was enjoying playing with appellant Sunday morning. Sarah also testified that appellant was “looking at [C.C.] and saying how beautiful she is even though she has a disability and saying he wants to get her . . . a little train so when she comes over more she could play with it.” Sarah testified that she and Ben were having sex when they were in the bathroom and could not hear anything. On cross-examination, she indicated some confusion as to whether the bathroom incident happened Saturday or Sunday. She maintained that they were interrupted by appellant, who burst into the bathroom and told her that she needed to get out because “[C.C.] keeps asking questions and 3 . . . [is] wondering what’s going on.” Sarah said she left the bathroom and found C.C. on the couch watching TV. She stated that C.C. began acting differently after the bathroom incident. When Sarah continued to ask C.C. what was wrong, C.C. “just got all quiet,” which Sarah said is uncharacteristic of C.C because “she is never quiet.” Marie testified that C.C. was quiet when she got home from appellant’s house and was “different” the following week. When Marie asked C.C. why she was being quiet, C.C. responded that she was “just tired.” Marie testified that she was shocked and became very upset and emotional after hearing C.C.’s outcry statement. Marie immediately went to ask Sarah if she knew about appellant touching C.C. Sarah testified that she was also shocked and that she started crying. C.C. testified at trial and remembered some but not all of the weekend’s details. She testified that on Sunday morning she was alone with appellant while Sarah and Ben were in the bathroom. She stated that she was wearing pajama pants and a shirt with panties underneath. She testified that appellant laid her on her back on the bed, pulled down her pajama pants and panties, and touched in her vagina. She said he touched her only once with one finger and did not say anything. The State used a tissue box to allow C.C. to show the jury exactly where appellant touched her. This time, C.C. stated that he just touched the outside of her vagina, not inside. C.C. testified that the touch did not hurt. C.C. also testified that appellant did not make her touch him anywhere and that appellant had clothes on the whole time. Elizabeth Castro testified that C.C. appeared uncomfortable during their oneon-one interview at the Children’s Assessment Center. Despite this, Castro stated that C.C. told her that “Pappa Mac” had touched inside her vagina. Castro also testified that she did not have to lead C.C. to disclose appellant’s name or his 4 relationship to her. Castro described C.C. as being embarrassed and not forthcoming with her narrative. Dr. Isaac testified that when he went through his routine medical examination questions with C.C., she told him “Pappa Mac” touched her “in [her] private” under her clothes with his finger and that it hurt. Although Dr. Isaac observed nothing abnormal about C.C.’s vagina during the examination, he testified that this is not uncommon with allegations of digital penetration of a child. Dr. Danielle Madera, a staff psychologist at the Children’s Assessment Center who did not examine C.C., testified that child sexual abuse victims will sometimes remember the actual abuse more distinctly than the details surrounding the incident. Dr. Madera also explained the concept of “grooming” as “any sort of behavior that a perpetrator will use to gain the trust of that child to later manipulate that child.” Dr. Madera included tickling and wrestling in her list of grooming behaviors. She testified that grooming is often geared toward not only the child but also members of the child’s family and the community so that the perpetrator will be seen as a “respected, trusted individual.” According to statements from appellant and testimony from his friends and family, he was “good with kids” and was known to engage children in roughhousing, wrestling, and tickling. At trial, Ben testified that he has always felt comfortable around his grandfather. Ben also denied that appellant interrupted him and Sarah in the bathroom. Appellant chose not to testify at trial, but Detective Jason Kelly testified about appellant’s voluntary interview with Detective Kelly at the Baytown Police Station. Detective Kelly stated that appellant said he and C.C. played together that weekend. This included “popping” the back of her panties and “goos[ing] her,” which he defined as tickling. Detective Kelly testified that when he asked 5 appellant if he had touched C.C.’s vagina, appellant said: “no, but if I did, I didn’t mean to. It would be an accident.” The State urged that appellant’s statements showed he never directly denied touching C.C.’s vagina. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault of a child, but the jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of indecency with a child. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS In his single issue on appeal, appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent necessary to be convicted of indecency with a child. I. Standard of review and applicable law In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. See Canfield v. State, 429 S.W.3d 54, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). When the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court presumes the trier of fact resolved the conflicts in favor of the State and defers to that determination. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 6 The State is not required to disprove every reasonable alternative hypothesis that is inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Additionally, direct and circumstantial evidence may both be probative and “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A person commits the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child younger than seventeen years of age, a person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). “Sexual contact” includes any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child, done with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(c)(1) (West 2011). The intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire can be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances; an “oral expression” of intent is not required. Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d). The uncorroborated testimony of a child seventeen years of age or younger is sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07 (West Supp. 2015). Courts liberally construe the testimony of child sexual abuse victims and “as long as the child communicates to the jury that the touching occurred on a part of the body within the definition of the statute,” the evidence will be sufficient. Jones v. State, 428 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet). II. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Appellant’s sole contention is that the evidence is insufficient to show that he had the requisite intent to “arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” 7 Tex. Pen. Code § 21.11(c)(1). Appellant asserts that testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the incident is contradictory, so a rational jury could not reach a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant points to conflicting testimony from C.C. as to whether appellant touched the inside or outside of her vagina. Appellant also points to Sarah’s confusion as to whether she and Ben took their bath Saturday or Sunday and who C.C. first told about the incident. Our role is not to resolve conflicts in the evidence, however. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Instead, we presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the verdict. Id. The State presented sufficient evidence to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the requisite intent for indecency with a child. C.C. testified at trial that appellant laid her on the bed, pulled off her pajama pants and underwear, touched the outside of her vagina one time with his finger, and pulled up her clothing after he touched her. See McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that when the appellant knelt down in front of complainant, said he was going to “see if she [was] clean,” touched her genitalia, and left immediately, the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire was a “permissible deduction”). C.C. also testified that appellant never tossed her on the bed in a playful way or popped her panties. C.C. and Sarah both testified that appellant was alone with C.C. for at least fifteen minutes while Sarah and Ben were in the bathroom. The jury heard testimony from Dr. Isaac, Castro, and Marie in which C.C.’s basic allegations of appellant touching her vagina remained consistent over time. Given this evidence and the wide latitude afforded to child testimony in sexual abuse cases, a rational juror could have concluded that appellant touched C.C.’s vagina with the intent to gratify or arouse his sexual desire rather than accidentally. See Balsley v. State, No. 01–10–00560– 8 CR, 2012 WL 3041449, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding the jury was entitled to find appellant had the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person even though he contended he touched complainant’s bare breast during accidental horseplay). Appellant maintains that if he had touched C.C.’s vagina, it would have been accidentally when he threw her on the bed while they were playing. The jury heard appellant’s statements to Detective Kelly and the testimony of appellant’s friends and family that appellant is “good with kids,” “unequivocally” trusted, and known to roughhouse and play with children. Nevertheless, the jury convicted appellant, choosing not to accept appellant’s proffered explanation. See Johnson v. State, 421 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Appellant's own statement that he did not conspire to rob Vasquez does not render the evidence to the contrary insufficient.”). We conclude that a rational jury could have made that choice. See Cole v. State, 194 S.W.3d 538, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d.) (holding jury is entitled to believe any or all testimony of State’s witnesses and its resolution of conflicts in evidence in favor of State did not render evidence factually insufficient). The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Madera about grooming, and it reasonably could have interpreted Sarah’s testimony about appellant telling C.C. how beautiful she was and how he wanted to buy C.C. a train as grooming behavior indicative of guilt. See Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 657-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding “grooming” is legitimate phenomenon and wellestablished subject of expert testimony in Texas and beyond). Additionally, a jury rationally could have inferred that appellant’s alleged roughhousing with C.C.— which included “play[ing] rough” and tickling—was also grooming behavior. See 9 id. at 667-68 (describing grooming behaviors like “engaging in ‘games’ or horseplay” as supported by case law). The jury watched the video of Castro’s interview with C.C. at the Children’s Assessment Center. Jurors were able to assess her demeanor and hear her conflicting and sometimes unintelligible statements regarding the incident. Again, the jury rationally chose to resolve conflicts in favor of the State. See Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 551 (“The jury has the sole province to decide what weight is to be given to contradictory testimony as it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.”). Appellant also contends that jurors acted irrationally because they used the evidence to convict appellant of indecency with a child but not of aggravated sexual assault, which requires penetration. As noted above, there was conflicting testimony from C.C. as to whether appellant penetrated C.C.’s vagina or only touched the outside. As the “exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to testimony,”2 jurors were entitled to resolve the conflict regarding penetration in appellant’s favor while resolving the conflict regarding intentional touching in the State’s favor. Given the state of the evidence, a reasonable juror could have convicted appellant of indecency with a child but not aggravated sexual assault. See State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“If there is evidence that raises a fact issue of whether the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense, an instruction on the lesser-included offense is warranted, regardless of whether the evidence is weak, impeached, or contradicted.”); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.08. (West 2006) (“In a prosecution for an offense with lesser included offenses, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense, but guilty of any lesser included 2 Canfield, 429 S.W.3d at 65. 10 offense.”). CONCLUSION For these reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court. /s/ J. Brett Busby Justice Panel consists of Justices Busby, Donovan, and Wise. Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.