In Re Michele Le--Appeal from 125th District Court of Harris County
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Emergency Motion for Stay Denied, Motion to Consolidate Granted, Petitions for
Writ of Mandamus Denied, and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed March 3,
2011.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
____________
NO. 14-11-00132-CV
NO. 14-11-00156-CV
____________
IN RE MICHELE LE, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
125th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2008-41349
MAJORITY
OPINION
Relator Michele Le has filed two related petitions for writ of mandamus in this
court. See Tex. Gov‘t Code § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the first, filed on
February 22, 2011, and docketed under cause number 14-11-00132-CV, relator complains
that respondent, the Honorable Kyle Carter, presiding judge of the 125th District Court of
Harris County, abused his discretion in ordering ―death penalty‖ sanctions in the
underlying case styled Luong Le, Individually and as President and Treasurer of Lindsay
Realty Services, LLC v. Nhu Thi Le, a/k/a Michele Le, Panda Village Management, LLC
and Lindsay Realty Services, LLC. In the second, filed on February 28, 2011, and
docketed under cause number 14-11-00156-CV, relator complains that the respondent
abused his discretion by making monetary sanctions due and payable before rendition of a
final judgment. We grant relator‘s motion to consolidate these two proceedings. Relator
also filed a motion to stay the trial scheduled to commence during the two-week period
beginning March 7, 2011. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.10(a). In her motion, relator also seeks
to stay the sanctions order and any future contempt hearings.
BACKGROUND
Relator and her brother, Luong Le, are principals of Lindsay Realty Services, LLC,
which was formed to purchase and manage over one hundred condominium units at a
complex in Houston, Texas. In July of 2008, real party in interest Luong Le, individually
and as president and treasurer of Lindsay Realty Services, LLC (hereinafter, ―Plaintiff‖),
filed suit against relator Michele Le, Lindsay Realty, and Panda Village Management LLC,
asserting, among other claims, that relator committed fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
related to the management of the condominium units.1
Discovery
A few months later, in September 2008, Plaintiff noticed relator‘s deposition for
October 10, 2008, and served a subpoena duces tecum. Relator filed a motion to quash the
deposition, which the trial court denied on October 8, 2008. The trial court ordered
relator‘s deposition to be taken on November 11, 2008, and ordered relator to comply with
the duces tecum, with the exception of request numbers 20 and 21. In the order, the trial
court admonished relator that failure to comply would result in appropriate
sanctions. Relator appeared for her deposition and produced eleven boxes of documents
in response to the duces tecum. But relator did not provide the Lindsay Realty financial
1
The exact nature of the underlying dispute is unclear; our mandamus record does not include the
pleadings below.
2
records on QuickBooks, as requested. Apparently, the deposition was then adjourned
until these records were produced.
Plaintiff then served a second request for production on relator.2 In January 2010,
Plaintiff filed a second motion to compel, and on March 3, 2010, the trial court granted the
motion. The trial court included an order to produce the previously requested QuickBooks
disks, and imposed a $500 sanction against relator for discovery abuse. Relator then
provided QuickBooks on disks, but the disks were password protected. When Plaintiff
obtained the password and his financial expert was able to review the disks, the expert
concluded that they were in an altered format and contained redactions. The expert opined
that the missing data would aid Plaintiff in the investigation and litigation of his claims.
Plaintiff has provided this court with a copy of a third request for production served
on relator in April of 2010. These requests included requests for emails between relator
and five other individuals, and Plaintiff asserts the emails have not been produced. Relator
has not addressed these requests in her mandamus petitions.
When relator failed to respond to Plaintiff‘s request for production, Plaintiff
incurred the expense of procuring the requested documents by depositions on written
questions. Relator moved to quash the depositions on written questions and, on May 17,
2010, the trial court denied relator‘s motion. The trial court ordered the depositions to
proceed. The trial court also ordered relator to identify other bank accounts, and Plaintiff
asserts that relator has not done so.
Plaintiff, on October 7, 2010, filed his third motion to compel compliance with the
trial court‘s discovery orders.3 In this motion, Plaintiff requested both monetary sanctions
and ―death penalty‖ sanctions. A few months later, on December 3, 2010, Plaintiff
2
Plaintiff has asserted that relator has not responded to this request and that these documents have never
been produced.
3
Relator did not include the exhibits to the motion in the mandamus record, but Plaintiff provided them
with his response.
3
supplemented his motion, detailing the alleged discovery abuses. Plaintiff asserted that
―death penalty‖ sanctions were warranted because of relator‘s discovery abuses, failure to
pay the $500 sanctions ordered on March 3, 2010, failure to provide account numbers
ordered on May 17, 2010, and failure to supplement discovery after her objections were
overruled. Plaintiff provided an affidavit asserting that relator‘s discovery abuse had
prejudiced Plaintiff by ―causing a delay in discovery and by failing to provide discoverable
documents and information.‖ Relator filed a supplemental response to Plaintiff‘s
subpoena duces tecum on December 3, 2010, in which she asserted that she had produced
the responsive documents in her possession in most instances and would provide additional
documents before the sanctions hearing.4
“Death Penalty” Sanctions
The trial court conducted a hearing on December 6, 2010.5 At the hearing, Plaintiff
argued that because of relator‘s delays, there is not enough time to complete necessary
discovery before the March 7, 2011, trial setting. After the hearing, relator filed a
document seeking to demonstrate her compliance with the court‘s orders. Plaintiff filed a
post-hearing supplement detailing some of the documents that relator had not produced.6
Relator responded and asserted that she did not have possession of the documents that
Plaintiff alleged she failed to produce. The trial court, on January 21, 2011, signed the
order that is the subject of relator‘s first mandamus petition. In that order the trial court
recited its findings, including the following:
4
Relator indicates that she filed a response to the motion for sanctions, but it is not included in the
mandamus record. Our record contains a short supplemental response filed December 3, 2010. In the
response, relator asserted that Plaintiff would be provided with the remaining discovery before the hearing,
and attached the above-referenced supplemental response to Plantiff‘s subpoena duces tecum.
5
Relator did not provide a record of the hearing with either petition, as required by Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 52.7. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(2) (requiring relator to file a properly authenticated
transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in
evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced). Plaintiff provided a copy with his response.
Relator did not include Plaintiff‘s post-hearing supplement in her mandamus record, but Plaintiff has
provided a copy.
6
4
1. The trial court issued an order on October 8, 2008, for relator to appear for
the continuation of her deposition and produce documents requested in the
notice of deposition duces tecum (with two exceptions) on or before November
11, 2008, and admonished relator that appropriate sanctions would be imposed
for failure to comply;
2. The trial court issued an order on March 3, 2010, sanctioning relator $500
for discovery abuse and ordering her to appear for the continuation of her
deposition on or before April 1, 2010;
3. Relator failed to comply with the March 3, 2010, order;
4. Relator failed to comply with the trial court‘s May 17, 2010, order for
production of title company and bank records, forcing Plaintiff to seek the
information directly from these nonparties by depositions on written questions;
5. Relator‘s attorneys were served on October 29, 2010, with a notice and
subpoena duces tecum for relator to appear for her previously ordered
deposition on December 6, 2010; and
6. Relator unilaterally cancelled the deposition on November 17, 2010.
The trial court ordered relator‘s pleadings stricken and barred relator from
presenting evidence at trial. The trial court further ordered relator to appear for her
deposition at a date convenient to Plaintiff and to bear reasonable costs and attorney‘s fees,
not to exceed $8,500 for the deposition. The trial court sanctioned relator $8,000 in
attorney‘s fees, $4,000 for the costs of examining the accounting records on QuickBooks,
and $11,392.95 for the costs of obtaining discovery by depositions on written
questions. The trial court further ordered that relator will be sanctioned $500 per day for
each day of noncompliance with the order. Even though the order was not signed until
January 21, 2011, the monetary sanctions were ordered to be paid by December 21, 2010.
In the sanctions order the trial court also set forth findings that relator‘s actions had
shown ―flagrant bad faith and callous disregard for the discovery process.‖ See
TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991) (holding that
―death penalty‖ sanctions should not be assessed absent a party‘s flagrant bad faith conduct
or counsel‘s callous disregard of the rules). The order contains findings that relator‘s
5
discovery abuses justify the presumption that her claims and defenses lack merit, that
lesser sanctions have been tested, the conduct warranting sanctions is attributable to
relator, and monetary sanctions alone would be ineffective. See id. at 916 (holding that
where a party has refused to produce material evidence despite the imposition of lesser
sanctions, the court may presume that asserted claims or defenses lack merit and strike the
party‘s pleadings).
Relator filed a motion on February 11, 2011, asking the trial court to reconsider its
sanctions order. No hearing was set on the motion. Relator then filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in this court and requested a stay of the upcoming trial.
Requests for Mandamus Relief
In her first mandamus petition, relator raises two issues asserting that the trial court
abused its discretion by striking her pleadings and prohibiting her from presenting
evidence at the trial, and that she has no adequate remedy by appeal. Relator did not
challenge the monetary sanctions in her first mandamus petition. This court requested a
response to the motion for stay. Plaintiff filed the response on February 28, 2011, and on
that same day, relator filed a second petition for writ of mandamus, docketed under cause
number 14-11-00156-CV, in which she asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
making the monetary sanctions due and payable before rendition of a final judgment and
that she has no adequate remedy by appeal, relying upon Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d
922, 929 (Tex. 1991).7
In the meantime, the trial court signed an amended sanctions order on February 15,
2011, correcting the date that the monetary sanctions were due to be paid, and ordering the
sanctions paid within seven days of the order. The amended order contains the same
―death penalty‖ sanctions and is in all other material respects the same as the January 21,
7
Other than a general complaint that the monetary sanctions will continue to accumulate, relator has not
briefed any specific challenge to the admonishment in the order that noncompliance would result in
additional sanctions of $500 per day for each day of noncompliance.
6
2011 order. Because the original sanctions order that is the basis of relator‘s first
mandamus petition has been replaced by the February 15, 2011, order, relator has
incorporated the arguments from her first petition in the new mandamus petition.
STANDARDS FOR MANDAMUS REVIEW
Mandamus relief is available to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which the
relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004). In determining whether the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In re Sanders,
153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its
decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports the trial court‘s
decision. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997).
INADEQUATE RECORD
It is especially important to note that, in imposing ―death penalty‖ sanctions, the
trial court may properly consider everything that has occurred during the history of the
litigation and is not limited to considering only the last violation of the discovery rules.
See Jefa Co. v. Mustang Tractor and Equip. Co., 868 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); White v. Bath, 825 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Berry-Parks Rental Equip. Co. v.
Sinsheimer, 842 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
Likewise, in assessing the propriety of the ―death penalty‖ sanctions, this court must be
able to evaluate the trial court‘s ruling in light of the history of the litigation. The
mandamus record before this court is inadequate for the task.
This court cannot make a sound decision based on an incomplete picture. But that
is precisely what relator is asking us to do by her failure to provide a sufficient mandamus
record. Those seeking the extraordinary remedy of mandamus must follow the applicable
7
procedural rules.8 Chief among these is the critical obligation to provide the reviewing
court with a complete and adequate record. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837
(Tex. 1992) (stating that it is relator‘s burden to provide a record sufficient to establish her
entitlement to mandamus relief). In the context of a ―death penalty‖ sanctions case in
which the challenged ruling can encompass conduct that occurred over the course of the
litigation, it is incumbent upon the relator to provide this court with a record that would
enable this court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. See id.
Relator has failed to do so. Through the Plaintiff‘s efforts, this court has an unsworn copy
of the record of the December 6, 2010 hearing. But we have no record of the other
discovery hearings, including the hearing on Plaintiff‘s second motion to compel, which
resulted in a $500 sanction against relator. It may be, as the dissenting justice concludes,
that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing ―death penalty‖ sanctions, for the
reasons noted in the dissenting opinion. Or, it may be that a review of what has occurred
during the history of the litigation would reveal that the sanctions are just. But, in the final
analysis, this court cannot and will not find an abuse of discretion on an incomplete record.
LACK OF PREDICATE REQUEST
In addition to failing to provide an adequate record, relator has failed to make the
requisite predicate request to the trial court as to one of relator‘s arguments. In Braden,
the Supreme Court of Texas held that if the imposition of monetary sanctions threatens a
party‘s continuation of the litigation, appeal affords an adequate remedy only if payment of
the sanctions is deferred until a final judgment is rendered and the party has the opportunity
8
Relator did not certify that every factual statement in the petition is supported by competent evidence
included in the appendix or record, as required by the rules of appellate procedure addressing original
proceedings. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(j). Every factual statement in the petition also must be supported
by citation to competent evidence included in the appendix or record. See Tex. R. App. P.
52.3(g). Relator is required to file a mandamus record containing a certified or sworn copy of every
document that is material to relator‘s claim for relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(1). Relator‘s mandamus
record has several relevant omissions. Also, relator is required to file a properly authenticated transcript of
any underlying hearing, or a statement that no testimony was adduced, and she failed to do so. See Tex. R.
App. P. 52.7(a)(2).
8
to supersede the judgment and perfect her appeal. 811 S.W.2d at 929. A party has an
adequate appellate remedy from a sanctions order, unless she asserts that the sanctions are
case determinative. See In Re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d. 714, 722 (Tex. 1998).
Relator alleges for the first time in her second mandamus petition that the monetary
sanctions threaten her ability to proceed with the underlying action. Notably, the record
before this court does not reflect that relator made this argument to the trial court. The
Supreme Court of Texas held in Braden that ―‗if a litigant contends that a monetary
sanction award precludes access to the court, the district judge must either (1) provide that
the sanction is payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final order
terminating the litigation; or (2) makes express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as
to why the award does not have such a preclusive effect.‘‖ Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.
(emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 882–83, n.23
(5th Cir. 1988)). As this court held in Prime Group, Inc. v. O'Neill, 848 S.W.2d 376, 379
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding), if a party does not contend that
pre-judgment payment of the sanction would prevent it from continuing the litigation,
staying the payment of the sanction is not necessary and the party has an adequate remedy
by appeal. See also Ex parte Conway, 843 S.W.2d 765, 766-67 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
making the sanctions payable on a date prior to final judgment when no contention had
been made that payment would preclude continuation of the litigation). Relator was
required to advise the trial court that the monetary sanctions would preclude her
continuation of the underlying suit. See Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929; In re Onstad, 20
S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, orig. proceeding) (refusing to address
complaint that sanctions were payable before final judgment because counsel did not claim
that the monetary sanction threatened the party‘s willingness or ability to continue the
litigation). Our record fails to demonstrate that she did so.
9
Equity is generally not served by issuing an extraordinary writ against a trial court
judge on a ground that was never presented in the trial court and that the trial judge thus had
no opportunity to address. See In re Texas Best Staff, Inc., Nos. 01-08-00296-CV &
01-08-00418-CV, 2008 WL 4531028, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2008,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.). Mandamus relief generally requires a
predicate request for an action and a refusal of that request. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798
S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. 1990). But, the requirement that there be a predicate request and
adverse ruling is excused when such a request would have been futile and the trial court‘s
refusal little more than a formality. See In re Texas Best Staff, Inc., 2008 WL 4531028, at
*5. To determine whether a request would have been futile, appellate courts examine
whether the request would have added anything for the trial court‘s consideration. See
id. In this mandamus proceeding, relator asserts that the trial court‘s monetary sanctions
preclude her from proceeding with the litigation in the trial court and block her access to
the courts. Significantly, however, relator did not make this assertion in the trial court, and
relator did not ask the trial court to set aside the monetary sanctions order, or postpone the
payment of sanctions, based on this assertion. The record does not show that the trial court
would have refused to consider such an assertion and request by relator; if relator had made
this assertion and request, the trial court could have found in relator‘s favor on this point
and provided that the monetary sanctions would be payable only upon final judgment, thus
obviating the need for mandamus relief in this regard. Had relator voiced this complaint
in the trial court, it would have added something for the trial court‘s consideration.
Therefore, it would not have been futile for relator to have requested this relief in the trial
court to see if the trial court would refuse it. See id. at *5-6. Relator did not present this
complaint or otherwise give the trial court an opportunity to correct the alleged deficiency
in its sanctions order, and relator has not asserted otherwise in this court. For these
reasons, relator failed to satisfy the requirement of a predicate request and refusal by the
trial court, and she is not entitled to this requested relief. See id. at *5-6.
10
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we deny relator‘s petitions for writ of mandamus. We
also deny relator‘s motion to stay the trial, the sanctions order, and further sanctions
hearings.
/s/
Kem Thompson Frost
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Frost and Christopher. (Christopher, J.,
dissenting).
11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.