Raymond Carl Martin, Jr. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 177th District Court of Harris County

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 19, 2007.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-06-00216-CR

____________

RAYMOND CARL MARTIN, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1042764

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant, Raymond Carl Martin, Jr., of murder and sentenced him to seventy-five years= confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In two issues, appellant argues (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right of confrontation by not permitting evidence of a prosecution witness=s reputation and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of January 9, 2005, appellant and Danyelle Jefferson were attending a barbeque at an apartment complex in the Greenspoint area of Houston. Jefferson testified that appellant brought a gun in a duffle bag with him to the barbeque. Arnold Moore approached Jefferson and offered him six Xanax pills. Appellant and Moore argued over the price of the pills. When they were not able to come to an agreement, appellant, Moore, and Jefferson went to George Johnson=s apartment to discuss the price with the decedent, Kristina Oblanis. Appellant and the decedent argued over the price of the pills inside the apartment, then walked outside. Appellant was carrying the gun from the duffle bag when he walked outside. Moore, Johnson, and Jefferson remained inside the apartment.

While appellant and the decedent were outside, Moore, Johnson, and Jefferson heard a gunshot. Immediately afterward, appellant came back inside still carrying the gun, and said to Jefferson, ACome on, let=s go.@ Jefferson and appellant walked outside and Jefferson saw the decedent lying face down on the ground. Jefferson asked appellant if he had killed the decedent, and appellant answered that he had. Appellant and Jefferson stopped at another person=s apartment in the same complex, and appellant told that person that he needed to dispose of the gun. At that time, appellant asked Jefferson to go back to the scene and look for bullets. Jefferson told appellant she would look for bullets, but instead used the opportunity to leave the scene. As Jefferson left, she saw police arriving on the scene in response to the gunshot.

Appellant was indicted for murder, enhanced by a prior felony conviction. He pleaded not guilty, and his jury trial began on January 27, 2006. After finding appellant guilty and returning a finding of true on the enhancement, the jury sentenced appellant to 75 years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and assessed a $10,000 fine. This appeal timely followed.

II. Confrontation Clause

In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Appellant attempted to cross-examine Danyelle Jefferson regarding her alleged history as a drug dealer and prostitute after Jefferson had testified about her employment on direct-examination. The State objected on relevance grounds and the trial court sustained that objection, specifically finding that whether Jefferson was a prostitute or drug dealer was not relevant and that the prejudicial effect of such evidence would outweigh any probative value. Although appellant did not raise any confrontation clause issue below,[1] on appeal he complains the trial court violated his federal Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. But because appellant did not make a Confrontation Clause argument or otherwise put the trial judge on notice of such an argument, he must Asuffer on appeal the consequences of his insufficiently specific offer.@ Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Grant v. State, 218 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref=d). Because appellant failed to preserve error on Confrontation Clause grounds, we overrule his first issue.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for murder. Appellant admits the evidence is sufficient to convict him of manslaughter, but contends the evidence is insufficient to show he intended to cause the decedent serious bodily injury or death. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we do not ask whether we believe that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318B19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).

A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003). A person also commits murder if he intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Id. ' 19.02(b)(2). Specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner. Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A handgun is a deadly weapon per se. Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2006). If a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that the defendant intended to kill. Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 215. Proof of a mental state almost always depends upon circumstantial evidence. Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). To determine culpability for an offense, the jury is entitled to consider events that occurred before, during, and after the commission of the offense. Mouton v. State, 923 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.);see also Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

The record reflects that both Danyelle Jefferson and George Johnson saw appellant follow the decedent out of the apartment with a gun in his hand. Both witnesses saw appellant argue with the decedent prior to hearing the gunshot. Appellant admits he fired the gun, but claims he did not intend to cause the decedent serious bodily injury or death. When Jefferson left with appellant, she asked him whether he had killed the decedent. Appellant replied that he had killed her, and later attempted to dispose of the handgun. Appellant=s actions before, during, and after the offense coupled with his use of a deadly weapon present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury or death. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to kill the decedent or cause her serious bodily injury. We overrule appellant=s second issue.

IV. Conclusion

Because we have overruled appellant=s two issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Eva M. Guzman

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 19, 2007.

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Seymore, and Guzman.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

[1] Instead, appellant argued only that the evidence was relevant for impeachment purposes.