Mobley, Elizabeth Ann v. The State of Texas--Appeal from Co Crim Ct at Law No 7 of Harris County

Affirmed and Opinion filed  September 30, 2003.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-02-00356-CR

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ELIZABETH ANN MOBLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the County Criminal Court  at Law No. 7

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1099892

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O P I N I O N

Elizabeth Ann Mobley was convicted by a jury of obstructing a highway and fined by the trial court in the amount of $600. In two issues, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. We affirm.

I. Background

On September 3, 2001, appellant pulled up to a toll booth and handed Caroline Husen, a toll collector with the Harris County Toll Road Authority, a $50 bill to pay a $1.50 toll. Pursuant to toll road authority policy, Husen told appellant she could not accept anything larger than a $20 bill and returned the $50 bill to her. Husen informed appellant she could give her an IOU allowing appellant to pay the toll by mail within 48 hours at no extra charge. Appellant refused to sign the IOU. When Husen told appellant to pay the toll, appellant again handed her the $50 bill. Husen then pointed to the posted notice which stated, NO BILLS LARGER THAN $20 WILL BE ACCEPTED. Appellant adamantly refused, however, to sign the IOU or give Husen a smaller bill.

Husen noticed traffic in her lane was starting to back up and told appellant she was blocking traffic. Husen s booth was the only full-service booth open on the north side of the tollway; the other booths required coins or vehicles with a tag for prepaid tolls. When Husen told appellant she was blocking traffic, appellant replied that she did not care. Husen then called her supervisor, Anthony Green, on the intercom. When Green walked up, appellant still refused to pay the toll. Husen had no more contact with appellant and opened another booth in an attempt to relieve the traffic congestion.

Anthony Green, a plaza supervisor for the toll road authority, again asked appellant to simply sign an IOU. Appellant again refused and said, It says on this form that my vehicle will be seized if I fail to pay. Green told appellant she only needed to worry about a vehicle seizure if she did not pay. According to Green, if a person signs the IOU and then does not pay, there is a processing fee of $5.00, plus the unpaid toll.

Green testified that traffic was building up behind appellant and drivers were trying to go through the coin and prepaid lanes. Green finally gave up trying to collect the toll and instructed appellant to drive on through, but she refused. Green told her that if she did not move, he would have to call the constable. Appellant then put her vehicle in park, and Green called the constable. Green then began working another lane to try to get traffic moving again.

When Harris County Deputy Constable Neilon arrived, he observed 20 to 30 vehicles backed up behind a van with a boat stopped in the lane. After one of the toll plaza advisors explained the situation to him, Neilon asked appellant if there was a problem; appellant replied there was no problem and she had not called him. Neilon admitted that the toll plaza personnel had called him, and appellant then suggested that he ask the toll road employees what had happened. Neilon explained to appellant that he already had spoken to them, and he wanted to hear her side of the story. Appellant responded, Absolutely not. She told Neilon he did not have the right to be there.

Neilon asked for assistance from another unit for safety reasons. When he asked appellant for identification, she told him he had no right to ask her for identification. Neilon informed appellant that because she was operating a vehicle on a public roadway in Texas she had to produce identification when it was requested. Appellant responded that she was not operating a vehicle because it was in park.

Two other patrol units arrived. After appellant refused Neilon s repeated requests to produce identification, he asked appellant to step out of her car. Appellant refused. Neilon again asked appellant to step out of her vehicle. When appellant refused a second time, Neilon opened the door of appellant s vehicle and asked her to step out. Neilon asked appellant to take off her seat belt; when she refused, Neilon reached in and unlatched the seat belt. Appellant still refused to step out of the vehicle.

Neilon and another deputy then physically took her out of the vehicle. Appellant went limp and became a dead weight. As the deputies were pulling appellant from the vehicle, the passenger in the front seat leaned over and grabbed appellant s arms and briefly pulled back. Neilon and another deputy eventually placed appellant in the rear of his patrol car.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In conducting this review, we do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

III. Unreasonably Inconvenient and Hazardous

Appellant claims the State failed to prove that she (1) rendered passage through the tollway unreasonably inconvenient and hazardous, or (2) had been informed that Green was a toll road authority employee who was authorized to control the use of the tollway.

Section 42.03 of the Texas Penal Code addresses the obstruction of a highway or other passageway:

(a) A person commits an offense if, without legal privilege or authority, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:

(1) obstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway, waterway, elevator, aisle, hallway, entrance, or exit to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access, or any other place used for the passage of persons, vehicles, or conveyances, regardless of the means of creating the obstruction and whether the obstruction arises from his acts alone or from his acts and the acts of others; or

(2) disobeys a reasonable request or order to move issued by a person the actor knows to be or is informed is a peace officer, a fireman, or a person with authority to control the use of the premises:

(A) to prevent obstruction of a highway or any of those areas mentioned in Subdivision (1); or

(B) to maintain public safety by dispersing those gathered in dangerous proximity to a fire, riot, or other hazard.

(b) For purposes of this section, obstruct means to render impassable or to render passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous.

Tex. Pen. Code Ann 42.03 (Vernon 2003).

Appellant complains that although the State introduced evidence that traffic behind her vehicle had started to back up and that traffic become potentially dangerous, there is no evidence that the traffic had become unreasonably inconvenient or unreasonably hazardous.

Appellant s vehicle was stopped in a lane at a tollbooth. Green testified that traffic was starting to build up in the full-service lane behind appellant and drivers were pulling into the coin and prepaid lanes because they could not get through the full-service lane. Green testified that he used some tokens to process vehicles through the coin lane to get traffic moving again and another full-service lane was opened.

When Neilon arrived, there were approximately 20 to 30 cars stacked up behind appellant. Neilon testified that vehicles behind appellant were turning into oncoming traffic to get across to other lanes. Neilon explained that to get across the other lanes, drivers had to make a turn and kind of make a little z turn to get over to that lane. And when you have a line of vehicles, it s not always so orderly to do. So, it was a little chaotic until they got it. Moreover, Neilon testified the normal speed on the toll road is 60 to 80 miles per hour and the lane for prepaid tolls is designed so that drivers do not have to slow down when passing through. Neilon further testified:

Q. Now, were the drivers of the vehicles behind the defendant, would you characterize the situation they were having to their change of driving situation as a dangerous one at that point?

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A. Yes, sir. That when they have to come over -- anytime you re having to come from a stop, like I stated, and change over into two lanes over and you have traffic topping a hill, which is right there into the toll plaza, it s -- and at night with limited visibility, it does cause for, you know, some shortened reaction time.

Obstruct means to render passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 42.03(b).

Here, appellant blocked the only open full-service lane of the toll plaza causing cars to cross over to other lanes with fast-moving traffic in order to pass through and forcing the toll road authority to open another lane. We hold this falls within the definition of obstruction by rendering passage of the toll road unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous. See, e.g., Haye v. State, 634 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that individual merely standing in middle of sidewalk, forcing pedestrian to walk around in mud is sufficient to support finding that obstruction of sidewalk rendered passage unreasonably inconvenient); Lauderback v. State, 789 S.W.2d 343, 346 47 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1990, writ ref d) (holding that where appellant blocked one lane of traffic with wheelchair causing cars to stop behind her and wait to move over into next lane in order to pass her clearly rendered passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous); Brightbill v. State, 734 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1987, no writ) (holding that where defendant parked vehicle in ditch where ditch was being graded, forced the grader out of ditch, and instructed crew to leave was sufficient to establish that defendant acted intentionally to render passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous for road grader employed in legitimate enterprise). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of obstructing a highway. Appellant s first issue is overruled.

IV. Authority to Control Tollway

In her second issue, appellant complains that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support her conviction based on the second paragraph of the information alleging that Green was an employee of the toll road authority and had authority to control the use of the tollway. The record does not reflect that Green identified himself to appellant as an employee of the toll road authority with authority to control the use of the tollway. However, the circumstances show that appellant was informed that Green was a toll road authority employee with authority to control the use of the tollway.

When appellant refused to sign the IOU, she asked to see a supervisor. When Green came over after Husen called him, he stepped into the booth and Husen no longer had any dealings with appellant. Green explained to appellant the consequences of not paying the IOU. When traffic was building up behind appellant s vehicle, Green told appellant to just go through. When appellant refused to move, he told her he would call the constable. Between the time that Green called the constables and the constables arrived, Green worked the coins lane, using tokens to allow traffic to pass through. Husen testified that the uniforms for all toll plaza personnel are the same. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was informed that Green was a toll road authority employee with authority to control use of the tollway. Appellant s second issue is overruled.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ J. Harvey Hudson

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed September 30, 2003.

Panel consists of Justices Hudson, Fowler, and Frost.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).