Reule, Christine E. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from Co Crim Ct at Law No 4 of Harris County

Affirmed and Opinion filed June 20, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-02-00378-CR

____________

CHRISTINE E. REULE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 4

Harris  County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 5317

O P I N I O N

Appellant, Christine E. Reule, was convicted by a jury in municipal court of disorderly conduct by abusive language and sentenced to a fine of $500. Appeal was taken to the county criminal court at law, which affirmed the municipal court=s judgment.[1] We affirm.

The record before us is exiguous. On May 1, 2000, a misdemeanor complaint was filed against appellant for using Aabusive, indecent, profane and vulgar language . . . in a public place@on November 15, 1999. Appellant went to trial on August 8, 2000, and, as aforementioned, was convicted of the offense and fined $500, plus costs. Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for new trial, contending the municipal court erred: (1) in allowing a witness without direct knowledge to testify; (2) in admitting testimony as to whether her conduct tended to Aincite an immediate breach of the peace@; (3) in failing to allow her additional time to prepare for trial; (4) in failing to dismiss the action with prejudice because her language was insufficiently egregious as to amount to Afighting words@; and (5) in failing to dismiss the action with prejudice for violation of her right to a speedy trial.

Appellant=s motion for new trial was denied, whereupon she appealed to the county criminal court at law. That court, noting the record contained no statement of facts or bills of exceptions and that no brief had been filed assigning error, found no error in the trial court=s record and affirmed the judgment. Appellant now appeals to this court, we presume, on those grounds advanced in her motion for new trial. See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 30.00027 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (record and briefs on appeal in county court at law constitute record and briefs on appeal to court of appeals).

In her first, second, and fourth points of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony and in finding her language amounted to fighting words. Without a statement of facts, however, we have no way of evaluating what transpired before the trial court. The record on appeal from a municipal court conviction must conform substantially to the provisions governing appellate records under the appellate rules and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 30.00016 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Moreover, a court reporter need not record municipal trial proceedings unless requested by the judge or by a party. Id. ' 30.00010. We do not know whether appellant requested a statement of facts for appeal, although the record before us suggests that no statement of facts exists. We do not know what evidence, if any, was presented. Without an adequate record before us, we cannot review appellant=s complaints. Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s first, second, and fourth points of error.

In her third point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to allow her additional time for trial. Specifically, appellant avers that, as a pro se litigant, she should have been allowed two additional weeks to subpoena witnesses and documents.

A prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review is that the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint; and that the trial court ruled on the request, objection, or motion either expressly or implicitly. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Since the record does not reflect appellant requested additional days to prepare prior to trial, we find that appellant failed to preserve any error for appellate review.

In her fifth point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action for violation of her constitutional right to an expeditious trial.[2]

A[T]he right to a speedy trial is a right to be implemented upon request, and . . . it can, therefore, be waived by want of such a request.@ Guevara v. State, 985 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref=d). In the instant case, the record is bereft of any evidence appellant brought her desire to be tried more hastily to the attention of the trial court. Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s fifth point of error.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ J. Harvey Hudson

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed June 20, 2002.

Panel consists of Justices Hudson, Fowler, and Edelman.

Do Not Publish CTex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).

[1] This Court has jurisdiction over cases that were appealed to the county criminal court from an inferior court where the fine imposed exceeds $100. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 2002).

[2] Appellant argues the State violated her constitutional rights by bringing her to trial A[n]ine months following an alleged incident.@ The length of delay, however, is measured from the time the defendant is formally accused or arrested until the time of trial. Guajardo v. State, 999 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref=d). Here, therefore, the delay complained of is the thirteen weeks between the complaint being filed against appellant on May 1, 2000, and her trial on August 8, 2000.