Yazdchi, Ali and Yazdchi, Habibolah v. The Bennett Law Firm, P.C.--Appeal from Co Civil Ct at Law No 2 of Harris County

Dismissed and Opinion filed May 30, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-01-00928-CV

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ALI YAZDCHI and HABIBOLAH YAZDCHI, Appellants

V.

THE BENNETT LAW FIRM, P.C., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 744,238

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an attempted appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award signed July 2, 2001. Both Ali Yazdchi and Habibolah Yazdchi, the intervenor, filed motions for new trial and notices of appeal. On April 26, 2002, a supplemental clerk=s record was filed containing Habibolah Yazdchi=s plea in intervention filed June 8, 2001, an order granting intervenor=s motion for continuance signed June 27, 2001, and a notice that trial had been reset to August 12, 2002.

On April 29, 2002, Habibolah Yazdchi filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the judgment is not final. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). To date, no response to the motion to dismiss has been filed.

Unless a statutory exception is applicable, this Court=s appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. See Lehmann v. Har Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). AWhen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.@ Id. at 205. Whether a judicial decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. Id. at 195.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court=s judgment does not actually dispose of all pending claims and parties. Specifically, the judgment does not dispose of the intervenor=s claim. Moreover, the record clearly reflects that the court contemplated further proceedings by granting the intervenor=s motion for continuance and setting the matter for trial. Even though the judgment contains a Mother Hubbard clause, stating Aall other relief not expressly granted herein is hereby denied,@ this language no longer indicates that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203-04. No other language in the judgment clearly and unequivocally states it is a final judgment as to all claims and parties. Therefore, we conclude that the July 2, 2001 judgment is not final.

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code grants the right to appeal an order confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 171.098(a)(3). Because a statutory right of appeal has been granted for orders confirming arbitration awards, it follows that an appeal may be taken from such an order, even if it is interlocutory. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd=s of London v. Celebrity, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1998) (recognizing appeals under Texas Arbitration Act are interlocutory when they do not arise from a final judgment disposing of all legal issues between all parties in underlying suit). Appeals from interlocutory orders are accelerated. Tex. R. App. P. 28.1. Filing a motion for new trial does not extend the time to perfect an interlocutory appeal. Id. In an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days after the judgment or order is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). In this case, the notice of appeal from the July 2, 2001 judgment was not filed until September 27, 2001. Accordingly, the notice is untimely to perfect an accelerated appeal from the interlocutory order confirming the arbitration award.

Because we have no jurisdiction over this appeal, we grant intervenor=s motion. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed May 30, 2002.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Anderson and Frost.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).