The Office of the Attorney General v. Anthony Lewis; Princor Financial Services Corporation; Principal Life Insurance Company; Energy Transfer Partners GP, L.P.; and M.A.L.. Appeal from 308th District Court of Harris County (memorandum opinion per curiam)

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Opinion issued May 3, 2016 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-16-00065-CV ——————————— THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Appellant V. ANTHONY LEWIS; PRINCOR FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION; PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS GP, L.P.; AND M.A.L., Appellees On Appeal from the 308th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2000-08653 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, The Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”), appealed from the trial court’s interlocutory order, signed on January 5, 2016, granting a temporary injunction in favor of appellee, Anthony Lewis, in this child support proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). On February 18, 2016, this Court granted the OAG’s motion to stay the entry of a final judgment pending disposition of this interlocutory appeal, but the OAG did not seek a stay of the trial set for February 23, 2016, or any other trial court proceeding. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4), (b) (West Supp. 2015); TEX. R. APP. P. 29.5(b). On March 16, 2016, the trial court granted the motion for partial non-suit of appellee, Anthony Lewis, to dismiss with prejudice all of Lewis’s claims against appellees Princor Financial Services Corporation, Principal Life Insurance Company, and Energy Transfer Partners GP, L.P. Similarly, on March 23, 2016, the trial court granted Lewis’s motion for non-suit to dismiss with prejudice all of Lewis’s claims against the OAG and appellee, M.A.L. On March 30, 2016, Lewis filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction in this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Lewis asserts that the temporary injunction was dissolved once the underlying lawsuit was dismissed after the trial court granted Lewis’s motions for non-suit. He asserts that, although a nonsuit does not affect any pending claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims by defendants or other parties, here there are no other pending claims filed by other parties. Thus, Lewis contends that this appeal is moot because there is no longer an issue in controversy. More than ten days have passed and the OAG has not responded to the motion to dismiss. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a). 2 The “fact that a temporary injunction has been issued does not prevent the plaintiff from taking a non-suit.” Gen. Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. “As a consequence of the trial court’s granting the nonsuit, the temporary injunction ceased to exist and the appeal became moot.” OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d at 571 (citation omitted); see also RSL–3B– IL, Ltd. v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01-13-00933-CV, 2014 WL 3107663, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 8, 2014, pet. dism’d) (“A nonsuit renders the merits of the nonsuited case moot.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court’s order granting the motions for non-suit, which vacated the temporary injunction on appeal, “is not precluded by Rule 29.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.” BP Amoco P.L.C. v. Rowan Cos., Inc., No. 14-0100199-CV, 2001 WL 726322, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2001, pet. dism’d by agr.) (granting appellees’ motion to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction after trial court granted appellees’ motion for nonsuit, which vacated interlocutory order on appeal) (citing, inter alia, TEX. R. APP. P. 29.5 (permitting trial court to issue order dissolving interlocutory order being appealed)). Generally, this Court has civil appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or interlocutory orders specifically authorized as appealable by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014(a)(1)–(12) (West Supp. 2015); 3 Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). However, after the trial court granted Lewis’s motions for non-suit, the temporary injunction dissolved, and there is no appealable final judgment or interlocutory order. See, e.g., Zapata v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 01-15-00346-CV, 2015 WL 7737626, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 1, 2015, no pet.) (granting joint motion to dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction after trial court vacated final judgment on appeal). “Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). Mootness deprives this Court of jurisdiction. See Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000). Thus, we must dismiss this case because we lack jurisdiction over the OAG’s appeal after the non-suits were granted. See RSL–3B–IL, Ltd., 2014 WL 3107663, at *3. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we lift this Court’s stay issued on February 18, 2016, grant Lewis’s motion, and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley. 4

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