Michael Allen Seaton v. The State of Texas Appeal from 351st District Court of Harris County (memorandum opinion per curiam)
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Opinion issued March 31, 2016 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00722-CR ——————————— MICHAEL ALLEN SEATON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1448336 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Michael Allen Seaton, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of injury to a child, reduced from capital murder, with the agreed recommendation of a sentencing cap of 50 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. On August 6, 2014, the trial court signed a judgment convicting appellant of capital murder of a child under six years of age, and in accordance with appellant’s plea bargain with the State, sentenced Seaton to fifty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On August 14, 2015, the trial court signed a judgment nunc pro tunc, correcting the offense to injury to a child. On August 6, 2015, appellant filed a notice of appeal. In a plea-bargain case, a defendant may only appeal those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2006); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). The trial court’s certification states that this is a plea-bargain case and that the defendant has no right of appeal.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record contains plea waiver and admonishment papers indicating appellant was indicted for capital murder, but that he pled guilty to the reduced charge of injury to a child in exchange for the State’s recommendation that sentencing be capped at 50 years’ confinement. Appellant’s agreement to plead guilty in exchange for the State’s reduction in the charge from capital murder to injury to a child constitutes a plea bargain. See Windom v. State, 968 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (appellant pled guilty in exchange for reduction in charge and no sentencing recommendation). Appellant’s plea was also in exchange for the State’s recommendation of a cap on sentencing. See, 1 At the time of the plea, the trial court entered a certification that this was not a pleabargain case and the defendant had the right to appeal. By order issued February 25, 2016, we suggested to the trial court that the certification might be defective. On March 7, 2016, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed, containing a certification indicating this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant had no right to appeal. 2 e.g., Wilson v. State, 264 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (agreement to 25-year sentencing cap constituted plea bargain under TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)). The judgment of conviction indicates the trial court accepted the plea-bargain agreement because it signed a judgment convicting appellant of the reduced charge of injury to a child and assessed appellant’s punishment at 50 years’ confinement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Thus, the record shows this was a plea-bargain case and appellant has no right to appeal. See id. The record supports the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Because appellant has no right of appeal in this plea-bargain case, we must dismiss this appeal without further action. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 3
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