Nathaniel Quarterman, Steve Massie, David Turrubiarte, Julia Humphrey, and Juan Jackson v. Robert Hampton--Appeal from 412th Judicial District Court of Brazoria County
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Opinion issued August 26, 2010
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-09-01061-CV
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NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, STEVE MASSIE, DAVID TURRUBIARTE,
JULIA HUMPHREY, AND JUAN JACKSON, Appellants
V.
ROBERT HAMPTON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 54075
OPINION ON REHEARING
Appellants, Nathaniel Quarterman, Steve Massie, David Turrubiarte, Julia
Humphrey, and Juan Jackson (the ―Employees‖), have filed a motion for rehearing.
We received a response from appellee, Robert Hampton. We deny rehearing but
withdraw our opinion and judgment of June 24, 2010 and substitute this opinion
and judgment in their place.
The Employees brought this interlocutory appeal of the trial court‘s order
denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon 2008);
Singleton v. Casteel, 267 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
pet. denied) (appellate court has jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal from
denial of motion to dismiss filed under Section 101.106(e) of Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code). In their sole issue, the Employees contend the trial court
erred by denying the motion because Section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code requires dismissal of this lawsuit filed against TDCJ
employees in their individual capacities by Hampton, an inmate in the TDCJ. We
conclude the trial court properly denied TDCJ‘s motion to dismiss under Section
101.106(e) because no suit was filed against TDCJ, the governmental unit, as
required for dismissal under that subsection. We affirm.
Background
Hampton sued the Employees in both their individual and official capacities,
alleging theft under the Texas Theft Liability Act, common law conversion, and
federal and state constitutional claims for unlawful taking and denial of due
process. Hampton did not name TDCJ as a defendant in the suit. Hampton
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asserted that, after he was found guilty of the prison disciplinary offense of
―trafficking and trading,‖ the Employees unlawfully removed $710 from his
inmate trust fund account. Hampton contended that forfeiture of funds was not a
permissible disciplinary action for his offense, and after exhausting the institutional
grievance procedure, he filed suit. Except for Juan Jackson, all of the Employees
filed an answer and jury demand.1 Although it was not a party to the suit, TDCJ
filed a motion to dismiss under Section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.
Dismissal Under Section 101.106
In their sole issue, the Employees contend that Section 101.106(e) requires
dismissal of the suit against them in their individual capacities because they were
sued in their official capacities and a suit against employees in their official
capacity is essentially a suit against a governmental unit.
A.
Applicable Law
To determine what Section 101.106(e) means, we examine (1) the rules of
statutory construction, and (2) the statute itself.
1. The Rules of Statutory Construction
Our primary objective in statutory construction is to give effect to the
legislature‘s intent. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). When
1
Jackson did not file an answer, but the Employees contend in their appellate brief
that he was never served with the petition.
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interpreting statutes, courts should ascertain and give effect to the Legislature‘s
intent as expressed by the language of the statute. Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289
S.W.3d 316, 318 (Tex. 2009). ―If the Legislature provides definitions for words it
uses in statutes, then we use those definitions in our task.‖ Id. (citing TEX. GOV‘T
CODE ANN. § 311.011(b) (Vernon 2005)). We rely on the plain meaning of the text
unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246
S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008).
In determining legislative intent, we may
consider, among other things, the objective the law seeks to obtain and the
consequences of a particular construction. TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 311.023(1),
(5) (Vernon 2005). We consider the statute as a whole and not its provisions in
isolation. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. 2002).
2. Terms Used in Section 101.106
Section 101.106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides for
dismissal or prohibition of certain lawsuits or recovery when a lawsuit is filed
against government employees. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106
(Vernon 2005). In relevant part, Section 101.106 states,
....
(b) The filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit
constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately
and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the
governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unless the
governmental unit consents.
....
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(e) If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental
unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be
dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.
(f) If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based
on conduct within the general scope of that employee‘s employment
and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the
governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in
the employee‘s official capacity only. On the employee‘s motion, the
suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files
amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the
governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the
date the motion is filed.
Id.
The Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines the terms used in Section
101.106. ―‗Employee‘ means a person, including an officer or agent, who is in the
paid service of a governmental unit by competent authority . . . .‖ TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(2) (Vernon 2005). ―‗Governmental unit‘ means:
(A) this state and all the several agencies of government that collectively
constitute the government of this state . . . ; (B) a political subdivision of this state,
including any city, county, school district . . . ; (C) an emergency service
organization; and (D) any other institution, agency, or organ of government the
status and authority of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from
laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.‖ Id. § 101.001(3).
The Texas Supreme Court recently interpreted Section 101.106
stating,
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Under the Tort Claims Act‘s election scheme, recovery
against an individual employee is barred and may be sought
against the governmental unit only in three instances: (1)
when suit is filed against the governmental unit only, [TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.] § 101.106(a); (2) when suit
is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee,
id. § 101.106(e); or (3) when suit is filed against an
employee whose conduct was within the scope of his or her
employment and the suit could have been brought against
the governmental unit, id. § 101.106(f).
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2008)
(emphasis added).
B.
Analysis
The Employees contend that Section 101.106(e) requires dismissal of the
claims filed against them in their individual capacities. Citing City of Hempstead
v. Kmiec, the Employees contend that a claim against a person in his official
capacity is no different than a lawsuit against the governmental entity that
employed the person. See 902 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, no writ). Based on this authority, the Employees conclude that the suit
against them in their official capacity was the same as a suit against the
governmental unit (TDCJ) for the purposes of Section 101.106(e). We disagree
with the Employees because (1) the definition for ―governmental unit‖ is plainly
different than the statute‘s definition for ―employee,‖ (2) the statute as a whole
treats claims against employees in their ―official capacity‖ as different from claims
against the ―governmental unit,‖ (3) the consequences of the construction
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suggested by TDCJ is contrary to the plain language of the statute, and (4) the
Legislative intent for Section 101.106(e) was for the governmental unit, and not for
an individual employee, to move for dismissal of a lawsuit against the employee to
which the unit is a party.
1. The Plain Meaning of the Text
Under the plain meaning of the statute, a governmental ―employee‖ is
different from a ―governmental unit.‖ The definition of ―governmental unit‖ does
not include employees sued in their official capacity; rather, it refers to certain
governmental entities. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001 (3).
The definition of ―employee‖ applicable to the section broadly includes all people
who are employees, without separating whether they are sued in their individual or
official capacities. See id. § 101.001(2). Subsection (e)‘s references to suits filed
against both an ―employee‖ and a ―governmental unit,‖ therefore, requires
dismissal of the suit against the employee, the person, when a suit is filed against
the governmental unit, an entity. See id. §§ 101.001(2)–(3), 101.106(e).
In its motion for rehearing, the Employees assert that by expressly including
―state agencies‖ in its definition of ―governmental unit,‖ ―it must be presumed that
the legislature included employees of state agencies sued in their official capacities
within the definition.‖ The plainly worded definition of ―governmental unit,‖
however, refers only to a government entity, such as a state agency, but it does not
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include employees in its definition. See id. § 101.001(3). Additionally, the Code,
in that same section, provides a specific definition for ―employee,‖ separately from
―governmental unit.‖ See id. § 101.001(2). Because the Legislature has provided
definitions for the words it uses in its statute, we should give effect to the
Legislature‘s intent as expressed by the language of the statute. See Hernandez,
289 S.W.3d at 318 (calling for examination of precise definition of terms).
2. The Statute as a Whole
The statute as a whole shows that the Legislature clearly differentiated
between the term ―employee of a governmental unit‖ and the term ―governmental
unit.‖ See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b) (Vernon 2005).
Furthermore, the statute as a whole shows that the Legislature clearly differentiated
between a claim ―against the employee in the employee‘s official capacity only‖
and a claim that is one ―naming the governmental unit as defendant.‖ Id. at §
101.106(f). Because the statute as a whole refers to a claim against an employee in
his ―official capacity‖ as something different from a claim against a ―governmental
unit as defendant,‖ we conclude the precise definition for ―governmental unit‖ was
not intended to include employees sued in their official capacity. See Downs, 81
S.W.3d at 805 (calling for examination of statute as whole).
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3. The Consequences of the Interpretation
The Employees contend that when an employee is sued in an official
capacity, governmental immunity is extended to an employee in his official
capacity just as it would to the governmental unit. See City of Hempstead, 902
S.W.2d at 122 (―If the City was not liable because of governmental immunity,
neither was the Chief when sued in his official capacity.‖). The Employees,
therefore, assert that when the Legislature used the term ―governmental unit‖ in
Section 101.106(e), it intended to include lawsuits against employees that are
against them in their ―official capacity.‖
But the consequences of interpreting Section 101.106(e) in the manner
suggested by the Employees would lead to a result contrary to the express language
in the statute. Under Section 101.106(e), the governmental unit, which is a party to
the lawsuit, may file a motion that dismisses the employees from the suit. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(e) (Vernon 2005). The Employees
suggest that we read the statute to say that an employee sued in his ―official
capacity‖ may file a motion that dismisses all the claims filed against him, other
than those claims that are filed against him in his official capacity.
Section
101.106(e), however, does not separately discuss the treatment of lawsuits against
the employee in his ―official capacity‖ from other types of lawsuits filed against
him.
See id.; compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f).
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Furthermore, section 101.106(e) states that the ―governmental unit‖ may file a
motion to dismiss the employees when a suit has been filed against it. See id. But
here no suit has been filed against TDCJ and it is not a party to this lawsuit. The
construction suggested by the Employees would lead to the consequence that the
express terms of the statute be compromised in a way inconsistent with its plain
meaning. See TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 311.023(1), (5) (Vernon 2005).
4. The Legislative Intent
In their motion for rehearing, the Employees contend our ruling would
permit a plaintiff to attempt to impose liability on both TDCJ through the official
capacity claims and on the individual defendants through the individual capacity
claims, which is what Section 101.106(e) was designed to prevent. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(e) (Vernon 2005). We disagree that Section
101.106(e) was the section designed to address that situation. As we have noted
above, Section 101.106(e) refers only to dismissal of employees on the motion of
the governmental unit that is a party to the lawsuit; it does not allow a nonparty
governmental unit, as here with TDCJ, or an individual employee to seek the
dismissal of the lawsuit. See id.
In its motion for rehearing, the Employees contend that we should construe
Section 101.106(e) as applying to official capacity claims for intentional torts
because we have held that the Section 101.106(f) does not include official capacity
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claims for intentional torts.
Compare Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 253
S.W.3d at 659 (interpreting Section 101.106(e) and stating, ―Because the Tort
Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common-law recovery against the
government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued
alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be ‗under [the Tort Claims
Act]‘ for purposes of section 101.106‖) with Williams v. Nealon, 199 S.W.3d 462,
466 (Tex. App.—Houston[1st Dist.] 2006) (holding Section 101.106(f) cannot be
used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims
because those claims ―could not have been brought under the Texas Tort Claims
Act‖); see also Menefee v. Medlen, No. 02-09-00440-CV, 2010 WL 2555643, *5
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 24, 2010, no pet. h.) (noting that court of appeals are
split regarding whether the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of ―under this chapter‖
in subsection (e) applies to subsection (f)). Whether Section 101.106(f) provides a
vehicle for dismissal of common law intentional tort claims is not pertinent to our
resolution of this appeal because, regardless whether it does, the precise terms of
Section 101.106(e) apply only when a ―governmental unit‖ is included in the
lawsuit.
Because the suit in the present case was not brought against both a
governmental unit and its employees, the trial court properly denied the Section
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101.106(e) motion to dismiss filed by the governmental unit. See id. § 101.106(e).
We overrule the Employees‘ sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court‘s denial of the motion to dismiss.
Elsa Alcala
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Alcala, and Massengale.
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