NICOLASA PATLAN, Appellant v. ABILIO R. BENITEZ, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed August 23, 2011.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-10-00996-CV
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NICOLASA PATLAN, Appellant
V.
ABILIO R. BENITEZ, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 302nd District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 09-06958-U
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Myers
        Nicolasa Patlan appeals from the divorce decree terminating her marriage to Abilio R. Benitez. Patlan brings two issues on appeal asserting (1) the trial court erred in determining a house was the separate property of both parties and owned by them as tenants in common; and (2) the trial court erred in not awarding Patlan her attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
        In early 2002, Patlan and Benitez were not married. Patlan received a check for about $104,000 in settlement of a medical-malpractice action from the death of her daughter. Benitez was not the child's father. On April 2, 2002, Patlan opened a bank account in her and Benitez's names and deposited the funds. Patlan testified Benitez told her to include his name on the account so that if anything happened to her, he “could be in charge of” Patlan's other children. Patlan stated none of the money belonged to Benitez.
        On May 23, 2002, the parties purchased a house for $52,218.43 using only the funds in the bank account. The deed listed both Patlan and Benitez as grantees. Patlan testified Benitez told her to include his name on the deed so that if something were to happen to her, he could sell the house for her daughters or transfer it to them when they came of age. She testified she never intended to make Benitez an owner of the house. After they purchased the house, Benitez made some improvements-changing the flooring from carpet to tile and repairing the roof over the deck-using the funds in the bank account.
        The parties married in August 2002. They separated in July 2008 after Benitez was arrested for domestic violence toward Patlan. Patlan testified Benitez told her that if she would drop the charges, he would agree to a divorce and not fight her for title to the house. Patlan dropped the charges and then filed her petition for divorce. Benitez, however, asserted an interest in the house. Patlan then amended her petition to ask the trial court to determine she was the sole owner of the property. Patlan requested that the trial court “grant her hundred percent of the property and have Respondent's [Benitez's] name removed from the property title.”
        Benitez testified that he did not force Patlan to open the bank account in both their names. He also testified that Patlan insisted on including him in the deed and that he told her to put it in someone else's name. He denied telling Patlan that she should include his name on the deed. Benitez testified that he did not remember whether he contributed any of the money in the bank account that went towards the purchase price of the house. When asked why he believed the house belonged to him, Benitez answered, “Well, we were a family, and I made improvements to the house. . . . I think it is fair.” When asked if he was seeking reimbursement for improvements to the house, Benitez stated, “No. I'm just fighting for what's fair. I'm not fighting for anything more.” When asked if his testimony was that Patlan intended to give him fifty percent of the house, Benitez stated, “No, sir. That's not what it was.”
        The parties waived a jury and tried the issue of ownership of the house to the court. The trial court found that the house was the separate property of the parties as tenants in common. The court also ordered that the parties were each responsible for their own attorney's fees and court costs as part of the equitable division of the parties' estate.
        After the trial court signed the final judgment, Patlan filed a motion for reconsideration asserting the trial court should have concluded the evidence established the existence of a resulting trust and that Patlan was the equitable owner of the entire tract. Patlan also asserted the trial court should have awarded her attorney's fees and court costs in the case. The trial court denied the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
        In her first issue, Patlan contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to reconsider, which argued that the purchase of the property with Patlan's separate funds and with Patlan and Benitez listed as co-grantees created a resulting trust with equitable title vested in Patlan. In her brief, Patlan asks that she be awarded equitable title to the property. Because Patlan's motion to reconsider is the functional equivalent of a motion for new trial, we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. See Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009); James v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 310 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. See In re Cerberus Capital Mgm't, L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding).         Patlan did not request, and the trial court did not file, findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.711 (West 2006); Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. Where a record contains no findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is implied that the trial court made all necessary findings of fact to support the judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Burns v. Burns, 116 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The judgment will be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Weisfield v. Tex. Land. Fin. Co., 162 S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). “When the appellate record includes the reporter's and clerk's records, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate appellate court.” BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). We review the entire record to determine if the trial court's implied findings are supported by any evidence. In re S.M.D., 329 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, pet. dism'd). Although “implied findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency, we do not determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding without such a challenge.” Fleming v. Patterson, 310 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010, pet. stricken) (quoting In re W.J.B., 294 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795); Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court's judgment absent properly assigned error.”)).
        The judge's comments made at the conclusion of a bench trial are not a substitute for findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
RESULTING TRUST
        A resulting trust is an equitable remedy arising by operation of law when title is conveyed to one person but the purchase price or a portion thereof is paid by another. Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904, 912 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2009, no pet.). The parties are presumed to have intended that the grantee hold title for the use of the person who paid the purchase price and whom equity deems to be the true owner. Cohrs, 338 S.W.2d at 130; Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). The trust arises out of the transaction and must arise at the time when the title passes. Cohrs, 338 S.W.2d at 130; Smith, 285 S.W.3d at 912. The trustee of a resulting trust generally is responsible only for conveying the property to the beneficiary (that is, the person paying the purchase price) or in accordance with his directions. Nolana Dev. Ass'n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984); Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 298. The doctrine of resulting trusts is invoked to prevent unjust enrichment. Nolana Dev. Ass'n, 682 S.W.2d at 250.
        There are exceptions to this doctrine. When the grantee under the deed is the wife, child, or other natural object of bounty of the payor of the purchase price, no resulting trust arises because it is presumed that a gift was intended. Somer v. Bogart, 749 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied), (quoting Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 442 (1959)); Bell v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). In that situation, the party seeking to establish the resulting trust must prove by clear and convincing evidence that no gift was intended. Bogart v. Somer, 762 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). In other situations, the presumption of a resulting trust may be rebutted by evidence showing the payor intended a gift of the equitable title to the grantee. See State v. City of Tyler, 407 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v. Pearce, 205 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). Generally, the law is suspicious of resulting trusts, and consequently a heavy burden of proof is placed on the party attempting to establish the existence of one. Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 298.         In this case, the trial court may have impliedly found that Patlan made a gift to appellant of partial equitable title to the property when she included his name as a grantee on the deed, which would rebut the presumption of a resulting trust. Patlan did not challenge that implied finding on appeal. Patlan does not assert on appeal that there was no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to support a finding of gift of partial equitable title to appellee. Patlan has not challenged the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied finding, and she has failed in her burden to show that no legal theory supported the trial court's judgment.
        Because Patlan has not challenged on appeal the implied finding supporting the trial court's judgment, we conclude she has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to reconsider. We overrule Patlan's first issue.   See Footnote 1 
ATTORNEY'S FEES
        In her second issue, Patlan contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for attorney's fees and court costs. As part of the equitable division of the parties' estate, the trial court ordered that each party was responsible for its own attorney's fees and costs. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2006) (“In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.”); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). In her motion for reconsideration, Patlan asserted she was entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs in this case, stating, “Because a resulting trust should be imposed in favor of Ms. Patlan, the Court should also award her attorneys' fees and court costs.” In her appellant's brief, Patlan states she “believes that the trial court erred in denying her request in regards to the property, and she also believes that the court erred in refusing to consider her request for attorney's fees and court costs.” Thus, Patlan's request for attorney's fees is premised on her being entitled to a resulting trust. Because we have determined Patlan failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a resulting trust, we conclude Patlan is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs. Moreover, Patlan fails to explain how the denial of her request for attorney's fees and costs made the trial court's division of the parties' estate inequitable or not “just and right.” We overrule Patlan's second issue.
CONCLUSION
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          LANA MYERS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
 
 
O'Neill, J. concurring without an opinion
 
 
100996F.P05
 
Footnote 1 In reaching this decision, we make no holding that a resulting trust could arise under these facts.